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influenza A virus
Influenza A virus is a member of the Orthomyxoviridae family. The influenza A vi-
ruses are classified on the basis of antigenic properties of the glycoproteins hemag-
glutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) into 17 HA subtypes (H1-H17) and 10 NA sub-
types (N1-N10) [1-3]. These different subtypes of HA and NA are used in influenza A 
virus nomenclature, to discriminate viruses based on the surface glycoproteins (e.g. 
H5N1, H3N2). All subtypes with the exception of H17N10 circulate in wild birds, 
which are considered their natural reservoir [4]. The H17N10 subtype has recently 
been isolated from bats, raising the possibility that birds are not the exclusive influ-
enza virus reservoir. 
Influenza A virus is a single-stranded negative-sense segmented RNA virus, with a 
genome consisting of eight gene segments, that can encode up to 16 proteins [5-9] 
(Fig 1a). Influenza A virus particles are enveloped with sizes ranging from 80 to 120 
nm. The HA glycoprotein is composed of two subunits, the globular surface subunit 
HA1 and the stalk-like transmembrane subunit HA2. The HA protein of influenza 
A viruses is initially synthesized as a single polypeptide precursor (HA0), which is 
cleaved into HA1 and HA2 subunits by cellular proteases [10]. The sequence of the 
cleavage site determines by which cellular proteases HA0 can be cleaved. Cleavage 
of HA by cellular proteases is a crucial step in the replication cycle; virus particles 
with uncleaved HAs are not infectious. In the initial stage of virus replication, the HA 
glycoprotein binds to specific sialic acid (SA) receptors on the surface of susceptible 
cells (Fig 1b). Human influenza viruses preferentially bind to α2,6-linked SA recep-
tors which are mainly expressed on epithelial cells in the human upper respiratory 
tract (URT), whereas avian influenza viruses bind to α2,3-linked SA receptors, which 
are abundantly present on epithelial cells in the intestine of birds and in the lower 
respiratory tract (LRT) of humans [11-14]. After binding to these SA receptors, virus 
particles enter the cell through receptor-mediated endocytosis. Subsequently, the 
increasingly acidic pH in the endosome triggers a conformational change in HA2, 
which exposes the fusion peptide that mediates fusion of the viral membrane with 
the endosomal membrane. The viral ribonucleoproteins (vRNPs), which consist of 
the viral RNA (vRNA), the polymerase complex and the nucleocapsid protein (NP) 
(Fig 1c), are subsequently released into the host cell cytoplasm. The RNA-depend-
ent RNA polymerase complex consists of three polymerase subunits; polymerase 
basic protein 1 (PB1), polymerase basic protein 2 (PB2), and polymerase acidic pro-
tein (PA). The vRNPs are then transported to the nucleus where the viral RNA-de-
pendent RNA polymerase transcribes and replicates the negative sense vRNA. The 
newly transcribed messenger RNAs (mRNAs) are transported to the cytoplasm for 
translation after which the viral proteins required for transcription and replication 
are translocated back to the nucleus. Newly synthesized vRNPs are transported to 
the cytoplasm by the nuclear export protein (NEP) and the matrix protein (M1). 
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Assembly of new virions takes place at the plasma membrane, a process known 
as budding. The NA protein of influenza A viruses has sialidase activity and subse-
quently cleaves SA off the cellular surface receptors, resulting in the release of virus 
progeny from infected cells. 
The influenza virus genome encodes additional proteins that are either not directly 
involved in virus replication or for which the function has not yet been elucidated. 
Figure 1. Influenza A virus particle and replication cycle
A) Schematic representation of influenza A particle and gene segments. The influenza genome consists of 
eight single-stranded RNAs. The non-structural proteins and/or newly identified proteins with unknown func-
tion are depicted in rectangles. B) Schematic representation of an influenza A virus replication cycle. Several 
influenza A proteins have been shown to be important determinants of virulence. These viral proteins are 
indicated and discussed in the main text. C) Schematic illustration of the vRNP structure. The viral RNA is 
wrapped around NP, and this structure is bound to the polymerase complex (PB2, PB1 and PA).
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The polymerase subunit PB1 can encode two more proteins. The PB1-F2 protein, 
that is encoded by the +1 alternate open reading frame of the PB1 gene, is present 
in most human and avian influenza viruses, and contributes to the virulence in a 
host- and strain-dependent manner [15]. PB1 N40 is a truncated version of PB1 that 
lacks transcriptase function but nevertheless interacts with PB2 and the polymer-
ase complex in the cellular environment [7]. Similarly, the influenza virus PA gene 
contains a second open reading frame that is accessed via ribosomal frameshift-
ing. This newly identified protein; PA-X, is a fusion protein that incorporates the 
N-terminal endonuclease domain of the PA protein with a short C-terminal domain 
and modulates the host response to infection by repressing cellular gene expression 
[8]. The NS1 protein functions as an antagonist to block the type 1 interferon (IFN) 
mediated host antiviral response [16,17]. M42 has only been discovered recently 
and encodes a novel M2-like protein with a variant extracellular domain. M42 can 
compensate for the loss of M2 in tissue culture cells and animals [6]. Currently, the 
identification of novel influenza virus proteins is receiving considerable interest and 
influenza segment PA has now been shown to encode as many as four proteins. Two 
recently identified PA-related proteins are translated from the eleventh and thir-
teenth in-frame AUG start codons in PA; PA-N155 and PA-N182 [9]. These proteins 
do not have polymerase activity, however, when viruses lacking the N-truncated 
PAs were investigated in mice, they demonstrated lower pathogenicity than the 
wildtype virus.
influenza epidemics and pandemics
Influenza A viruses are the cause of recurrent epidemics and occasional pandemics. 
The annual epidemics result in about three to five million cases of severe illness, 
and about 250000 to 500000 deaths worldwide [18]. Infection with influenza A vi-
rus results in protective immunity against the viral surface glycoproteins HA and NA. 
However, the accumulation of point mutations in HA and to a lesser extent NA, al-
lows the virus to escape the host immunity. This phenomenon, known as antigenic 
drift, explains the occurrence of seasonal influenza epidemics. As a result of this 
antigenic drift, the vaccine composition has to be updated almost annually [19]. 
Antigenic shift refers to a major change to produce a new influenza A virus subtype 
in humans that was not currently circulating among people. Antigenic shift can be 
caused by direct introduction of an influenza A virus from the animal reservoir via 
interspecies transmission or by reassortment, i.e. the mixing of genes from two (or 
more) influenza A viruses, between animal and human influenza A viruses. While 
influenza viruses are continuously changing by antigenic drift, antigenic shift hap-
pens only occasionally. 
Influenza viruses with pandemic potential may arise in pigs upon reassortment [20], 
as pig cells express both human and avian influenza receptors, therewith providing 
an opportunity for replication of avian and human influenza viruses in the same cell 
[21]. In the human population, co-infections with different influenza strains have 
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result of reassortment between contemporary circulating H1N1 and H3N2 viruses. 
Fortunately, this virus did not persist in the human population [25,26]. Reassort-
ment is also an important factor to increase genetic variation of influenza viruses as 
multiple reassortment events have been shown to occur between different lineages 
of the H3N2 virus [27,28].
In the last century, four human influenza A virus pandemics have emerged, at least 
three of which resulted from reassortment of human and animal influenza A viruses 
[29-31] (Fig 2).
Spanish H1N1 pandemic
The ‘Spanish’ influenza H1N1 pandemic of 1918 is known as the deadliest single 
event recorded in human history, killing approximately as many as 50 million peo-
ple worldwide [29]. The mortality rates were unusually high among young adults, a 
phenomenon which remains poorly understood to this day. Although its origin has 
not been fully resolved [29,32], the avian influenza virus-like genome of the 1918 
pandemic H1N1 virus suggests that it evolved from an avian virus around 1910, 
with or without adaptation in an intermediate host [33]. Reverse genetics allowed 
the reconstruction of the 1918 pandemic H1N1 virus [34] and its pathogenesis was 
studied in mice, ferrets and non-human primates. The 1918 pandemic H1N1 virus 
caused efficient viral infection and disease in mice without prior adaptation, which 
is uncommon for human influenza viruses, and elicited an aberrant innate immune 
response [35]. In non-human primates this unusual innate immune response was 
also demonstrated [36]. There is no obvious single virulence factor in the 1918 pan-
demic H1N1 virus. However, HA, NS1, PB1-F2 and the polymerase complex proteins 
are known to play an important role in its pathogenesis [37-43] (see paragraph on 
virulence factors). 
Asian H2N2 pandemic
The ‘Asian’ pandemic H2N2 virus of 1957 was responsible for approximately 2 mil-
lion deaths globally [44]. This H2N2 virus affected predominantly very young and 
very old individuals. The H2N2 virus emerged after the introduction of a novel sub-
type in humans through reassortment between human and avian influenza viruses. 
The HA, NA and PB1 genes originated from an avian H2N2 virus and the remaining 
gene segments from the H1N1 virus that circulated prior to 1957 [30,45]. 
Hong Kong H3N2 pandemic
In 1968, the circulating H2N2 virus was replaced by the ‘Hong Kong’ H3N2 virus, 
which has continued to circulate in humans to date. The pandemic in 1968 killed an 
estimated one million people worldwide [44]. The pandemic H3N2 virus was also 
the result of reassortment between avian and human influenza viruses, this time 
the HA and PB1 segments of H2N2 were replaced by those of an avian H3 virus 
[30,45]. This pandemic was mild compared to the earlier pandemics, possibly as a 
result of prior-immunity in the human population against the N2 subtype.
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Re-emergence of H1N1
In 1977, an influenza outbreak was detected that affected predominantly young 
adults. This outbreak was caused by the reintroduction of an H1N1 virus also known 
as the ‘Russian’ H1N1 virus. This virus was genetically very similar to viruses circulat-
ing in the early 1950s and lacked years of genetic evolution. This suggests that the 
1977 H1N1 virus was accidentally released from a laboratory [46]. The reintroduced 
H1N1 virus did not replace the circulating H3N2 virus and subsequently these sub-
types co-circulated in humans until the ‘Russian’ H1N1 virus was replaced in 2009 
by the pandemic H1N1 influenza virus [47].
H1N1 pandemic
The H1N1 virus (pH1N1) caused the first influenza pandemic in this century and con-
tinues to be detected worldwide [47,48]. In spring 2009, pH1N1 emerged in Mexico, 
after which it spread around the world in only a few months. In terms of mortality, 
the pH1N1 virus was relatively mild and preferentially affected young adults. People 
“Spanish” influenza 1918     ”Asian” influenza 1957 “Hong Kong” influenza 1968  “Mexican” influenza 2009
    H1N1   H2N2   H3N2         H1N1
Figure 2. Reassortment and adaptation events of pandemic influenza A viruses 
For the 1918 H1N1 “Spanish influenza” pandemic, evidence for two mutually exclusive scenarios 
has been presented: the gradual adaptation of avian genes to the human host and a reassortment 
event between avian and mammalian viruses. After 1918, the same H1N1 virus caused seasonal 
epidemics until 1957, when the H2N2 virus emerged upon reassortment between the seasonal 
H1N1 and an avian H2N2 virus, introducing the avian HA, NA, and PB1 genes. This H2N2 virus cir-
culated in humans until 1968, when reassortment of the H2N2 with an avian H3 virus resulted in 
exchange of the H3 HA and PB1 genes to yield a new pandemic virus of subtype H3N2. The 2009 
H1N1 pandemic virus included the NA and M genes of the Eurasian swine lineage, and the other 
genes of a “triple reassortant” swine influenza virus that had previously acquired its genes upon 
reassortment between human, avian, and (classical) swine viruses. Grey colour in virus particles 
indicates uncertainty of viral gene segment origin or lack of data. Dotted arrows indicate uncertain 
scenarios and solid arrows indicate events that are supported by scientific evidence. Dashed arrows 
represent pandemic viruses circulating in subsequent influenza seasons.
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of cross-reactive antibodies to the pH1N1 virus as this virus was antigenically similar 
to H1N1 viruses circulating before 1957 [49]. 
The pH1N1 virus is a reassortant virus that contains the NA and M genes from the 
Eurasian swine influenza virus lineage, while other genes originate from a ‘triple re-
assortant’ swine influenza virus that had previously acquired its gene constellation 
upon reassortment between human, avian, and (classical) swine influenza viruses 
[50]. The fact that the pH1N1 virus emerged after reassortment in swine, supports 
the hypothesis that swine can serve as a mixing vessel for the generation of new 
human influenza viruses [20]. 
Since the start of the H1N1 pandemic there have been concerns that the virus may 
mutate or reassort with contemporary influenza viruses and give rise to a more 
pathogenic virus. Especially since the pH1N1 virus does not contain any of the 
known virulence factors (further information on virulence factors p. 6) and retained 
some host-range markers typical for avian influenza viruses [31]. However, the in-
troduction of several known virulence factors in pH1N1 by reverse genetics did not 
affect its virulence in animal models [51-53]. In humans, the only reported mutation 
associated with increased virulence is D222G in HA, which was related to fatal and 
severe cases of infection [54-57]. 
Pandemic threats
Historically, influenza viruses of three HA subtypes (H1, H2 and H3) have acquired 
the ability to be transmitted efficiently between humans. To date, influenza viruses 
of the H1 and H3 subtype co-circulate in humans, however influenza viruses of the 
H2, H5, H6, H7 and H9 subtype are also considered to have pandemic potential.
In 1997, a large outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus 
in poultry in Hong Kong resulted in the first documented cases of direct transmis-
sion of HPAI H5N1 virus from poultry to humans, with a fatal outcome in 6 out 
of 18 cases [58]. As a result, this outbreak warranted the mass culling of 1.5 mil-
lion chickens. HPAI H5N1 viruses have spread throughout Asia, Europe and Africa 
since, causing severe disease outbreaks in poultry. Furthermore, HPAI H5N1 viruses 
have been isolated from mammals on numerous occasions. Since 2003, over 600 
cases of human HPAI H5N1 infections have been reported, more than half of which 
were fatal [59]. Although rare cases of H5N1 virus transmission between humans 
have been reported, sustained human-to-human transmission of HPAI H5N1 virus 
has not been detected yet [60-62]. It is this absence of efficient human-to-human 
transmission that has prevented an H5N1 pandemic to occur. With the sporadic in-
troduction of HPAI H5N1 virus in the human population, it is feared that these avian 
H5N1 viruses may mutate or reassort with contemporary human influenza viruses, 
possibly resulting in adaptation to humans. Fortunately, at present, reassortment of 
HPAI H5 virus with contemporary human influenza viruses has not been detected in 
nature. However, co-infections of avian and human influenza viruses in humans or 
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pigs may provide new opportunities for reassortment [63-65]. Due to the enzootic 
nature of HPAI H5N1, the large host reservoir (over 20 different mammalian species 
[66]) and the accumulation of mammalian adaptation mutations, this virus is cur-
rently considered to be the largest pandemic threat to humans. 
Several outbreaks of HPAI H7 viruses in poultry have resulted in transmission to hu-
mans. In 2003, a large outbreak of an HPAI H7N7 virus in poultry in the Netherlands 
resulted in 89 cases of human infections, one of which was fatal [67,68]. HPAI H7N7 
virus displayed an unusual tissue tropism; the virus targeted the conjunctiva, result-
ing in conjunctivitis, a symptom rarely reported for other influenza virus subtypes 
[69]. Recently, a novel H7N9 virus emerged in China, which is responsible for 108 
confirmed human cases that resulted in death of 22 cases up to now [70]. Influenza 
viruses of the H7 subtype have the ability to infect humans, which underlines its 
pandemic potential. 
Since the mid-1990's, H9N2 viruses have become endemic in poultry populations 
throughout Eurasia. The first human case of infection with an avian H9N2 virus was 
documented in 1999 in Hong Kong [71] and sporadically human infections have 
been described since [72]. Furthermore, this subtype has been isolated from pigs 
and numerous reassortment events between H9N2 virus and other influenza virus 
subtypes (i.e. H5N1 and H6N2) [65,73] have been reported. H9N2 viruses with ei-
ther avian and human or human receptor specificity [74] are now prevalent in many 
Eurasian countries, thereby increasing the possibility of this virus to infect humans.
Human infections with H6 viruses have not been reported, however, some H6 virus-
es were found to replicate in mice and ferrets without prior adaptation [75]. In ad-
dition, given the high prevalence and frequent reassortment of H6 viruses in birds, 
concerns have risen about the possible emergence of a pandemic H6 virus [76,77].
Influenza viruses of the H2 subtype have not circulated in humans since 1968 and 
therefore a large proportion of the current world population is likely to be suscep-
tible for infection with H2 viruses if they would re-emerge. As H2 viruses continue 
to circulate in swine and several avian species [78-81], they remain a potential pan-
demic threat. 
The pH1N1 virus in 2009 illustrated that a new pandemic does not necessarily re-
quire the introduction of a virus with an HA subtype that is new to the human 
population. A novel influenza A (H3N2) variant virus (H3N2v) containing seven gene 
segments of swine influenza origin and the pH1N1 M segment was isolated from 
12 humans in 2011 [82-84]. Although there is a low level of cross-reactive antibod-
ies with a human H3N2 virus that circulated in the 1990’s [85,86], the H3N2v is 
antigenically different from the currently circulating seasonal H3N2 viruses and can 
thus potentially infect a large proportion of the human population. 
With the continuous pandemic threat of avian influenza A viruses of different sub-
types, bird surveillance is essential to allow the early detection of influenza viruses 
with pandemic potential. Moreover, after the pH1N1 virus introduction from swine, 
surveillance studies in swine populations were expanded. Such surveillance studies 
are crucial for preparedness.
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HA
Amino acid substitutions in HA that affect the receptor binding preference can influ-
ence the cellular host range and tissue tropism which may alter virulence. Specific 
amino acid residues in HA regulate the receptor binding specificity of human and 
avian influenza viruses and, these specific residues differ among subtypes. Binding 
patterns of pandemic influenza A viruses of the H1 subtype are modulated by amino 
acids at position 190 and 225 in HA (H3 numbering) [87,88]. For influenza viruses of 
the H2 and H3 subtypes, positions 226 and 228 are important for receptor binding 
specificity [89]. Since the HA proteins of the 1918, 1957, and 1968 pandemic strains 
were derived from avian influenza viruses, adaptation of avian HA proteins to the 
human receptor is considered to be a prerequisite for efficient human-to-human 
transmission [89]. Numerous studies have described amino acid substitutions in HA 
of HPAI H5N1 viruses that change and/or increase binding to human α2,6-linked SA 
receptors that are present in the human URT [90-93]. The majority of these amino 
acid substitutions are located in or near the receptor binding site of HA. However, 
a potential N-glycosylation motif at amino acid position 154–156 of HA, which is 
proximal but not immediately adjacent to the receptor-binding site, may also affect 
binding preference and virulence [94,95].
One of the best-known virulence determinants of HPAI viruses is the multi basic 
cleavage site (MBCS) in HA. The sequence of this cleavage site determines by which 
cellular proteases HA0 is cleaved and consequently determines viral tropism and 
virulence (Fig 3). The HA of low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses and hu-
man influenza viruses harbors a monobasic cleavage site that is cleaved by trypsin-
like proteases. These trypsin-like proteases are only present in the respiratory tract 
of humans and the respiratory and/or intestinal tract of birds, thereby restricting 
Figure 3. Cleavage site as an important virulence factor
The HA0 is cleaved into two subunits HA1 and HA2 by cellular proteases which recognize either a mono basic 
or multi basic cleavage site. HA0 of LPAI viruses, which harbor a mono basic cleavage site, are cleaved by 
trypsin-like proteases only, limiting replication of these viruses to sites where these enzymes are expressed; 
i.e. respiratory and intestinal tract. The HA0 of HPAI viruses of the H5 and H7 subtype can be cleaved by 
ubiquitously expressed furin-like proteases, facilitating systemic replication in chickens.
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virus replication in these tissues [96]. Cleavage of the human influenza virus HA is 
thought to occur by trypsin-like serine proteases of the type II transmembrane ser-
ine protease (TTSP) family that are present at the plasma membrane, or by extracel-
lular proteases present in the respiratory tract [10].
Influenza viruses of the H5 and H7 subtype may become highly pathogenic after 
circulation in poultry. The switch from a low pathogenic to a high pathogenic phe-
notype of these H5 and H7 influenza viruses is caused by the introduction of basic 
amino acid residues into the HA0 cleavage site by insertion or recombination [97-
99]. This HA0 can subsequently be cleaved by ubiquitously expressed pro-protein 
convertases of the subtilisin family, like furin or PC5/6, thereby facilitating systemic 
replication in chickens [10,100,101].
In mammals, the association between the presence of an MBCS and systemic spread 
is less obvious. The presence of a MBCS in H5 HA does not always induce systemic 
spread in mammals since the inoculation of cynomolgus macaques with HPAI H5N1 
resulted in respiratory infection only [102]. However, in mice, deletion of the MBCS 
of an HPAI H5N1 virus results in a virus that only causes respiratory tract infection in 
contrast to the systemic spread of the wildtype HPAI H5N1 virus, indicating that the 
MBCS is a major virulence factor in mice [103]. 
Polymerase proteins
The influenza virus polymerase proteins, and in particular PB2, have been shown 
to be important determinants of virulence. Amino acid substitution lysine (K) to 
glutamic acid (E) at position 627 in PB2 has been studied extensively in the context 
of mammalian adaptation [104]. This substitution is suggested to occur in order 
to adapt to physiological constraints, e.g. differences in body temperature. Most 
avian influenza A viruses, which preferentially replicate at a relatively high tem-
perature of around 41 degrees Celsius in the digestive tract of birds, have a E resi-
due at position 627. In contrast, human influenza A viruses replicate at the lower 
temperature of around 33 degrees Celsius, which is the temperature in the human 
URT. These viruses typically have a K residue at this position. The E627K substitu-
tion was acquired rapidly when avian viruses were experimentally passaged in mice 
[105,106]. Moreover, this mutation has been correlated with increased virulence of 
human HPAI H5N1 virus isolates and was found in a fatal human case of infection 
with HPAI H7N7 [95,103]. In the absence of the E627K mutation, an aspartate (D) 
to asparagine (N) substitution at position 701 of H5N1 PB2 was found to increase 
virulence and to expand the host range of avian H5N1 virus to mice and humans 
[105,107,108]. The adaptive mutation D701N induces enhancement of binding of 
PB2 to importin alpha1 in mammalian cells resulting in increased transport of PB2 
into the nucleus [109]. Noteworthy, unlike other human influenza viruses, pH1N1 
does not contain the mammalian adaptation residues 627K and/or 701N. When the 
mammalian adaptation substitutions E627K or D701N were introduced in pH1N1, 
no increase in virulence was observed [51]. However, the absence of these mam-
malian adaptation markers in PB2 have been compensated to some extent by a 
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protein's interaction with viral and/or cellular factors and hence its ability to sup-
port virus replication in mammals [110,111]. Besides the extensively studied adap-
tion mutations, E627K and D701N, a mutation close to the cap-binding region of 
PB2, T271A, may also enhance viral polymerase activity in mammalian cells [112].
During several adaptation experiments in mice, substitutions in PA have been iden-
tified that contribute to increased polymerase activity and virulence [113-117]. Fur-
thermore, the substitution of an avian PA by that of pH1N1, has also been identified 
as a potential mechanism to increase viral replication and to potentially cross the 
species barrier [118]. In addition, mutations in PB1 and NP have also been impli-
cated as determinants of virulence [109,119].
PB1-F2
PB1-F2 contributes to the virulence of influenza A viruses by inducing apoptosis of 
infected cells [15]. Moreover, PB1-F2 promotes and increases severity of secondary 
pneumonia [40]. The PB1-F2 protein was demonstrated to contribute to the viru-
lence of HPAI H5N1 and the 1918 H1N1, 1957 H2N2, 1968 H3N2 pandemic strains 
[37,120,121]. In particular, an N to S substitution at position 66 (N66S) of HPAI H5N1 
and 1918 pandemic influenza PB1-F2, is partly responsible for the high virulence of 
these viruses [37]. The PB1-F2 N66S variant reduces the production of IFN, which is 
part of the innate immune response [122]. In contrast to previous pandemic influ-
enza viruses, pH1N1 does not encode a PB1-F2, because of three premature stop 
codons. Surprisingly, when the pH1N1 PB1-F2’s coding capacity was restored, the 
virulence was only modestly affected in mice and ferrets [53,123].
PA-X
The PA gene encodes a newly identified protein PA-X [8]. This protein modulates 
the host response by repressing cellular gene expression, i.e. host-cell shut off. PA-X 
deficient influenza viruses cause more severe disease in mice, as a result of an ac-
celerated host response. Moreover, influenza viruses lacking PA-X differ in host-cell 
shutoff compared to wildtype virus. A truncation of PA-X protein appears to be as-
sociated with influenza virus lineages circulating in particular hosts, indicating that 
there may be some species specificity to the evolution of PA-X [124]. 
NS1
In response to the presence of pathogens in the host, interferons (IFNs) are se-
creted by cells and ‘interfere’ with viral replication. To establish productive infec-
tion, influenza viruses have mechanisms to evade host immune responses, includ-
ing the type-I IFN response. The influenza virus NS1 protein has several ways to act 
as an IFN antagonist; (1) NS1 prevents activation of the RIG-I-dependent pathway 
by blocking recognition of influenza pathogen associated molecular patterns, (2) 
Downregulation of IFN response by blocking nuclear export of cellular mRNA and 
(3) NS1 inhibits transcription of IFN and interferon stimulated genes by blocking 
mRNA processing via interaction with the cellular 30 kDa subunit of the cleavage 
and polyadenylation specificity factor (CPSF30) [125-127]. Binding to CPSF30 is a 
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property maintained in circulating human influenza viruses [128].
NS1 has been studied extensively as a molecular determinant of virulence. Influ-
enza viruses lacking the IFN antagonist NS1 are only able to replicate in cells or 
mice that have a compromised IFN response [17,129]. H5N1 viruses, unlike other 
human, avian and swine influenza viruses, are relatively resistant to the antiviral ef-
fects of interferons which result in increased levels of pro-inflammatory cytokines 
[130-132]. This effect requires a glutamic acid (E) at amino acid position 92 of the 
NS1 molecule and allows virus replication in the presence of IFN; this mutation was 
a determinant of virulence in pigs [133]. Furthermore, a glutamic acid, instead of 
an aspartic acid, at this position increased virulence of HPAI H5N1 in mice. Similarly, 
the P42S substitution in NS1 in HPAI H5N1 resulted in increased virulence in mice 
[134]. Considering the binding of CPSF30 by H5N1 NS1 proteins, L103F and I106M 
play important roles [128].
Large-scale genome sequence analysis of avian influenza virus isolates indicated 
that four C-terminal residues of the NS1 protein form a PDZ (postsynaptic density 
protein 95, Drosophila disc large tumor suppressor, and zonula occludens 1 protein) 
ligand domain of the X-S/T-X-V type [135]. This carboxyterminal portion of NS1 has 
also been shown to influence influenza virus virulence. Pandemic 1918 H1N1 and 
H5N1 HPAI viruses contain 4 carboxyterminal amino acids encoding a PDZ ligand 
domain motif which increases virulence when introduced into a mouse-adapted 
influenza strain [136]. This demonstrates that NS1 can modulate virulence through 
different mechanisms.
pH1N1 lacks the ability to block host gene expression in both human and swine cell 
lines [137], which is partially due to mutations that block CPSF30-binding. Addition-
ally, pH1N1 has a truncated NS1 protein with a 11 amino acid deletion at its C-termi-
nus, and therefore lacks the PDZ-binding domain [31]. However, even when these 
functions are restored for pH1N1, they do not appear to have a significant effect on 
replication, virulence or transmission of pH1N1 in various animal models [52,137].
NA
Considering that HA binds to SA receptors and NA cleaves SA from cellular recep-
tors, the balance between HA and NA activity is critical for virus replication and 
transmission [138,139].
Two influenza viruses are known that have developed additional mechanisms that 
promote cleavage of HA. The NA of the neurovirulent laboratory H1N1 strain A/
WSN/33 recruits plasminogen which, when converted to plasmin, cleaves HA in the 
absence of trypsin [140]. On the other hand, the 1918 H1N1 NA gene enables the 
virus to replicate in the absence of trypsin. Additionally, this NA protein was shown 
to play a critical role in the high virulence of the 1918 pandemic H1N1 in mice [34]. 
In 2003, an outbreak of HPAI H7N7 virus in poultry in the Netherlands resulted in 
the death of one person and 89 human cases of conjunctivitis. When the sequence 
of the virus obtained from the fatal case was compared to a virus isolated from a pa-
tient with conjunctivitis, four amino acid substitutions in the NA gene were identi-
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efficient replication in mammalian cells most likely by preventing the formation of 
virus aggregates [95].
When avian influenza viruses are transmitted from wild birds to poultry, genetic 
changes as a result of adaptation to the new host frequently occur. One example of 
such a change is a deletion in the stalk region of the NA that has been reported in 
several viruses isolated from unrelated poultry outbreaks [141-143]. This shortened 
NA stalk region is frequently detected upon transmission of avian influenza virus-
es from waterfowl to domestic poultry and is associated with increased virulence 
[144,145]. It is not yet clear how this shortened NA stalk region influences viru-
lence, however, deletion in the NA stalk does not enhance the release of progeny 
viruses but probably affects an earlier step of the viral cycle.
transmission
Human-to-human transmission of influenza viruses can occur through direct con-
tact, indirect contact via fomites (contaminated environmental surfaces), and/or 
airborne transmission via small aerosols or large respiratory droplets. Efficient and 
sustained human-to-human transmission is critical for the circulation of seasonal 
and pandemic influenza viruses in the human population. Transmission has been 
studied extensively in mammalian models, in particular the ferret and guinea pig 
[146]. Ferrets are naturally susceptible to both human and avian influenza viruses 
and upon infection develop similar symptoms and pulmonary pathology as humans. 
In addition, cells of the ferret respiratory tract express predominantly α2,6-linked 
SA receptors in the URT and α2,3-linked SA receptors in the LRT similar to humans 
[147,148]. Avian influenza viruses do not transmit via the airborne route in the fer-
ret model [149,150]. Therefore, the ferret model is a valuable tool to study viral 
traits for influenza virus transmission in mammals. This is highly relevant as it is cur-
rently unclear what exactly determines transmission of influenza viruses in mam-
mals via aerosols or respiratory droplets. For this reason, the ferret model was used 
extensively to compare the transmissibility of pH1N1 with the contemporary sea-
sonal H1N1 virus, when it first emerged in humans [150]. In addition, transmission 
of the 1918 H1N1 virus was studied in ferrets. These studies showed that changes 
in the HA receptor-binding domain and PB2 were critical to initiate transmission of 
an avian-derived influenza virus [88,151]. Similar genetic changes were required for 
the Asian H2N2 virus. An early H2N2 virus (1957) failed to transmit to naïve ferrets. 
However a glutamine to leucine at position 226 in HA was sufficient to change its 
preference from avian to human receptor, subsequently resulting in transmission 
between ferrets [152]. Overall, amino acid substitutions in HA and polymerase pro-
teins can affect host range and transmission of influenza viruses [108,110,151]. 
As described above, avian influenza viruses of the H5, H7, and H9 subtypes are 
considered a potential pandemic threat. However, the requirements for a virus to 
become pandemic (i.e. transmissible between humans) are poorly understood. In 
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order to study the determinants that could lead to a pandemic virus, a avian H9N2 
virus was genetically engineered hereby potentially creating an transmissible avian 
influenza virus. An avian H9N2 virus that harbored the internal genes from a human 
H3N2 virus could be transmitted efficiently between ferrets via respiratory droplets 
after adaptation of this reassortant virus by serial passage in ferrets [153]. This indi-
cates that avian H9N2 viruses may acquire the ability to be transmitted between hu-
mans. Furthermore, this demonstrates that airborne transmission is not restricted 
to human influenza viruses of the subtype H1, H2, and H3. 
The lack of sustained airborne transmission of HPAI H5N1 virus between humans 
has been confirmed in guinea pigs and ferrets. Attempts to create airborne-trans-
missible H5 viruses by generating reassortant viruses between H5N1 and human 
influenza viruses did not result in H5 viruses that could be transmitted between 
mammals via the airborne route [92,154]. However, based on evidence from previ-
ous influenza pandemics, it has been hypothesized that a switch of receptor binding 
preference from avian α2,3-linked to human α2,6-linked SA receptors is required for 
an avian virus to become transmissible between humans. Nevertheless, changing 
the receptor binding preference alone was not sufficient to confer airborne trans-
mission of H5N1 virus, indicating that additional adaptive changes are required for 
H5N1 viruses to become transmissible [92].
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HPAI H5N1 viruses remain a scourge for the poultry industry. The high lethality and 
virulence in poultry and mammals is mainly determined by the acquisition of an 
MBCS in the HA glycoprotein. The presence of an MBCS is only observed in influ-
enza viruses of the H5 and H7 subtype. In chapter 2.1 we investigated whether an 
LPAI H6N1 virus can convert into a highly pathogenic phenotype by the introduc-
tion of an MBCS. In chapter 2.2 we determined the effect of the MBCS on virulence 
in mammals in the context of a human H3N2 virus. In chapter 2.3 the role of the 
MBCS in HPAI H5N1 virus in systemic replication in ferrets was studied. In addition, 
we describe the spread of HPAI H5N1 virus in ferrets over time, including along the 
olfactory route. 
Virus reassortment has played an important role for influenza A viruses in the gen-
eration of new strains with pandemic potential. In chapter 3.1 we used an in vitro 
selection method to generate reassortant viruses between pH1N1 and the seasonal 
H1N1 or H3N2 viruses. These viruses were tested for their replication kinetics in tis-
sue culture and pathogenicity, tissue tropism and transmissibility was investigated 
in ferrets. In chapter 3.2 we used the same in vitro selection method to produce 
reassortant viruses between HPAI H5N1 and pH1N1, seasonal H1N1 or seasonal 
H3N2 viruses. These viruses were evaluated for their replication kinetics in (pri-
mary) tissue cultures. Subsequently, a mixture of reassortants between HPAI H5N1 
and pH1N1 was tested in the ferret transmission model to screen for reassortants 
that might have gained the ability to be transmitted via the airborne route.
In chapter 4.1, knowledge about pandemic, zoonotic and epidemic influenza virus-
es was used to formulate hypotheses about the minimal requirements for efficient 
transmission of an animal influenza virus between humans. Chapter 4.2 addresses 
the question whether HPAI H5N1 can acquire the ability to be transmitted via the 
airborne route between mammals. For this purpose, a genetically modified HPAI 
H5N1 virus was serially passaged in the URT of ferrets, followed by extensive trans-
missibility studies in ferrets. 
In chapter 5, the results of the previous chapters and implications of these studies 
are evaluated in a summarizing discussion.
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CHAPTER 2 
Multi basic cleavage site as a virulence factor 
of influenza A viruses
2.1
Insertion of a multi basic cleavage motif into the 
hemagglutinin of a low pathogenic avian influenza
H6N1 virus induces a highly pathogenic phenotype
Vincent J. Munster*, Eefje J. A. Schrauwen*, Emmie de Wit, Judith 
M. A. van den Brand, Theo M. Bestebroer, Sander Herfst, Guus F. 
Rimmelzwaan, Albert D. M. E. Osterhaus and Ron. A. M. Fouchier
J Virol 2010 84(16):7953-60
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AbstrAct
The highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus phenotype is restricted to in-
fluenza A viruses of the H5 and H7 hemagglutinin (HA) subtypes. To obtain more 
information on the apparent subtype specific nature of the HPAI phenotype, a low 
pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) H6N1 virus was generated containing an HPAI H5 
R-R-R-K-K-R↓G multi basic cleavage site (MBCS) motif in HA (the downward arrow 
indicates the site of cleavage). This insertion converted the LPAI virus phenotype 
into an HPAI virus phenotype in vitro and in vivo. The H6N1 virus with an MBCS dis-
played in vitro characteristics similar to those of HPAI H5 viruses, such as cleavage 
of HA0 (the HA protein of influenza A virus initially synthesized as a single plypep-
tide precursor) and virus replication in the absence of exogenous trypsin. Studies of 
chickens confirmed the HPAI phenotype of the H6N1 virus with an MBCS, with an 
intravenous pathogenicity index of 1.4 and systemic virus replication upon intrana-
sal inoculation, the hallmarks of HPAI viruses. This study provides evidence that the 
subtype specific nature of the emergence of HPAI viruses is not at the molecular, 
structural or functional level, since the introduction of an MBCS resulted in a fully 
functional virus with an HPAI genotype and phenotype.
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iNtroDUctioN
Wild birds represent the natural reservoir of avian influenza A viruses in nature 
[2]. Influenza A viruses are classified on the basis of the hemagglutinin (HA) and 
neuraminidase (NA) surface glycoproteins. In wild birds throughout the world, in-
fluenza A viruses representing 16 HA and 9 NA antigenic subtypes have been found 
in numerous combinations (also called subtypes, e.g., H1N1, H6N1) [1]. Besides 
classification based on the antigenic properties of HA and NA, avian influenza A vi-
ruses can also be classified based on their pathogenic phenotype in chickens. Highly 
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), an acute generalised disease of poultry in which 
mortality may be as high as 100%, is restricted to subtypes H5 and H7. Other avian 
influenza A virus subtypes are generally low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) vi-
ruses that cause much milder, primarily respiratory disease in poultry, sometimes 
with loss of egg production [155]. 
The HA protein of influenza A virus is initially synthesized as a single polypeptide 
precursor (HA0) which is cleaved into HA1 and HA2 subunits by host cell proteases. 
The mature HA protein mediates binding of the virus to host cells, followed by en-
docytosis and HA-mediated fusion with endosomal membranes [2]. Influenza vi-
ruses of subtypes H5 and H7 may become highly pathogenic after introduction into 
poultry and cause outbreaks of HPAI. The switch from an LPAI phenotype to the 
HPAI phenotype of these H5 and H7 influenza A viruses is achieved by the intro-
duction of basic amino acid residues into the HA0 cleavage site by substitution or 
insertion, resulting in the so-called multi basic cleavage site (MBCS), which facili-
tates systemic virus replication [156-159]. The cleavage of the HA0 of LPAI viruses 
is restricted to trypsin-like proteases which recognize the X-X-X-(R/K)↓G cleavage 
motif, where ↓ indicates the site of cleavage. Replication of these LPAI viruses is 
therefore restricted to sites in the host where these enzymes are expressed, i.e. the 
respiratory and intestinal tract [160,161]. The introduction of an R-X-(R/K)-R↓ G or 
R-(R/K)-X-R↓G minimal MBCS motif into H5 and H7 subtype viruses facilitates the 
recognition and cleavage of the HA0 by ubiquitous proprotein convertases, such as 
furin [161-164]. H5 influenza A viruses with a minimal MBCS motif only have the 
highly pathogenic phenotype if the masking glycosylation site at position 11 in the 
HA is substituted into a non-glycosylation site. Otherwise, at least one additional 
basic amino acid has to be inserted to allow the shift from an LPAI to an HPAI phe-
notype to occur [97,165-168]. No information is available on the minimal prerequi-
sites for H7 influenza A viruses to become highly pathogenic, but all HPAI H7 viruses 
have at least 2 basic amino acid insertions in the HA0 cleavage site [166]. HA0 with 
MBCS is activated in a broad range of different host cells and therefore enables HPAI 
viruses to replicate systemically in poultry [169]. To date, little is known about the 
apparent subtype specific nature of the introduction of the MBCS into LPAI viruses 
and the evolutionary processes involved in the emergence of HPAI viruses. When 
an MBCS was introduced in a laboratory adapted strain of influenza virus, A/Duck/
Ukraine/1/1963 (H3N8), it did not result in a dramatic change in pathogenic phe-
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notype [170]. Here, the effect of the introduction of an MBCS into a primary LPAI 
H6N1 virus, A/Mallard/Sweden/81/2002, is described. The introduction of an MBCS 
resulted in trypsin-independent replication in vitro and enhanced pathogenesis in a 
chicken model. Understanding the basis of the HA subtype-specificity of the intro-
duction of an MBCS into avian influenza viruses will lead to a better understanding 
of potential molecular restrictions involved in emergence of HPAI outbreaks.
mAteriAls AND methoDs
cells
Madin-Darby Canine kidney (MDCK) cells were cultured in EMEM (Lonza, Breda, 
The Netherlands) supplemented with 10% FCS, 100 IU/ml penicillin, 100 μg/ml 
streptomycin, 2 mM glutamine, 1.5 mg/ml sodiumbicarbonate, 10 mM Hepes and 
non-essential amino acids. 293T cells were cultured in DMEM (Lonza) supplement-
ed with 10 % FCS, 100 IU/ml penicillin, 100 μg/ml streptomycin, 2 mM glutamine, 1 
mM sodiumpyruvate and non-essential amino acids. 
Viruses
Influenza virus A/Mallard/Sweden/81/02 (H6N1) was isolated from a migratory 
mallard (Anas platyrrhynchos) within the framework of our ongoing avian influenza 
surveillance program [77], and passaged twice in embryonated chicken eggs. Influ-
enza virus A/Hong Kong/156/97 (H5N1) was isolated from the human index case 
during the 1997 H5N1 outbreak in Hong Kong [58]. The H6N1WT virus, H5N1WT, 
H6N1 virus with MBCS in HA (H6N1MBCS) and the H5N1 virus lacking the MBCS 
(H5N1∆MBCS) were generated by reverse genetics as described previously [171]. 
The supernatant of the transfected cells was harvested 48h after transfection and 
was used to inoculate MDCK cells. The genotypes of all recombinant viruses were 
confirmed by sequencing. The nucleotide sequences of the 8 gene segments of A/
Mallard/Sweden/81/02 (H6N1) are available from GenBank under accession num-
bers CY060379 - CY060386. The risk potential of the H6N1MBCS virus was assessed 
prior to start of the experiments and it was determined that the anticipated risk of 
generating this virus would be equivalent to that of an HPAI virus. Therefore, all in 
vivo and in vitro experiments were performed under ABSL3+ conditions.
Plasmids
The 8 gene segments of A/Mallard/Sweden/81/2002 (H6N1) and A/Hong 
Kong/156/97 (H5N1) were amplified by RT-PCR and cloned in the BsmBI site of a 
modified version of plasmid pHW2000 [171]. For the construction of the plasmid 
containing the MBCS in HA of H6N1, a QuickChange Multi Site-directed mutagen-
esis kit (Qiagen, Venlo, The Netherlands) was used according to instructions of the 
manufacturer. The following primers were used for the introduction of nucleotides 
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encoding the RRRKKR↓ MBCS in the HA gene: gaggcttgcaactggactaagaaatgttccaca-
gagaaaaaaaagaggacttttcggagcc and tggactaagaaatgttccacagagaagaagaaaaaaaagag-
gacttttcg. For the generation of the H5N1∆MBCS 15 nucleotides encoding 5 amino 
acids (underlined), PQRERRRKKR↓G, were modulated into PQIETR↓G of the MBCS 
in HA of the H5N1 virus as previously described [172]. 
replication kinetics and virus titrations
Multi step replication kinetics were determined by inoculating MDCK cells in the 
presence and absence of 1 μg/ml trypsin (Lonza) with a multiplicity of infection 
(MOI) of 0.01 TCID50 per cell. Supernatants were sampled at 6, 12, 24 and 48 hours 
after inoculation. Virus titers were determined by end-point titration in MDCK cells 
in 96-well plates (Greiner Bio-One) as described previously [171]. MDCK cells were 
inoculated with tenfold serial dilution of culture supernatants or tissue homoge-
nates. One hour after inoculation, cells were washed once with PBS and grown in 
200μl of infection media, consisting of EMEM (Lonza) supplemented with 100 U/ml 
penicillin, 100 μg/ml streptomycin, 2mM glutamine, 1.5mg/ml sodiumbicarbonate 
(Lonza), 10mM Hepes (Lonza), non-essential amino acids (MP Biomedicals) and 20 
μg/ml trypsin (Lonza). Three days after inoculation, the supernatants of infected 
cell cultures were tested for agglutinating activity using turkey erythrocytes as an 
indicator of infection of the cells. Infectious titers were calculated from 5 replicates 
by the method of Spearman-Karber. For the multi step replication kinetics geomet-
ric mean titers were calculated using the infectious titers of two independent ex-
periments.
Western blotting 
293T cells were transfected with plasmids expressing the HA gene of H6N1WT, 
H6N1MBCS, H5N1WT and H5N1∆MBCS. Cells were harvested 48h after transfec-
tion and were treated either with PBS or 2.5 ug/ml trypsin (Lonza) for 1 hr at 37 
0C. Cells were lysed in hot lysis buffer (1% SDS, 100 mM NaCl, 10 mM EDTA, 10 mM 
Tris HCl pH 7.5), treated with 3x dissociation loading buffer (2% SDS, 0.01 dithio-
threitol, 0.02M Tris-HCL, pH6.8) for 5 min at 96 0C and proteins were separated in 
10% SDS-polyacrylamide gels. A molecular Magic MarkerTM (Invitrogen, Leek, The 
Netherlands) was run alongside to determine protein sizes. Proteins were trans-
ferred onto nitrocellulose membrane by electroblotting for 1 hour in blot buffer (25 
mM Tris, 192 mM glycine and 20% methanol). The blots were incubated overnight 
at 4 0C in block buffer (PBS with 5% (w/v) non-fat dried milk and 0.05% Tween-10), 
and incubated with 1:2000 rabbit antisera (1:1 mixture of rabbit α-A/Turkey/Mas-
sachutes/65 H6N1 and rabbit α-A/Shearwater/Australia/1/72 H6N1 for H6, rabbit 
α-A/Hong Kong/156/97 H5N1 for H5) in block buffer for 2 hours at room tempera-
ture. Blots were washed with PBS containing 0.05% Tween and incubated for 1 hr 
with swine anti-rabbit horseradish peroxidase (DAKO, Denmark) 1:3000 in block 
buffer, washed again, and developed with ECLTM Western Blotting Detection rea-
gents (GE Healthcare, UK). 
boekje5.indd   27 8/27/2013   3:21:11 PM
A highly pathogenic phenotype of an H6N1 virus28
Ch
ap
te
r 
2.
1
intravenous pathogenicity index
The intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) of recombinant viruses was determined 
using 10 six-week-old specific pathogen free (SPF) white leghorn chickens (GDL, De-
venter, The Netherlands) according to the OIE standards [173]. In short, chickens 
were injected intravenously in the ulnar vein with 0.1 ml of the H6N1WT or H6N-
1MBCS virus at a dose of 106 TCID50. The development of clinical signs was moni-
tored for 10 days for each individual chicken. Chickens were classified sick when 
displaying one clinical sign, such as depression, cyanosis of the comb or wattles, 
respiratory involvement, diarrhoea, oedema of the face/head and nervous signs 
and severely sick if they displayed two or more clinical signs. The IVPI index was 
calculated as the mean score per bird per observation. All animal studies and pro-
cedures were reviewed and approved by the Institutional Animal Ethics Commit-
tee of Erasmus Medical Center and have been conducted according to the national 
guidelines of the Netherlands.
intranasal infection of chickens 
Two groups of 10 six-week-old specific pathogen free (SPF) white leghorn chickens 
(GDL) were inoculated intranasally with 5x106 TCID50 of the H6N1WT or H6N1MBCS 
virus. Oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs were collected and stored in 1 ml transport 
media; virus titers in the swabs were determined by end-point titration in MDCK 
cells. At day 3 and day 6 after inoculation, 5 animals from each group were eutha-
nized and virus titers in the nasal turbinates, trachea, lungs, spleen, liver, heart, in-
testine and brain were determined for 3 out of 5 animals; remaining chickens were 
used for immunohistochemistry. Tissues were homogenized in 3ml transport me-
dium, consisting of Hanks balanced salt solution containing 10% glycerol, 200 U/ml 
penicillin, 200 mg/ml streptomycin, 100 U/ml polymyxin B sulphate, and 250 mg/
ml gentamycin (ICN, The Netherlands), using the Fastprep system (MP biomedicals) 
with 2 1/4” ceramic sphere balls (MP biomedicals) and centrifuged briefly.
immunohistochemistry 
Immunohistochemistry was performed with tissues of chickens inoculated with the 
H6N1WT and H6N1MBCS viruses. For each virus, 2 chickens were euthanized 3 and 
6 days after inoculation by exsanguination. Necropsies and tissue sampling were 
performed according to a standard protocol (protocol available on request). After 
fixation in 10 % neutral-buffered formalin and embedding in paraffin, tissue sections 
were stained with an immunohistochemical method using a monoclonal antibody 
against the nucleoprotein of influenza A virus as a primary antibody for detection 
of influenza virus antigen (clone Hb65, ATCC, UK). The following tissues were exam-
ined: nasal turbinates, trachea, lungs, spleen, liver, heart, intestine, brain and comb. 
Nucleotide sequence accession numbers
The nucleotide sequences of the 8 gene segments of A/Mallard/Sweden/81/02 
(H6N1) are available from GenBank; accession numbers CY060379 to CY060386 
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resUlts
in vitro characteristics of h6N1mbcs virus
In order to investigate the subtype-specificity of the insertion of an MBCS into the 
HA of LPAI viruses, an MBCS was inserted into the HA0 of A/Mallard/Sweden/81/02 
(H6N1WT), resulting in H6N1MBCS. The functionality of the MBCS insertion in the 
H6 HA was first studied by expression of HA in 293T cells upon transfection and 
determining the cleavage pattern in the presence and absence of trypsin. The cleav-
age pattern of H6WT and H6MBCS was compared to the cleavage pattern of HA of 
HPAI A/ HongKong/156/97 H5N1 (H5WT) and HA of this virus from which the MBCS 
was removed (H5∆MBCS). H5WT and H6MBCS displayed similar cleavage patterns 
upon western blot analysis, with cleavage of the HA0 both with and without sup-
plemental addition of trypsin. H5∆MBCS displayed a cleavage pattern similar to that 
of H6WT with efficient HA0 cleavage only upon the addition of trypsin (Fig.1A). 
Next, the effect of the introduction of the MBCS on the replication kinetics in MDCK 
cells was determined. Using reverse genetics 2 wild type (H6N1WT and H5N1WT) 
and 2 mutant viruses (H6N1MBCS and H5N1∆MBCS) were produced. The H6N1WT 
and H6N1MBCS virus contained 7 gene segments of A/Mallard/Sweden/81/02 
H6N1 and wild type H6 or H6 HA with MBCS respectively and the H5N1WT and 
H5N1∆MBCS virus contained 7 gene segments of A/ HongKong/156/97 H5N1 and 
wild type H5 HA or H5 HA from which the MBCS was deleted. The H6N1WT vi-
rus was able to replicate to high titers in the presence of trypsin; in the absence 
of trypsin the H6N1WT virus failed to replicate efficiently. The H6N1MBCS virus 
was able to replicate to comparable titers in the presence and absence of trypsin, 
with only modest differences in maximum virus titers after 48 hours (Fig 1B). The 
comparison of the replication kinetics of the H6N1WT and H6N1MBCS virus and 
the HPAI H5N1WT and H5N1∆MBCS virus (Fig. 1C) was in agreement with observa-
Figure 1. The in vitro phenotype of H6N1MBCS 
in comparison with H6N1WT, H5N1WT and 
H5N1∆MBCS influenza A viruses. (A) Western 
blots of transfected 293T cells with H6N1WT, 
H6N1MBCS, H5N1WT and H5N1∆MBCS HA 
open reading frame and treated with (+) or 
without trypsin (-). Replication kinetics in MDCK 
cells of (B) the H6N1WT (squares) and H6N-
1MBCS (circles) viruses in MDCK cells in the 
presence (filled symbols) or absence of trypsin 
(open symbols) or (C) H5N1WT (squares) and 
H5N1∆MBCS (circles) in MDCK cells in the 
presence (filled symbols) or absence of trypsin 
(open symbols). Geometric mean titers were 
calculated from two independent experiments; 
error bars indicate standard deviation.
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tions in western blot analysis. The H6N1MBCS and H5N1WT virus displayed similar 
replication kinetics in the absence of trypsin as H6N1WT and H5N1∆MBCS virus in 
the presence of trypsin. The H6N1WT and H5N1∆MBCS viruses did not replicate 
efficiently in the absence of trypsin, in agreement with an LPAI phenotype. Thus, 
the insertion of an MBCS in an LPAI H6N1 virus conferred an in vitro phenotype 
comparable to an HPAI H5N1 virus.
intravenous pathogenicity index of the h6N1Wt and h6N1mbcs virus
To determine whether the in vitro HPAI phenotype of the H6N1MBCS virus also 
resulted in an HPAI phenotype in vivo, the intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) 
was determined. The IVPI is the gold standard for the assessment of the pathogenic 
phenotype of avian influenza viruses in poultry. Avian influenza viruses with an IVPI 
< 1.2 are considered LPAI viruses and avian influenza viruses with an IVPI ≥ 1.2 are 
considered HPAI viruses. Ten six-week old leghorn chickens were inoculated intrave-
nously with 0.1 ml 1x106 TCID
50
/ml of the H6N1WT or H6N1MBCS virus and 
monitored closely for 10 days. The 10 chickens inoculated with the H6N1WT virus 
did not show clinical signs of disease over the 10 day period, resulting in an IVPI of 
0.0, confirming the LPAI phenotype in vivo (Table 1) [173]. 
The chickens inoculated with the H6N1MBCS virus displayed a rapid progressive 
disease with 8/10 animals severely sick at 3 days post inoculation (d.p.i.) and 1 de-
ceased animal at 5 and 6 d.p.i. A variety of clinical symptoms was observed in these
h6N1
Wt
Days post inoculation score total
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Normal 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 100 x 0 0
sicka 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 1 0
severely sickb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 2 0
Dead 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 3 0
0
IVPIc 0
h6N1
mbcs
Days post inoculation score
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Normal 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 16 x 0 0
sicka 7 5 1 2 1 1 6 5 5 5 38 x 1 38
severely sickb 0 4 8 8 8 7 0 0 0 0 35 x 2 70
Dead 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 11 x 3 33
141
IVPIc 1,41
table 1. Overview of the intravenous pathogenicity index for the H6N1WT and H6N1MBCS viruses. Two groups of 
10 chickens each were inoculated intravenously with 0.1 ml 1x106 TCID50 of either virus and observed for clinical 
signs of disease for 10 days. At each observation, each bird is scored 0 if normal, 1 if sick, 2 if severely sick and 3 
if dead.
a Sick birds show one of the following signs: respiratory involvement, depression, diarrhoea,
cyanosis of the exposed skin or wattles, oedema of the face and/or head, nervous signs.
b Severely sick birds show two or more of the signs mentioned undera.
c The intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) is the mean score per bird per observation over the 10-day period.
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birds including respiratory involvement (2/10), depression (10/10) (Fig. 2), diar-
rhoea (2/10), cyanosis of the exposed skin or wattles (6/10) (Fig. 2), oedema of the 
face and/or head (6/10) and nervous signs (6/10) (Table 1). The overall IVPI score of 
the H6N1MBCS virus was 1.4, in concordance with an HPAI phenotype. 
infection of chickens via the intranasal route
Next, clinical signs, virus shedding, and tissue distribution in chickens were studied 
upon intranasal inoculation, considered more representative of a natural infection 
than the intravenous inoculation described above. To this end, 10 chickens were in-
oculated intranasally with 5x106 TCID50/ml of either the H6N1WT or H6N1MBCS vi-
rus. The chickens were observed for clinical signs of disease and cloacal and oropha- 
ryngeal swabs were obtained daily over a 6-day period. None of the chickens in-
oculated with the H6N1WT virus displayed clinical signs during the course of the 
experiment, whereas all H6N1MBCS virus inoculated chickens were (10/10) lethar-
gic and some developed cyanosis of the comb (2/10). Virus shedding from the respi-
ratory tract was observed to start at 1 d.p.i. for both viruses and continued until 4-5 
d.p.i. The amount of virus shedding was comparable between the 2 viruses. Virus 
shedding from the intestinal tract started at 3 d.p.i. for both viruses and contin-
ued during the course of the experiment for the H6N1MBCS virus, whereas cloacal 
shedding of the H6N1WT virus was minimal and below detection limit after 6 days 
(Fig. 3). On 3 and 6 d.p.i., 5 chickens from each group were euthanized and virus 
Figure 2. Clinical symptoms of chickens infected with H6N1MBCS virus 
consistent with HPAI virus infection: cyanosis of the comb and wattles (A), 
subcutaneous haemorrhage of the shanks (B) and severe depression, ruf-
fled fur with oedema of head and neck and cyanosis of the comb, wattles 
and paws (C).
Figure 3. Virus shedding from the respiratory 
tract (A) and the intestinal tract (B) after in-
tranasal inoculation of chickens the H6N1WT 
(open circle) and H6N1MBCS (closed circle) 
viruses. Oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs 
were taken daily and virus titers were deter-
mined by end-point titration in MDCK cells. 
The geometric mean titers, calculated per day 
per group, are displayed; error bars indicate 
95% confidence interval. The dotted lines in-
dicate the cut off value of the assay.
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titers in the nasal turbinates (NT), trachea, lungs, spleen, liver, heart, intestine and 
brain were determined for 3 of these animals; the remaining chickens were used for 
immunohistochemistry. The H6N1WT and H6N1MBCS viruses were detected with 
comparable titers in the upper respiratory tract of inoculated chickens at 3 d.p.i.. In 
the lungs, the H6N1MBCS virus replicated to higher titers and was detected in all 
animals, whereas the H6N1WT virus was only detected in 1 animal. The H6N1WT 
virus was also detected in the spleen (1/3 animals) and intestine (3/3) whereas the 
H6N1MBCS was detected in the brain (2/3) (Table 2). 
Immunohistochemistry was performed in order to confirm influenza A virus repli-
cation in tissues obtained at 3 d.p.i. Using an α-NP monoclonal antibody, expres-
sion of influenza virus antigen was not detected in any of the tissues of the group 
inoculated with H6N1WT. For the group inoculated with H6N1MBCS expression of 
influenza virus antigen was detected in all tissue samples, including tissue of the 
comb (Figure 4) in agreement with reports on H5 and H7 HPAI infections in chickens 
[174,175]. At 6 d.p.i. H6N1MBCS virus was still detected in the brain (1/3), heart 
(1/3) and intestine (2/3) whereas the H6N1WT was cleared from all sampled tissues 
by this time (Table 2).
Day 3 h6N1
Wt 
virus h6N1
mbcs 
virus
tissue
Virus detection 
(n/3)
Virus titer (log 
10tciD
50
/gram tissue) 
± standard deviation
Virus detection (n/3)
Virus titer (log 
10tciD
50
/gram tissue) 
± standard deviation
lung 1/3 1,52 (±0,17) 3/3 2,10 (±0,79)
trachea 3/3 2,83 (±0,47) 3/3 3,37 (±1,34)
Nt 2/3 2,97 (±0,81) 3/3 2,59 (±0,17)
brain 0/3 <1,41 2/3 1,53 (±0,17)
spleen 1/3 2,16 (±1,15) 0/3 <1,50
heart 0/3 <1,51 0/3 <1,51
liver 0/3 <1,43 0/3 <1,43
intestine 3/3 2,56 (±0,92) 0/3 <1,65
Day 6 h6N1
Wt 
virus h6N1
mbcs 
virus
tissue
Virus detection 
(n/3)
Virus titer (log 
10tciD
50
/gram tissue) 
± standard deviation
Virus detection (n/3)
Virus titer (log 
10tciD
50
/gram tissue) 
± standard deviation
lung 0/3 <1,42 0/3 <1,42
trachea 0/3 <1,91 0/3 <1,91
Nt 0/3 <2,01 0/3 <2,01
brain 0/3 <1,41 1/3 1,57 (±0,27)
spleen 0/3 <1,50 0/3 <1,50
heart 0/3 <1,51 1/3 1,56 (±0,08)
liver 0/3 <1,43 0/3 <1,43
intestine 0/3 <1,65 2/3 1,92 (±0,31)
table 2. Virus titers in tissues of chickens inoculated either with the H6N1WT or H6N1MBCS virus. Three chickens 
of each group were euthanized at 3 d.p.i. and 6 d.p.i. Virus titers in lung, trachea, nasal turbinates (NT), brain, 
spleen, heart, liver and intestine were determined by end-point titration in MDCK cells. Geometric mean titer ± 
standard deviation is indicated; the cut-off value is given for negative tissues.
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DiscUssioN
The emergence of HPAI viruses from LPAI ancestral viruses is restricted to influ-
enza A viruses of the H5 and H7 subtypes. All currently known HPAI outbreaks were 
caused by HPAI H5 and H7 viruses [176]. The emergence of HPAI viruses is primarily 
thought to occur by introduction of an MBCS in HA of LPAI H5 and H7 viruses during 
their circulation in poultry. LPAI viruses other than H5 and H7 also frequently cause 
outbreaks in poultry, in general with mild clinical symptoms [160,177,178]. Despite 
extensive circulation in poultry, HPAI viruses have never emerged during LPAI out-
breaks other than those caused by influenza A viruses of the H5 or H7 subtypes, 
pointing to a subtype specific nature of the emergence of HPAI viruses. Whereas the 
structural and molecular mechanism for the emergence of HPAI viruses has been 
partly elucidated [168,179], the subtype specificity of this emergence remains un-
known. The proposed molecular mechanisms underlying the introduction of basic 
amino acid residues into the HA0 cleavage are nucleotide/amino acid substitution 
and insertion of additional basic amino acid residues via a strand-slippage [168]. In 
addition, in the case of two H7 virus strains it has been shown that recombination 
with host or viral RNA was responsible for the introduction of an MBCS [180,181]. 
The present study aimed to understand the nature of the subtype specificity of the 
MBCS introduction by artificial insertion of an MBCS motif identical to that of cur-
rently circulating H5 HPAI viruses in an LPAI H6N1 virus. The choice for an LPAI H6 
virus was made because multiple introductions of this subtype into poultry have oc-
curred and because of the extensive circulation of H6 viruses in poultry [182,183]. 
These characteristics make it likely that H6 viruses with an HPAI genotype would 
have emerged if not for an as yet unidentified restriction. The insertion of an MBCS 
into the LPAI H6N1 virus resulted in a shift from a trypsin-dependent into a trypsin-
independent phenotype, comparable to that of an HPAI H5N1 virus. Moreover, the 
introduction of the MBCS into the LPAI H6N1 virus also resulted in an in vivo HPAI 
Figure 4. The tissue distribution of the H6N-
1WT (left column) and H6N1MBCS (right col-
umn) viruses after intranasal inoculation of 
chickens. Serial sections of these tissues of 
chickens infected with H6N1WT virus could 
not detect the expression of viral antigen in 
lung, tracheal epithelium, nasal turbinates 
(NT), brain, liver, spleen, heart, intestine and 
comb. Expression of viral antigen could be 
detected in all tissues of chickens infected 
with H6N1MBCS virus. The chickens were 
inoculated intranasally with 5x106 TCID50 
H6N1WT and H6N1MBCS virus and eutha-
nized 3 days post infection. Tissue sections 
were stained with a monoclonal antibody 
against influenza A virus nucleoprotein, vis-
ible as a red-brown staining.
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phenotype. The clinical signs observed in H6N1MBCS virus infected chickens, such 
as subcutaneous haemorrhages of the shanks, cyanotic combs and wattles and 
neurological signs are hallmarks of HPAI infection (Fig. 2). In addition, the IVPI was 
greater than 1.2 (Table 1), which places the H6N1MBCS virus within the category 
of HPAI viruses [173]. Our data are in agreement with previous studies which show 
that the introduction of an MBCS into LPAI H5 viruses increases the tissue tropism to 
extra-respiratory and extra-intestinal replication [157]. However, the pathogenicity 
of the generated H6N1MBCS virus is not completely equivalent to the pathogenic-
ity displayed in naturally occurring HPAI H5 and H7 viruses which in general have 
IVPI scores in the range of 2 to 3 [166,184,185], although lower IVPI scores (1.2) 
have been reported for naturally occurring HPAI viruses as well [186]. The relatively 
limited pathogenicity of the H6N1MBCS virus in the chicken model upon intranasal 
inoculation, as compared to intravenous inoculation, might be caused by the lack 
of adaptation of the original H6N1WT virus to efficient replication in chickens. The 
H6N1WT virus was isolated from a wild-caught migratory mallard and as such will 
be adapted to replication in this wild bird species. It has been shown in a previous 
report comparing the intranasal infectious dose of LPAI viruses, that infection of 
white leghorn chickens required very high doses of viruses isolated from wild birds 
as compared to viruses obtained from chickens [187]. Previous studies have also 
shown that changes in HA alone are not sufficient for efficient replication of wild 
bird avian influenza viruses in chickens, and that besides changes in HA, changes 
in the internal genes such as PB1, PB2 and PA are necessary for adaptation toward 
efficient replication in chickens [143,188,189]. We suggest that such additional ad-
aptations in the internal genes of the H6N1MBCS virus will likely result into further 
increased pathogenicity, possibly comparable to the pathogenicity of other HPAI 
viruses upon intranasal infection and IVPI. It has also been shown for multiple LPAI 
viruses that adaptation to replication in poultry results in increased virus shedding 
from both the respiratory tract and the intestinal tract [143,188,190]. 
For the H6N1WT virus, the low virus shedding from the respiratory tract at 3 d.p.i. 
(2.3 ± 0.9 Log10 TCID50/ml, 10/10) was accompanied by low or undetectable virus 
titers in the respiratory tract tissues (Table 2). Likewise, low shedding from the in-
testinal tract at 3 d.p.i. (0.7 ± 0.6 Log10 TCID50/ml, 3/10) was accompanied by low 
virus titers in the intestinal tract (colon). Upon immunohistochemistry using multi-
ple cross-sections of tissues of 2 chickens not used for virus isolation, no influenza 
A virus NP positive cells were detected in tissues of the respiratory or intestinal 
tract, again indicating the variability and the low level of virus replication within the 
group of chickens inoculated intranasally with H6N1WT virus. Real-time reverse-
transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RRT-PCR, ([191]) further confirmed the 
absence of viral genomic RNA in tissues negative in virus isolation (data not shown). 
In the 10 chickens inoculated with H6N1MBCS virus, low virus shedding was de-
tected in the respiratory tract at 3 d.p.i. (2.3 ± 1.0 Log10 TCID50/ml, 10/10) accom-
panied by low virus titers in of the respiratory tract tissues. Low shedding from the 
intestinal tract at 3 d.p.i (0.8 ± 0.6 Log10 TCID50/ml, 3/10) was accompanied by 
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the absence of virus titers in the intestinal tract. Although viable H6N1MBCS virus 
could not be detected in all organs at 3 d.p.i., low amounts of viral genomic RNA 
were detected by RRT-PCR in all tissues of the chickens inoculated with H6N1MBCS 
virus (data not shown). These data are in agreement with the immunohistochem-
istry data (Fig.4) and indicate that despite the poor adaptation of the H6N1MBCS 
virus to chickens, a low level of systemic replication, below the threshold value of 
the TCID50 assay, had occurred, which is an indication of increased tissue tropism 
similar to that of natural occurring HPAI viruses [169].
Earlier work indicated that the introduction of an MBCS in the HA of a human sea-
sonal influenza A virus and an LPAI H3 influenza A virus strain ceased the virus’ 
dependence on trypsin for the activation of HA0 upon expression of HA proteins 
in vitro [170,192-194]. However, in the context of infectious virus H3N8 LPAI vi-
ruses with an MBCS did not result in an HPAI phenotype upon intranasal inoculation 
of white leghorn chickens. Of note, the IVPI of these viruses was not determined 
[170]. These experimental data also suggested a lack of adaptation in chickens of 
the wild duck derived H3N8 virus and showed an increased cloacal shedding only 
of the H3N8 virus with the RRRKKR↓G MBCS out of 3 different MBCSs tested [170]. 
Collectively, the results from the H3N8 virus and our study suggest that different HA 
subtypes might require different MBCS motifs. 
Now that we have shown that an LPAI H6 virus can become highly pathogenic upon 
the introduction of an MBCS in HA, the question arises why the HPAI phenotype is 
restricted to H5 and H7 influenza A viruses in nature. Since it was shown here that 
there is no functional constraint to H6 with an MBCS with respect to HA0 cleavage 
and infectivity in vivo - in fact, virus shedding of the H6N1MBCS virus from the 
intestinal tract was higher as compared to H6N1WT virus - there must different 
constraints for the emergence of HPAI H6 viruses in nature. Moreover, the insertion 
of the minimal MBCS motif REKR↓G into H6N1WT virus did not result in a trypsin 
independent phenotype and replication kinetics were similar to that of H6N1WT 
virus in the presence and absence of trypsin (data not shown), suggesting that the 
introduction of a minimal MBCS into H6N1WT virus does not result in increased 
pathogenicity, comparable to H5 and H7 influenza A viruses [97,166,167]. The pre-
diction of the cleavability of HA by proprotein convertases, is therefore not directly 
useful to predict the HPAI or LPAI phenotype of influenza viruses [195]. Based on 
our data it is likely that the subtype restriction of the HPAI genotype and phenotype 
is not at the molecular, structural or functional level, but potentially at the evolu-
tionary level with sequence restrictions preventing the emergence of HPAI viruses 
other than those of the H5 and H7 subtypes.
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Multi basic cleavage site as a virulence factor 
of influenza A viruses
2.2
Insertion of a multi basic cleavage site in the 
hemagglutinin of a human influenza H3N2 virus 
does not increase pathogenicity in ferrets
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AbstrAct
A multibasic cleavage site (MBCS) in the hemagglutinin (HA) protein of influenza 
A virus is a key determinant of pathogenicity in chickens, and distinguishes high-
ly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses from low pathogenic avian influenza 
(LPAI) viruses. An MBCS has only been detected in viruses of the H5 and H7 sub-
types. Here we investigated the phenotype of a human H3N2 virus with an MBCS in 
HA. Insertion of an MBCS in the H3N2 virus resulted in cleavage of HA and efficient 
replication in MDCK cells in the absence of exogenous trypsin in vitro, similar to 
HPAI H5N1 virus. However, studies in ferrets demonstrated that insertion of the 
MBCS in HA did not result in increased virus shedding, cellular host range, systemic 
replication, or pathogenicity as compared to wildtype virus. This study indicates 
that acquisition of an MBCS alone is insufficient to increase pathogenicity of a pro-
totypical seasonal human H3N2 virus.
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In wild birds and poultry throughout the world, avian influenza viruses expressing 
16 antigenically distinct subtypes of hemagglutinin (HA) and 9 subtypes of neurami-
nidase (NA) have been described [1,196]. Only subtypes H1, H2 and H3 have circu-
lated extensively in humans [197]. Avian influenza viruses can be classified based 
on pathogenicity in chickens into highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) and low 
pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses. Virtually all known HPAI viruses are of 
the H5 or H7 subtypes. Direct transmission of HPAI H5N1 viruses to humans was 
first detected in 1997 [58] and has continued to be reported since [59]. In addition, 
various human cases of HPAI H7 virus infections have been reported [67,198,199]. 
Pathogenicity of avian influenza viruses in chickens is directly associated with the 
cleavability of the HA glycoprotein [97,98,156,200]. HA is initially synthesized as a 
HA0 precursor protein that is subsequently cleaved into the two functional subunits 
HA1 and HA2. This cleavage step is essential for virus infectivity since uncleaved HA 
is able to mediate virus attachment but unable to perform the fusion step neces-
sary for the initiation of infection [201]. HA proteins of LPAI viruses have a single 
arginine at the cleavage site that is recognized by trypsin-like proteases expressed 
predominantly in the respiratory and intestinal tract. HA of HPAI viruses contain a 
multibasic cleavage site (MBCS) that can be cleaved by ubiquitously expressed furin 
and related furin-like proprotein convertases (PC5/6) [10,101]. The cleavage prop-
erties of HA and the expression patterns of proteases in the host are considered to 
be the major determinants of systemic influenza virus replication and pathogenesis 
in chickens. 
The association between HA cleavability and replication outside the respiratory 
tract is less straightforward for influenza viruses in mammals. Human influenza vi-
ruses of subtypes H1, H2, and H3 do not have an MBCS in HA and virus replication 
is generally restricted to the respiratory tract. For humans infected with HPAI H5 
and H7 viruses, virus detection outside the respiratory tract has been reported, but 
is not a general phenomenon [202]. In Cynomolgus macaques infected with HPAI 
H5N1 virus, detection of virus antigen was limited to the respiratory tract [102]. Sys-
temic virus replication and associated pathogenesis has been reported for several 
HPAI H5 and H7 viruses in mice, ferrets, and cats, but certainly not for all viruses 
tested in these mammalian model systems [203-207]. In mice, it has been shown 
that removal of the MBCS from some HPAI H5 and lab-adapted H7 virus HAs result-
ed in reduced virulence [103,115]. Here we followed an opposite – gain of function 
– approach, by inserting an MBCS in a human H3N2 virus and testing virus replica-
tion and pathogenesis in the ferret model. The goal of this work was to increase our 
basic understanding of the role of the MBCS and trypsin/furin-dependent cleavage 
of HA on influenza virus pathogenesis in mammals.
Influenza virus A/Netherlands/16190/68 (H3N2) was isolated from an individual in 
the Netherlands during the 1968 pandemic. Influenza virus A/Hong Kong/156/97 
(H5N1) was isolated from the human index case during the 1997 H5N1 outbreak 
in Hong Kong [58]. The 8 gene segments of these two viruses were amplified by 
RT-PCR and cloned in the BsmBI site of a modified version of plasmid pHW2000 
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[171,208]. For the generation of H5N1 virus without an MBCS (H5N1ΔMBCS), the 
cleavage site PQRERRRKKR↓G in the H5 HA plasmid was changed to PQIETR↓G 
by RT-PCR with specific primers as described previously [172]. For the generation 
of H3N2 virus with an MBCS (H3N2MBCS), the cleavage site PEKQTR↓G in the H3 
HA plasmid was changed to PEKQRRRKKR↓G, identical to the MBCS of the con-
trol virus A/HongKong/156/97 H5N1. Viruses H3N2wt, H5N1wt, H3N2MBCS and 
H5N1ΔMBCS were generated by reverse genetics as described previously [209]. The 
genotypes of all plasmids and viruses were confirmed by sequencing. The risk po-
tential of the H3N2MBCS virus was assessed prior to start of the experiments and it 
was determined that the anticipated risk of generating this virus would be equiva-
lent to that of a mammal-transmissible HPAI virus. Therefore, all in vivo and in vitro 
experiments were performed under ABSL3+ containment conditions. Animal stud-
ies were approved by an independent Animal Ethics Committee (stichting Dieren 
Experimenten Commissie consult). 
First, the requirement of trypsin for the cleavability of the H3 HA proteins was 
tested. To this end, 293T cells were harvested 48h after transfection with plasmids 
expressing HA of H3N2wt and H3N2MBCS, using HA of H5N1wt and H5N1ΔMBCS 
as controls. Cells were treated either with PBS or 2.5 µg/ml trypsin (Lonza) for 1 
Figure 1. In vitro phenotype of H3N2wt, H3N2MBCS, H5N1wt and H5N1ΔMBCS. 
Western blots of lysates of 293T cells transfected with HA of H3N2wt, H3N-
2MBCS (A), H5N1wt and H5N1ΔMBCS (B) upon treatment with (T) or without 
trypsin (-). Replication of H3N2wt (closed square) and H3N2MBCS (open circle) 
in the presence (black) or absence of trypsin (grey) (C) or H5N1wt (open circle) 
and H5N1ΔMBCS (closed square) in the presence (black) or absence of trypsin 
(grey) (D). MDCK cells were inoculated with 0.01 TCID50/cell and supernatant 
samples were harvested 6, 12, 24, and 48 hours later. Supernatant samples 
were titrated in MDCK cells. Geometric mean titers and standard deviation 
were calculated from two independent experiments. Data for Fig 1B and 1D 
were taken with permission from the American Society for Microbiology, from 
[209].
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hr at 37 0C. Cell lysates were subjected to electrophoresis in 10% SDS-polyacryla-
mide gels, blotted, and western blots were incubated with rabbit serum to A/Hong 
kong/1/68 (H3) or A/Hong Kong/156/97 (H5) and a peroxidase-labelled swine anti-
rabbit antibody as previously described [209]. In the presence of trypsin, the HA of 
H3N2wt and H3N2MBCS were cleaved to completion (Fig 1A). In contrast, in the 
absence of trypsin, HA of H3N2wt remained uncleaved while a large fraction of the 
HA of H3N2MBCS was cleaved. Thus, upon insertion of an MBCS in H3 HA the cleav-
age of HA was no longer dependent on exogenous trypsin. H3 HA with and without 
an MBCS thus behaved essentially the same as H5 HA with and without an MBCS 
(Fig 1A-B). 
Next, virus replication of reverse genetics-derived H3N2wt and H3N2MBCS viruses 
in the presence and absence of 1 μg/ml trypsin (Lonza) was tested in MDCK cells, 
again using H5N1wt and H5N1ΔMBCS as controls. Cells were inoculated in duplo at 
a multiplicity of infection (MOI) of 0.01 TCID50 per cell. Supernatants were sampled 
at 6, 12, 24 and 48 hours after inoculation and virus titers were determined by end-
point titration in MDCK cells [209]. The H3N2wt and H5N1ΔMBCS viruses replicated 
to high titers in the presence of trypsin. In the absence of trypsin both viruses failed 
to replicate to high titers. The H3N2MBCS and H5N1wt viruses replicated to com-
parable virus titers in MDCK cells in the presence and absence of trypsin (Fig 1C-D). 
The trypsin independent phenotype of the human influenza H3N2 virus with an 
MBCS in vitro was also observed with a second H3N2 virus, A/Netherlands/178/95 
(data not shown). Thus, trypsin-independent HA cleavage by insertion of an MBCS 
can be achieved not only in avian influenza viruses but also in human influenza A/
H3N2 virus [192].
Next, we investigated whether the trypsin-independent cleavage of H3N2MBCS re-
sulted in enhanced pathogenicity in ferrets. The ferret model is generally thought 
to be a good animal model for influenza in humans, because ferrets are naturally 
susceptible to infection and develop respiratory disease and lung pathology similar 
to humans when infected with seasonal, avian, or pandemic influenza viruses [210-
212]. Groups of six influenza-seronegative female ferrets (Mustella putorius furo) 
were inoculated intranasally with 106 TCID
50
 of H3N2wt or H3N2MBCS virus, divided 
over both nostrils (2 x 250µl). Animals were observed for the development of clini-
cal symptoms and weighed daily. The percentage mean maximum weight loss was 
8.8±1.4% (standard deviation) for animals inoculated with the H3N2wt virus. Ani-
mals inoculated with H3N2MBCS had a maximum weight loss of 7.0±1.4% (standard 
deviation) (Fig. 2A). No differences were observed for clinical parameters such as 
lethargy, sneezing, ruffled fur, interest in food, and runny nose between the two 
groups of ferrets. Thus, H3N2MBCS does not appear to cause more severe disease 
as compared to H3N2WT.
Throat and nasal swabs were collected daily to determine virus excretion from the 
upper respiratory tract. Infectious virus shedding from the nose peaked at day 2 for 
both viruses and continued until day 7 and 6 for H3N2wt and H3N2MBCS respec-
tively (Fig. 2B) and shedding from the throat peaked at day 1 and continued until 
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day 6 for both viruses (Fig 2C). We observed a consistent decline in viral shedding 
from the throat, compared to the nose. Nucleotide sequencing was performed to 
confirm that the HA cleavage site remained unchanged during the experiment.
Three animals from each group were euthanized at 3 and 7 days post inoculation 
(dpi), and the nasal turbinates, trachea, lungs, liver, spleen, kidney, colon, and brain 
were collected to study virus distribution. Necropsies and tissue sampling were 
performed according to a standard protocol and infectious virus titers were deter-
mined by end-point titration in MDCK cells [209]. At 7 dpi, virus was undetectable 
in samples from the organs in all groups of ferrets. At 3 dpi, virus was not detected 
in lungs, spleen, liver, kidney and intestine of ferrets inoculated with H3N2wt or 
H3N2MBCS. Both groups of inoculated ferrets revealed low virus titers in the tra-
chea. Virus titers in the nasal turbinates were high and similar for both groups of 
ferrets. Virus was detected in the brain of 1/3 animals inoculated with H3N2wt and 
3/3 animals inoculated with H3N2MBCS, but only at low titers (Fig 2D). Immunohis-
tochemistry was performed to confirm virus replication in nasal turbinate, trachea 
and brain at 3 dpi. After fixation in 10% neutral-buffered formalin and embedding 
in paraffin, tissue sections were stained using a monoclonal antibody against the 
Figure 2. Weight loss, virus replication, and influenza virus antigen in ferrets inoculat-
ed with H3N2wt and H3N2MBCS virus. Weight loss of ferrets inoculated with H3N2wt 
(black, circle) and H3N2MBCS (square, grey) virus (A). Mean bodyweight and standard 
deviation were calculated as percentages of bodyweight at time of inoculation for 
each group. After day 3, only 3 animals remained in each group. Virus shedding from 
the nose (B) and throat (C) of ferrets inoculated with H3N2wt (black) and H3N2MBCS 
(grey). Virus detection in tissues of ferrets inoculated with H3N2wt (black) and H3N-
2MBCS (grey) virus at day 3 (D). Geometric mean titers are shown, with error bars to 
indicate the standard deviation. The lower limit of detection is indicated by the dotted 
line. The number of positive tissues from the ferrets are shown. 
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nucleoprotein of influenza A virus [209]. Influenza virus antigen expression was not 
detected by immunohistochemistry in the brain and trachea of both groups of fer-
rets. In contrast, virus antigen was readily detected in the nasal turbinates of all 
three ferrets in both groups at 3 dpi. There was no evidence for different cellular 
tropism between H3N2MBCS and H3N2WT virus in the nasal turbinates of infected 
ferrets (Fig 3). These results indicated that replication of H3N2MBCS, like replication 
of H3N2WT, is mostly restricted to the upper respiratory tract of ferrets. 
The current study demonstrates that with an insertion of an MBCS identical to that 
of currently circulating HPAI H5 viruses, a human H3N2 virus becomes trypsin-in-
dependent in vitro. The introduction of an MBCS into other human and LPAI HA 
subtypes (H3, H6) also resulted in trypsin independent cleavage of HA0 in vitro 
[170,192,193,209]. Introduction of an MBCS in an LPAI H6N1 virus resulted in an 
increased intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) in chickens [209]. However, the 
consequences of the introduction of the MBCS on human H3N2 virus replication 
and pathogenesis in animal models were not investigated previously. Surprisingly, 
the trypsin independence of a human H3N2 virus did not result in enhanced patho-
genicity, tissue tropism, or cellular tropism in the ferret model, as compared with 
wild type H3N2 virus. If anything, the H3N2MBCS virus was slightly attenuated com-
pared to H3N2WT virus, based on weight loss and virus shedding from the upper 
respiratory tract. 
Both groups of inoculated ferrets revealed no virus replication in the lower respira-
tory tract. This is not unusual, as strain-to-strain variability among human H3N2 
viruses with respect to infection of the lower respiratory tract of ferrets has been 
demonstrated [154,213-215]. Although the H3N2MBCS virus was detected in the 
brain of ferrets, virus titers were very low and virus-infected cells were not detected 
by immunohistochemistry. Given that low virus titers were also detected for a ferret 
inoculated with H3N2WT virus, and that neither of the groups of infected ferrets 
Figure 3. Tissue distribution of the H3N2WT and 
H3N2MBCS virus in the respiratory tract
Expression of viral antigen in trachea, nasal turbinates 
(NT) and brain of ferrets inoculated with H3N2WT 
and H3N2MBCS at 3 dpi. Tissue sections were stained 
with a monoclonal antibody against influenza A virus 
nucleoprotein, visible as red-brown staining.
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developed neurological symptoms, we conclude that the MBCS in the context of 
H3 HA did not result in systemic virus replication and enhanced disease. In ferrets 
infected with more recent wildtype human H3N2 viruses, low virus titers were also 
detected in the brains [214]. 
The goal of the present work was to increase the basic understanding of the role of 
the MBCS and trypsin or furin-dependent cleavage of HA on influenza virus patho-
genesis in mammals. Our results indicate that an MBCS is not sufficient to increase 
the virulence of a human H3N2 virus. For HPAI H5N1 viruses, additional virulence 
determinants in HA and other viral proteins have been shown to affect virulence 
independently of the MBCS in ferrets and chickens [204,216-218]. It is possible that 
an MBCS in H3 HA in combination with other genetic changes, such as changes in 
the receptor binding site, could result in increased pathogenicity of human H3N2 
virus as well, by facilitating replication in extra-respiratory tissues. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Multi basic cleavage site as a virulence factor 
of influenza A viruses
2.3
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cal for systemic spread along the olfactory and 
hematogenous routes in ferrets
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AbstrAct
The route by which highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus spreads sys-
temically, including the central nervous system (CNS), is largely unknown in mam-
mals. Especially the olfactory route, which could be a route of entry into the CNS, 
has not been studied in detail. Although the multi basic cleavage site (MBCS) in 
the HA of HPAI H5N1 viruses is a major determinant of systemic spread in poultry, 
the association between the MBCS and systemic spread in mammals is less clear. 
Here we determined the virus distribution of HPAI H5N1 virus in ferrets in time and 
space—including along the olfactory route—and the role of the MBCS in systemic 
replication. Intranasal inoculation with wild type H5N1 virus revealed extensive rep-
lication in the olfactory mucosa from where it spread to the olfactory bulb and the 
rest of the CNS, including the cerebral spinal fluid (CSF). Virus spread to the heart, 
liver, pancreas and colon was also detected, indicating hematogenous spread. Fer-
rets inoculated intranasally with H5N1 virus lacking an MBCS demonstrated respi-
ratory tract infection only. In conclusion, HPAI H5N1 virus can spread systemically 
via two different routes, the olfactory and hematogenous routes in ferrets. This 
systemic spread was dependent on the presence of the MBCS in HA.
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iNtroDUctioN
In wild birds and poultry throughout the world, influenza A viruses are represented 
by 16 hemagglutinin (HA) and 9 neuraminidase (NA) antigenic subtypes [1,2]. In-
fluenza viruses of the H5 and H7 subtype may become highly pathogenic influenza 
(HPAI) viruses upon transmission from wild birds to poultry. HPAI H5N1 virus, which 
has been enzootic in poultry for more than a decade, causes severe damage to 
the poultry industry. Direct transmission of HPAI H5N1 virus to humans was first 
detected in 1997 [58] and has continued to be reported since, causing severe and 
often fatal disease with a case-fatality rate of approximately 60% [59]. Unlike most 
influenza viruses in mammals, which are normally restricted to the respiratory tract, 
HPAI H5N1 virus is regularly able to spread systemically in humans and other mam-
mals [66,219]. 
The highly pathogenic phenotype of avian influenza viruses in chickens is primarily 
determined by the acquisition of a multibasic cleavage site (MBCS) in the HA of a 
low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus, and is believed to be a major determi-
nant in tissue tropism and high pathogenicity in poultry [97,98,200]. The HA of low 
pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses can be cleaved by trypsin-like proteases. 
Replication of these LPAI viruses is therefore restricted to sites in the host where 
these enzymes are expressed, i.e. the respiratory and intestinal tract [10]. In con-
trast, the HA of HPAI viruses can be cleaved by ubiquitously expressed furin-like 
proteases, facilitating systemic replication in chickens [101]. 
In mammals, the association between the presence of an MBCS and systemic spread 
is less straightforward. None of the human pandemic or seasonal influenza viruses 
harbor an MBCS, and introduction of an MBCS in a human seasonal H3N2 influenza 
virus neither increased pathogenicity nor induced systemic spread in ferrets [220]. 
In contrast, removal of the MBCS from HA of an HPAI H5N1 virus resulted in a virus 
that caused respiratory tract infection without systemic spread in mice, indicating 
that the MBCS is a major virulence factor for mice [103]. Whether the MBCS in HPAI 
H5 is also a major determinant for systemic replication in other mammalian species 
remains unclear. 
Differences in replication sites of human and avian influenza viruses in the mam-
malian respiratory tract correspond with differences in localization of virus attach-
ment. In humans and ferrets, human influenza viruses attach abundantly to cells in 
the upper respiratory tract and along the tracheo-bronchial tree. In contrast, avian 
influenza viruses, including HPAI H5N1 virus, attach rarely to the upper respiratory 
tract, but attach abundantly to cells of the lower respiratory tract [90,147,206,221]. 
Interestingly, HPAI H5N1 virus does replicate in the ferret nose, although it does not 
attach to respiratory epithelial cells of the nose [214]. 
Extra-respiratory tract replication of HPAI H5N1 virus has been observed—although 
not consistently— in humans, ferrets, mice, cats, palm civets, tigers, leopard, do-
mestic dog, American mink, fox and stone marten [66,205]. In ferrets, animals com-
monly used to study influenza virus infections, as they resemble humans in receptor 
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distribution and disease signs closely, systemic virus replication has been reported 
for HPAI H5N1 viruses [204,207] although this depends on the route of inoculation 
and the virus isolate used [222-224].
Several studies have shown that the central nervous system (CNS) is the most 
common extra-respiratory site of replication after experimental intranasal inocula-
tion. The neurotropism of influenza viruses, including HPAI H5N1 viruses, has been 
studied in mice [225-230] and more recently in ferrets [222,223,231]. In mice, it 
was shown that influenza viruses could enter the CNS via the olfactory nerve and 
trigeminal nerve from the nasal cavity [226-230] but also via the vagal nerves and 
sympathetic nerves from the lungs [227]. In ferrets, HPAI H5N1 virus entered the 
CNS most likely via the olfactory nerve [222,231]. However, virus entry via the ol-
factory nerve, through infection of olfactory receptor neurons (ORN) of which the 
axons directly extent into the olfactory bulb, has never been proven in ferrets. In 
mice, virus replication of neurotropic influenza viruses in ORN has been described 
[228,232].
Here we studied the systemic spread of HPAI H5N1 virus in ferrets, with a special 
focus on the olfactory route. Additionally, we determined the role of the MBCS of 
HPAI H5N1 virus in this systemic spread. To this end, ferrets were inoculated with 
HPAI H5N1 virus either with or without the MBCS, and virus replication and associ-
ated lesions were determined in multiple tissues at different time points.
mAteriAls AND methoDs
cells and viruses
Madin-Darby Canine kidney (MDCK) cells were cultured in EMEM (Lonza, Breda, 
The Netherlands) supplemented with 10% FCS, 100 IU/ml penicillin, 100 μg/ml 
streptomycin, 2 mM glutamine, 1.5 mg/ml sodiumbicarbonate, 10 mM Hepes and 
non-essential amino acids. 293T cells were cultured in DMEM (Lonza) supplement-
ed with 10% FCS, 100 IU/ml penicillin, 100 μg/ml streptomycin, 2 mM glutamine, 1 
mM sodiumpyruvate and non-essential amino acids. 
Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus A/Indonesia/5/05 (H5N1) was isolated from 
a human case and passaged once in embryonated chicken eggs and once in MDCK 
cells. All eight gene segments were amplified by reverse transcription polymerase 
chain reaction (RT-PCR), cloned in a modified version of the bidirectional reverse 
genetics plasmid pHW2000 [171,208], and subsequently used to generate re-
combinant virus (H5N1WT) by reverse genetics as described elsewhere [171]. For 
the generation of H5N1 virus without an MBCS (H5N1ΔMBCS), the cleavage site 
PQRERRRKKR↓G in the H5 HA plasmid was changed to PQIETR↓G by RT-PCR with 
specific primers. Primer sequences are available upon request.
replication kinetics 
Multi step replication kinetics were determined by inoculating MDCK cells in the 
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presence and absence of 20 μg/ml trypsin (Lonza) with a multiplicity of infection 
(MOI) of 0.01 TCID50 per cell in two-fold. Supernatants were sampled at 6, 12, 24 
and 48 hr after inoculation and virus titers in these supernatants were determined 
as described below.
Virus titrations
Virus titers in nasal- and throat swabs, homogenized tissue samples from inocu-
lated ferrets, or samples from inoculated MDCK cells, were determined by end-
point titration in MDCK cells in 96-well plates (Greiner Bio-One). MDCK cells were 
inoculated with ten-fold serial dilutions of each sample, washed one hour after in-
oculation with PBS, and cultured in 200 μl of infection medium, consisting of EMEM 
supplemented with 100 U/ml penicillin, 100 μg/ml streptomycin, 2 mM glutamine, 
1.5 mg/ml sodiumbicarbonate, 10 mM Hepes, non-essential amino acids and 20 
μg/ml trypsin (Cambrex). Three days after inoculation, supernatants of infected cell 
cultures were tested for agglutinating activity using turkey erythrocytes as an indi-
cator of virus replication in the cells. Infectious virus titers were calculated from four 
replicates by the method of Spearman-Karber [233].
Western blotting 
293T cells were transfected with the plasmids expressing H5N1WT or H5N1∆MBCS 
HA gene segments using CaPO4 method. Cells were harvested 48 hours after trans-
fection and were treated either with PBS or 2.5 µg/ml trypsin (Lonza) for 1 hour at 
37 0C. Cells were lysed in hot lysis buffer and treated with 3x dissociation loading 
buffer for 5 min at 96 0C as previously described [209]. Cell lysates were subjected 
to electrophoresis in 10% SDS-polyacrylamide gels, blotted, and western blots were 
incubated with 1:2000 rabbit serum to A/Hong Kong/156/97 (H5) and a 1:3000 di-
luted peroxidase-labelled swine anti-rabbit antibody. Blots were developed with 
ECLTM Western Blotting Detection reagents. 
Ferret experiments
All animal studies were approved by an independent Animal Ethics Committee. All 
experiments were performed under ABSL3+ conditions. The ferret model used to 
study the pathogenicity and virus distribution of H5N1WT and H5N1∆MBCS viruses 
was described previously [150]. Groups of twelve influenza virus seronegative and 
Aleutian disease negative female ferrets (Mustela putorius furo) were inoculated 
intranasally with 106 TCID
50
 of H5N1WT or H5N1∆MBCS virus, divided over both 
nostrils (2 x 250µl). Throat and nose swabs were collected daily to determine vi-
rus excretion from the upper respiratory tract. Nose swabs were collected from 
only one nostril to keep the respiratory epithelium of the other nostril intact for 
pathology. Animals were weighed daily and observed for clinical signs as an indi-
cator of disease. Three animals from each group were euthanized at 1, 3, 5 and 7 
days post inoculation (dpi) and necropsies were performed according to a standard 
protocol. The trachea was clamped off so the lungs would not deflate upon open-
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ing of the pleural cavity, which allowed visual estimation of the area of affected 
lung parenchyma. Nasal turbinates (NT) containing both respiratory and olfactory 
mucosa, trachea, lungs, liver, spleen, kidney, colon, cervical spinal cord, pancreas, 
heart, cerebellum, cerebrum, serum and cerebral spinal fluid (CSF) were collected 
to study virus distribution by virus titration. Half the head was fixed in 10% formalin 
and multiple part of the respiratory and olfactory epithelium from the nasal cavity 
and the olfactory bulb, cerebrum, cerebellum and trigeminal nerve were collected 
for pathological investigation. Other tissues collected for pathological investigation 
were cervical spinal cord, tonsil, trachea, left lung, heart, liver, spleen, pancreas, 
duodenum, jejunum, colon, kidney and adrenal gland. 
Pathology & immunohistochemistry
Samples for pathological examination were collected in 10% neutral-buffered for-
malin during necropsy (lungs after inflation with formalin) and fixed for 7 days. Tis-
sues were embedded in paraffin, sectioned at 3 μm, and stained with hematoxylin 
and eosin (HE) for the detection of histological lesions by light microscopy. For the 
detection of virus antigen by immunohistochemistry, tissues were stained with a 
monoclonal antibody against influenza A virus nucleoprotein as described previ-
ously [206]. 
Virus histochemistry
The attachment pattern of H5N1WT virus was determined in olfactory epitheli-
um and respiratory epithelium from control ferrets (n=2) as described previously 
[147]. Briefly, reassortant virus consisting of six gene segments of influenza virus A/
PR8/8/34 and the HA and PB2 of A/Indonesia/5/05 was propagated in MDCK cells 
and concentrated and purified using sucrose gradients. Concentrated virus was in-
activated by dialysis against 0.1 % formalin, and labelled with fluorescein isothiocy-
anate. Paraffin-embedded tissues were incubated with FITC-labeled H5N1WT virus, 
and detected with a peroxidase-labeled rabbit anti-FITC antibody (DAKO, Heverlee, 
Belgium) and the signal was amplified with a tyramide signal amplification system 
(Perkin Elmer, Groningen, The Netherlands). Peroxidase was revealed with 3-ami-
no-9-ethyl-carbozyle resulting in a red precipitate. 
 
resUlts
h5N1Δmbcs trypsin dependent in vitro
The functionality of the HA protein after deletion of the MBCS was investigated by 
expression of the HA of H5N1wt and H5N1ΔMBCS viruses in 293T cells. The cleav-
age pattern was determined in the presence and absence of trypsin. Upon deletion 
of the MBCS, efficient cleavage of HA0 into HA1 and HA2 was observed only in the 
presence of trypsin whereas the H5N1WT HA was cleaved in the absence of trypsin 
(Fig. 1A). Next, the effect of the deletion of the MBCS on the replication kinetics was 
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determined in the absence and presence of trypsin (20 μg/ml). Via reverse genet-
ics, H5N1wt and H5N1ΔMBCS viruses were rescued. H5N1wt replicated to similar 
virus titers in the presence and absence of trypsin. In contrast, H5N1ΔMBCS virus 
did not replicate efficiently in the absence of trypsin which is in agreement with an 
LPAI virus phenotype (Fig. 1B). H5N1ΔMBCS virus is able to replicate one round of 
infection. Hereafter the HA of progeny released H5N1ΔMBCS cannot be cleaved 
and therefore the virus is no longer infectious.
clinical signs and gross lesions in ferrets inoculated with h5N1Δmbcs virus were 
less severe compared to h5N1Wt virus inoculated ferrets
To determine the pathogenicity of HPAI H5N1 virus in ferrets, including systemic 
spread, and to elucidate the role of the MBCS, 12 ferrets were inoculated intra-
nasally with 106 TCID
50
 of H5N1WT or H5N1∆MBCS virus. Ferrets inoculated with 
H5N1WT virus developed anorexia and lethargy. In contrast, ferrets inoculated with 
H5N1∆MBCS virus did not reveal any clinical signs. Ferrets were weighed daily as 
indicator of disease. The maximum weight loss was 20% (20 ± 1.6) for animals in-
oculated with H5N1WT virus at 7 dpi, the end of the experiment. Ferrets inoculated 
with H5N1∆MBCS virus lost a maximum of 6% (6.0 ± 4.0) of their body weight at 3 
dpi and there body weight returned to 100% at 7 dpi (Fig. 2A). 
Gross pathological examination in ferrets inoculated with H5N1WT virus revealed 
multifocal dark red areas of consolidation in the lungs in 1 out of 3 (1/3), 2/3, 3/3 
and 3/3 ferrets at 1, 3, 5 and 7 dpi respectively, with a maximum of affected lung 
tissue of 37% (37 ± 39) at 7 dpi. In ferrets inoculated with H5N1∆MBCS virus, 2/3 
at 1, 3 and 7 dpi and 1/3 at 5 dpi showed multifocal dark red areas of consolidation 
in the lungs with a maximum of affected lung tissue of 7% (7 ± 6) at 7 dpi (Table 
1). The relative lung weight had a maximum at 5 dpi for ferrets inoculated with 
H5N1WT and H5N1∆MBCS virus of 1.3 (1.3 ± 0.4) and 1.0 (1.0 ± 0.4), respectively 
(Table 1). Stomachs were empty in all ferrets inoculated with H5N1WT virus, with 
Figure 1. In vitro phenotype of H5N1wt and H5N1ΔMBCS viruses
(A) Western blots of lysates of 293T cells untransfected or transfected with HAs 
of H5N1∆MBCS virus and H5N1WT virus upon treatment with (T) or without (−) 
trypsin. (B) Replication of H5N1WT virus (black) and H5N1∆MBCS virus (grey) 
in MDCK cells in the presence (square) or absence (circle) of trypsin. Geometric 
mean titers were calculated from two independent experiments, error bars indi-
cate standard deviations. The lower limit of detection is indicated by the dotted 
line.
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the exception of 2 ferrets at 1 dpi. Only two ferrets inoculated with H5N1∆MBCS 
virus revealed empty stomachs at 1 and 3 dpi (Table 1). These results indicate that 
the H5N1∆MBCS virus induced less severe disease compared to H5N1WT virus con-
sidering the body weight, clinical signs and gross lesions. 
Virus isolation from swabs and organs differs between h5N1Wt and h5N1Δmbcs 
virus inoculated ferrets 
Nose and throat swabs were collected daily, and virus titers were determined by 
end-point titration in MDCK cells. Nose swabs remained positive up to 7 dpi in H5N-
1wt virus inoculated ferrets and up to 6 dpi in H5N1ΔMBCS virus inoculated ferrets. 
(Fig. 2B). Virus shedding from the throat continued up to 7 or 6 dpi of H5N1WT or 
H5N1∆MBCS virus inoculated ferrets, respectively (Fig. 2B). 
Figure 2. Weight loss and virus shedding in ferrets inoculated with H5N1WT or H5N1ΔMBCS viruses
(A) Mean body weights and standard deviations are depicted as percentage of body weight at time 
of inoculation for each group inoculated with H5N1WT virus (black) and H5N1∆MBCS virus (grey). (B) 
Virus shedding from the upper respiratory tract of ferrets inoculated with H5N1WT virus (black) and 
H5N1∆MBCS virus (grey) from the nose (dashed line) and throat (solid line) are indicated. Geometric 
mean titers are shown, with error bars to indicate the standard deviation. The lower limit of detection 
is 1.5 10log TCID
50
.
Virus dpi
Animals with 
macroscopic lung 
lesions (n/N)a
Area of lung 
affected (%)b
relative lung 
weight (%)
empty stomach (n/N)c
h5N1
Wt
1 1/3 2 ± 3 0.7 ± 0.0 1/3
3 2/3 3 ± 3 0.7 ± 0.0 3/3
5 3/3 29 ± 23 1.3 ± 0.4 3/3
7 3/3 37 ± 39 1.3 ± 0.7 3/3
h5N1
Δmbcs
1 2/3 3 ± 3 0.8 ± 0.1 1/3
3 2/3 5 ± 5 0.8 ± 0.2 1/3
5 1/3 2 ± 3 1.0 ± 0.4 0/3
7 2/3 7 ± 6 0.8 ± 0.1 0/3
table 1. Gross pathology in ferrets inoculated with H5N1WT virus or H5N1ΔMBCS virus
a No. of ferrets in which macroscopic lung lesions were detected/total no. of ferrets is depicted
b Area of lung affected and relative lung weight are reported as means ± SD (n=3)
c  No. of ferrets with empty stomachs/total no. of ferrets is depicted
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Shedding from the respiratory tract of H5N1∆MBCS virus inoculated ferrets appears 
to be lower than in H5N1wt virus inoculated ferrets, indicative for less efficient virus 
replication. 
At 1, 3, 5 and 7 dpi, three ferrets from each group were euthanized and NT, trachea, 
lungs, liver, spleen, kidney, colon, spinal cord, pancreas, heart, cerebellum, cere-
brum, serum and CSF were collected and virus titers were determined. The virus 
titers in samples from lung and trachea were similar at 1, 3 and 5 dpi between H5N-
1WT and H5N1∆MBCS virus inoculated ferrets. However, in NT the virus titers were 
3.0 10log TCID50 lower in H5N1∆MBCS virus inoculated ferrets than in H5N1WT 
inoculated ferrets at 1, 3, and 5 dpi, respectively. At 7 dpi, virus was undetectable in 
all samples from H5N1∆MBCS virus inoculated ferrets, indicating that the animals 
cleared the virus by this time point (Table 2). Infectious virus was isolated from 
extra-respiratory tissues of H5N1WT virus inoculated ferrets from 3 dpi onwards. 
table 2. Virus titers in tissues and CSF of ferrets inoculated with H5N1WT virus or H5N1ΔMBCS virus
Virus titer(s) (log 10tciD
50
/gram tissue)
h5N1
Wt
h5N1
Δmbcs
tissue day 1 day 3 day 5 day 7 day 1 day 3 day 5 day 7
respiratory system
  Nasal turbinates
6.0±0.7 
(3/3)a
7.2±0.9 
(3/3)
6.6±0.8 
(3/3)
6.2±0.2 
(3/3)
3.0±0.0 
(2/3)
4.2±0.6 
(2/3)
3.6±0.3 
(3/3)
<1.2 b
  trachea
2.9±0.7 
(3/3)
3.2 
(1/2)c
3.4±0.2 
(2/3)
3.9±0.6 
(2/3)
3.0±0.3 
(3/3)
1.9 (1/3)
3.9±2.8 
(3/3)
<1.7
  lung
2.0±0.7 
(2/3)
2.9 (1/3)
5.3±1.7 
(3/3)
4.2±2.3 
(2/3)
2.9±0.2 
(3/3)
1.8 (1/3)
3.9±2.2 
(2/3)
<1.3
Nervous system
  cerebrum <1.5 <1.5 <1.5
2.1±0.2 
(3/3)
<1.5 <1.5 <1.5 <1.5
  cerebellum <1.7 <1.7 <1.7
3.7±0.0 
(2/3)
<1.7 <1.7 <1.7 <1.7
  spinal cord <1.7 <1.7 <1.7 2.1 (1/3) <1.7 <1.7 <1.7 <1.7
  cerebrospinal fluidd <1.5 <1.5 <1.5
3.8±0.7 
(2/3)
<1.5 <1.5 <1.5 <1.5
other
  Pancreas <1.5 <1.5 3.0 (1/3)
2.9±0.5 
(2/3)
<1.5 <1.5 <1.5 <1.5
  liver <1.1 <1.1
2.8±0.9 
(3/3)
4.4±1.1 
(3/3)
<1.1 <1.1 <1.1 <1.1
  colon <1.4 2.1 (1/3) <1.4
1.8±0.1 
(2/3)
<1.4 <1.4 <1.4 <1.4
  heart <1.5 <1.5
2.1±0.3 
(2/3)
2.3 (1/3) <1.5 <1.5 <1.5 <1.5
a Virus titers are reported as means ± SD (n=3) or as individual titers if viruses were not isolated from all three 
animals. No. of ferrets in which virus positive organs were detected/total no. of ferrets is depicted
b Cut off values are given for negative tissues
c Only two trachea samples were collected
d Virus titers of cerebrospinal fluid are in log10TCID50/ml
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At 3 dpi, infectious virus was found in one colon sample. At 5 dpi infectious virus 
was found in the liver (3/3), pancreas (1/3) and heart (2/3). At 7 dpi, extra-respi-
ratory infectious virus was detected in the liver (3/3), pancreas (2/3), colon (2/3), 
heart (1/3), spinal cord (1/3), cerebellum (2/3) and cerebrum (3/3). In contrast, 
H5N1∆MBCS virus inoculated ferrets did not reveal any extra-respiratory infectious 
virus. Infectious virus was not detected in spleen and kidney at any of the time 
points in H5N1WT virus inoculated ferrets. Interestingly, at 7 dpi we detected in-
fectious virus in the CSF. No infectious virus could be isolated from the serum of 
H5N1WT virus inoculated ferrets (Table 2). Nevertheless, low levels of viral genomic 
RNA were detected in serum by quantitative RT-PCR from 1/3, 2/3, 1/3 and 3/3 
ferrets at 1, 3, 5 and 7 dpi respectively (data not shown). No infectious virus was 
isolated from extra-respiratory tissues, serum and CSF of H5N1ΔMBCS virus inocu-
lated ferrets.
table 3. Detection of influenza A virus nucleoprotein in tissues from ferrets inoculated either with H5N1WT 
virus or H5N1ΔMBCS virus 
h5N1
Wt
h5N1
Δmbcs
tissue day 1 day 3 day 5 day 7 day 1 day 3 day 5 day 7
respiratory 
system
  respiratory 
epithelium
+/- 
(3/3) a
+/- (3/3)b
+/- 
(3/3)b
- c
+/- 
(2/3)
+/- 
(1/3)b
- -
  olfactory 
epithelium
+/- (3/3) + (3/3)b,d + (3/3)b + (3/3)b
+/- 
(2/3)
+ (3/3)b +/- (2/3)b + (2/3)
  trachea - - - +/- (1/3) - - +/- (2/3)b -
  bronchus - - -
+/- 
(1/3)b
- - - -
  bronchioles - - +(1/3)b + (1/3)b - - +/- (1/3)b -
  Alveoli - + (1/3)b + (3/3)b - - + (1/3)b + (1/3)b -
Nervous system
  olfactory bulb - + (1/3)b + (2/3)b + (3/3)b - - - -
  cerebrum - - + (1/3)b + (2/3)b - - - -
  cerebellum - - - + (1/3)b - - - -
  spinal cord - - - + (1/3)b - - - -
  trigeminal 
nerve
- - + (1/3)b - - - - -
other
  Pancreas - - - + (1/3)b - - - -
  liver - - - + (2/3)b - - - -
  tonsils - + (1/1)b,e + (1/3)b - - - - -
a +/- < 10 cells contained virus antigen 
b The detection of virus antigen was associated with histological lesions
c- Virus antigen was not detected
d + >10 cells contained virus antigen
e Only one tonsil was sampled
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Distibution of virus antigen is more widespread in h5N1Wt virus inoculated fer-
rets compared to h5N1Δmbcs virus inoculated ferrets
The distribution of virus antigen was determined in cerebrum, cerebellum, trigemi-
nal nerve, NT, spinal cord, tonsil, trachea, left lung, heart, liver, spleen, pancreas, 
duodenum, jejunum, colon, kidney and adrenal gland from ferrets inoculated with 
H5N1WT or H5N1∆MBCS virus on 1, 3, 5 and 7 dpi (Table 3). 
In ferrets inoculated with H5N1WT virus, virus antigen was detected in the res-
piratory tract from 1 dpi onward. In the NT, virus antigen was observed in only 
a few respiratory epithelial cells at 1, 3 and 5 dpi. Virus antigen was present 
in a few olfactory receptor neurons at 1 dpi, but abundantly present at 3, 5 
and 7 dpi, with a peak at 3 dpi (Fig. 3). Interestingly, virus antigen was also ob-
served in the Bowman’s glands and the olfactory ensheathing cells in the lam-
ina propria of the olfactory mucosa (Fig. 4). In the lower respiratory tract, 
virus antigen was present in 1/3 ferrets at 3 dpi, 3/3 at 5 dpi and 1/3 at 7 dpi. 
Figure 3. Influenza virus antigen expression in respiratory epithelium and olfactory epithelium 
of ferrets inoculated either with H5N1WT virus or H5N1ΔMBCS virus
Influenza virus antigen in the respiratory epithelium (left two columns) and olfactory epithe-
lium (right two columns) in ferrets inoculated with H5N1WT or H5N1ΔMBCS virus at 1, 3, 5 and 
7 dpi (original magnification 400x). Tissue sections were stained with a monoclonal antibody 
against influenza A virus nucleoprotein, visible as red staining. In the respiratory epithelium, 
individual virus antigen positive epithelial cells are observed 1, 3 and 5 dpi in H5N1WT virus 
inoculated ferrets and at 1 and 3 dpi in H5N1ΔMBCS virus inoculated ferrets. In the olfactory 
epithelium, virus antigen in H5N1WT inoculated ferrets was present from 1 till 7 dpi, with a 
peak at 3 dpi. At day 5 and 7 dpi there was focal severe necrosis of olfactory epithelial cells, with 
infiltration of neutrophils (arrows). In the H5N1ΔMBCS virus inoculated ferrets, virus antigen 
was present from day 1 till 7.   
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Figure 4. Detection of histological 
lesions or influenza A virus antigen 
expression in tissues from the nerv-
ous system of ferrets inoculated with 
H5N1WT virus
A cross-section of a ferret head to il-
lustrate the different anatomical sites 
is shown at the top. The nasal cav-
ity, containing the nasal turbinates, 
which are lined by respiratory mu-
cosa, except at the back and top of 
the cavity where they are lined by 
olfactory mucosa (1). The olfactory 
bulb (2) is separated from the nasal 
cavity by the cribriform plate, and 
connected via the olfactory tract (3) 
to the cerebrum (4). The cerebellum 
(5), cerebrum, olfactory bulb and ol-
factory tract are all surrounded by the 
meninges (6). Immunohistochemistry 
for influenza A virus antigen in dif-
ferent tissues of the olfactory route 
(left and middle columns, original 
magnification of 200x and 400x re-
spectively). Histological lesions in dif-
ferent tissues of the olfactory route 
(right column, original magnification 
400x). Olfactory epithelium (1) which 
contained virus antigen from 1 dpi in 
olfactory receptor neurons, with fo-
cally necrosis of olfactory epithelial 
cells associated with infiltrating neu-
trophils (arrow); Olfactory ensheath-
ing cells and Bowman’s glands (1), 
which contained virus antigen from 3 
dpi, with necrosis of Bowman’s glands 
epithelial cells associated with infil-
trating neutrophils along the nerve 
twigs (*); Olfactory bulb (2), which 
contained virus antigen from 3 dpi, 
with infiltrating neutrophils between 
the glomeruli (*) in the glomerular 
layer; Olfactory tract (3), which con-
tained virus antigen from 7 dpi, with 
neuronal necrosis and infiltrating 
neutrophils (arrow); Cerebrum (4), 
which contained virus antigen from 5 
dpi, with neuronal necrosis and infil-
trating neutrophils (arrow); Cerebel-
lum (5) which contained virus antigen 
from 7 dpi, with neuronal necrosis 
and infiltrating neutrophils; and me-
ninges (6), which contained virus 
antigen from 7dpi, with infiltration 
of many mononuclear cells and occa-
sional neutrophils (arrow). Tissue sec-
tions were stained with a monoclonal 
antibody against influenza A virus 
nucleoprotein, visible as red staining.
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Virus antigen was most commonly found in alveolar epithelial cells and in 2/3 fer-
rets (5 and 7 dpi) in epithelial cells of the bronchioles, bronchus and trachea (Table 
3).
In the nervous system of H5N1WT virus inoculated animals, virus antigen was found 
in 0/3, 1/3, 3/3 and 3/3 ferrets at 1, 3, 5 and 7 dpi, respectively (Table 3-4). At 3 dpi, 
virus antigen was first observed in periglomerular cells in the glomerular layer of 
the olfactory bulb where the axons of the olfactory receptor neurons have contact 
with both second order neurons and periglomerular cells in the olfactory bulb. At 5 
dpi, virus antigen was observed in the periglomerular cells of the olfactory bulb, in 
glial cells in the cerebrum and in one neuron in the trigeminal nerve. At 7 dpi, virus 
antigen was found in mitral cells and granular cells in the olfactory bulb, in glial cells 
and neuronal cells in the olfactory tract, in glial cell and neuronal cells in the cer-
ebrum and cerebellum, in meningeal cells surrounding the cerebrum, cerebellum 
and spinal cord, and in ependymal cells in choroid plexus around the cerebellum 
(Fig. 4). 
Beyond the respiratory tract and CNS, virus antigen was observed in lymphoid cells 
in the tonsils at 3 and 5 dpi, in hepatocytes in the liver at 7 dpi, and in acinar cells in 
the pancreas at 7 dpi (Table 3, Fig. 5). No virus antigen was detected in tissues of the 
heart, adrenal gland, kidney, spleen, duodenum, jejunum or colon.
In ferrets inoculated with H5N1∆MBCS virus, virus antigen expression was restrict-
ed to the respiratory tract (Table 3). Virus antigen was only found in a few respira-
tory epithelial cells at 1 and 3 dpi. In the olfactory epithelium, virus antigen was 
observed in 2/3, 3/3, 2/3 and 2/3 ferrets at 1, 3, 5 and 7 dpi (Fig. 3). Overall, the 
number of olfactory receptor neurons that contained virus antigen was lower in the 
H5N1∆MBCS inoculated ferrets than in the H5N1WT virus inoculated ferrets. There 
was no evidence of virus antigen in the Bowman’s glands and olfactory ensheating 
cells in the H5N1∆MBCS virus inoculated ferrets. 
No. with histological lesions/No. with virus antigen expression 
at each day
Nervous tissue day 1 (n=3) day 3 (n=3) day 5 (n=3) day 7 (n=3)
olfactory epithelium 0/3 3/3 3/3 3/3
olfactory bulb 0/0 0/1 1/2 3/3
cerebrum 0/0 0/0 0/1 3/2
cerebellum 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/1
spinal cord 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/1
leptomeninges 0/0 0/0 1/0 3/1
choroid plexus 0/0 0/0 0/3 0/1
table 4. Presence of histological lesions and the presence of virus antigen in tissues that belong 
to the nervous system in ferrets inoculated with HPAI H5N1WT virus
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histological lesions in ferrets inoculated with h5N1Wt virus were more severe 
compared to h5N1Δmbcs virus inoculated ferrets
Association of histological lesions and influenza virus infection was based on co-
localization of lesions and influenza virus antigen. Influenza virus-associated lesions 
in H5N1WT virus inoculated ferrets predominated in nasal cavity, central nervous 
system, and lower respiratory tract, and were less frequent in liver, pancreas, and 
tonsils (Table 3). Influenza virus-associated lesions in H5N1ΔMBCS virus inoculated 
ferrets were restricted to the nasal cavity and lower respiratory tract.
Lesions in both the olfactory and respiratory epithelium of the nasal cavity occurred 
commonly in H5N1WT virus inoculated ferrets (Table 3), but the lesions were much 
more extensive and severe in the olfactory mucosa than in the respiratory mucosa. 
Olfactory mucosa lesions consisted of a moderate or severe, multifocal necrotizing 
rhinitis, characterized at 3 dpi by necrosis of olfactory epithelial cells and of epithe-
lial cells of the underlying Bowman’s glands, and infiltration by moderate numbers 
of partly degenerate neutrophils. At 5 dpi, lesions progressed to multiple erosions 
of the olfactory mucosa adjacent to reactive hypertrophy and hyperplasia of re-
maining olfactory epithelial cells, and disruption of the histological architecture of 
the Bowman’s glands. The lesions at 7 dpi were similar to those at 5 dpi with the ad-
dition of hypertrophy and hyperplasia of remaining epithelial cells in the Bowman’s 
glands. In comparison, respiratory mucosa lesions consisted of a mild, focal rhinitis, 
characterized by infiltration of a few neutrophils in the respiratory epithelium and 
underlying connective tissue. Lesions in the olfactory and respiratory epithelium 
were less common in H5N1ΔMBCS virus inoculated ferrets (Table 3) and milder in 
character.
Lesions in the central nervous system of H5N1WT virus inoculated ferrets first oc-
curred in the olfactory bulb of single ferrets at 3 and 5 dpi, and subsequently were 
widespread throughout the central nervous system of all ferrets at 7 dpi (Table 4, 
Fig. 4). Olfactory bulb lesions consisted of a focal infiltration with rare neutrophils in 
the glomerular layer at 3 dpi. At 5 dpi, olfactory bulb lesions had extended to multi-
focal infiltration with moderate numbers of neutrophils in the glomerular and gran-
ular layers, as well as perivascular cuffing with mononuclear cells and neutrophils. 
At 7 dpi, lesions were similar to those at 5 dpi, except that they were restricted to 
the granular layer and perivascular cuffing consisted predominantly of mononuclear 
cells. At 7 dpi, lesions also were present in the olfactory tract, cerebrum, cerebel-
lum, and spinal cord. In general, these lesions consisted of multiple foci of neuronal 
necrosis, infiltration by moderate numbers of partly degenerate neutrophils, and 
perivascular cuffing with mononuclear cells. The leptomeninges overlying these tis-
sues were infiltrated by many mononuclear cells and occasional neutrophils. In ad-
dition to cerebellar lesions, two ferrets also had necrosis and sloughing of adjacent 
ependymal cells and edema of the underlying neuropil.
Lesions in the lower respiratory tract were present in five H5N1WT virus–inoculated 
ferrets (Table 3) and were mild and focal except for those in one ferret at 5 dpi, 
which were moderate and locally extensive. In general, lesions were centred on al-
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veoli and bronchioles, with milder and less frequent lesions in bronchi and trachea. 
At 3 dpi, the lesions were characterized by necrosis and loss of alveolar and bron-
chiolar epithelial cells, infiltration of neutrophils in alveolar and bronchiolar walls, 
and presence of neutrophils mixed with fibrin in alveolar and bronchiolar lumina. 
At 5 and 7 dpi, mononuclear cells progressively predominated over neutrophils in 
the inflammatory cell infiltrate, and there was hypertrophy and hyperplasia of epi-
thelial cells in both alveoli and bronchioles. Lesions in the lower respiratory tract of 
ferrets inoculated with H5N1ΔMBCS virus were present in single ferrets at 3, 5, and 
7 dpi. These lesions were focal and comparable in appearance to those in ferrets 
inoculated with H5N1WT virus.
Lesions outside the nervous and respiratory systems were restricted to the liver, 
pancreas, and tonsils of ferrets inoculated with H5N1WT virus. In the liver, lesions 
were present in two ferrets at 7 dpi (Table 3, Fig. 5). These lesions consisted of 
multifocal necrosis of hepatocytes and replacement by variable proportions of 
neutrophils and mononuclear cells. Additionally, there was bile duct hyperplasia. 
Figure 5. Detection of histological lesions and 
influenza A virus antigen expression in extra-
respiratory tract tissues in ferrets inoculated 
with H5N1WT virus 
In the liver, virus antigen was observed in 
hepatocytes, with multifocal necrosis of hepa-
tocytes and replacement by variable numbers 
of neutrophils and mononuclear cells. In the 
pancreas, virus antigen was observed in acinar 
cells, with necrosis of acinar cells, widespread 
edema and infiltration of neutrophils and 
mononuclear cells. 
Figure 6. Attachment of H5N1WT to ferret respiratory epithelium and olfactory epithelium in 
the nose
No attachment of H5N1WT virus to the apical side of respiratory epithelium (left) and abun-
dant attachment of H5N1WT virus to the apical side of the olfactory epithelium (right) (original 
magnification 1000x). Tissue sections were incubated with H5N1WT virus, attachment is vis-
ible as red staining
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In the pancreas of one ferret at 7 dpi, there was multifocal necrosis of pancreatic 
acinar cells, with widespread edema and infiltration of neutrophils and mononu-
clear cells. In the tonsils of single ferrets at 3 and 5 dpi, there was focal and mild (3 
dpi) or multifocal and moderate (5 dpi) lymphocytic necrosis in the lymphoid tissue, 
with infiltration of neutrophils.
h5N1Wt virus attaches abundantly to olfactory epithelium
To explain the differences in number of cells infected between the respiratory 
epithelium and olfactory epithelium in ferrets inoculated with H5N1WT virus, we 
determined the attachment pattern of H5N1WT virus on these tissues from unin-
fected ferrets in the nose. There was no attachment of H5N1WT virus to respira-
tory epithelium, which is in accordance with previous observations [90]. However, 
H5N1WT virus was able to attach abundantly to the apical side of the olfactory 
epithelium (Fig. 6). H5N1ΔMBCS virus reveals the same attachment pattern, since 
the receptor preference of the virus has not been changed as was shown by Chuti-
nimitkul et al. [90].
 
DiscUssioN
This study improves our knowledge of systemic spread of HPAI H5N1 virus in a mam-
malian model in two respects. First, we show that the olfactory epithelium forms 
an island of susceptible cells in a sea of relatively resistant respiratory epithelium. 
From this island, HPAI H5N1 virus spreads directly to the CNS via the olfactory route. 
Second, we show that the MBCS is necessary for systemic spread of HPAI H5N1 vi-
rus. In its absence, the virus is restricted to the respiratory tract.
Intranasal inoculation of HPAI H5N1WT virus resulted in respiratory tract infection, 
characterized by extensive replication and lesions in the olfactory epithelium. The 
abundant attachment and replication of HPAI H5N1WT virus in cells of the olfactory 
epithelium explains the origin of the high virus titers found in homogenized NT. 
Virus antigen in the olfactory epithelium peaks at 3 dpi (Fig. 3) which corresponded 
with a peak in infectious virus titers in the NT at 3 dpi (Table 2) and nose swabs at 
2 dpi (Fig. 2). The lack of abundant virus replication in the respiratory epithelium is 
consistent with the rare attachment of H5N1 virus (Fig. 6). Furthermore, low repli-
cation in the respiratory epithelium explains the relatively low virus titers found in 
the nasal swabs, compared to titers found after inoculation with a seasonal H3N2 
virus [220]. It is therefore tempting to speculate that a switch from replication in the 
olfactory epithelium to the respiratory epithelium would result in higher virus titers 
in nasal swabs and possibly efficient respiratory droplet transmission [234]. Inter-
estingly, intranasal inoculation of H5N1 virus did not result in a consistent severe 
inflammation of the lower respiratory tract which is in accordance with a previous 
study by Bodewes et al [222].
There was evidence for two routes of extra respiratory spread in the HPAI H5N1wt 
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virus inoculated ferrets; first via the olfactory route to the CNS and secondly via the 
hematogenous route. First, HPAI H5N1 virus is able to directly infect and replicate 
extensively in ORN in the olfactory epithelium, from which it spread to the olfactory 
bulb and further into the CNS. The ORN, which were influenza virus antigen posi-
tive from 1 dpi onwards, have axons that extent through the cribriform plate into 
the glomerular layer of the olfactory bulb. These axons synaps with periglomerular 
cells and neurons in the olfactory bulb, which contained virus antigen from 3 dpi 
onwards. Since it has been shown for HPAI viruses that trans-axonal transport is 
possible [235,236], infection of ORN provides a direct route for H5N1 virus into 
the olfactory bulb. From 5 dpi onwards, virus spread along the olfactory tract into 
the cerebrum and cerebellum was observed. Infectious virus was detected in CSF 
at 7 dpi together with virus antigen in the meninges, choroid plexus and epedy-
mal cells, providing an additional route of virus spread throughout the CNS from 7 
dpi onwards as described before [222]. The observations that HPAI H5N1WT virus 
spreads to the CNS without severe respiratory disease, fits with the case report of 
two children with acute encephalitis, without initial respiratory disease. From one 
of these children, HPAI H5N1 virus was detected in the CSF retrospectively [237]. It 
remains to be determined if virus entry via the olfactory route is a unique feature 
of A/Indonesia/5/05 HPAI H5N1 virus, or that other HPAI H5N1 strains and possibly 
seasonal influenza viruses are also able to enter the CNS via the olfactory route in 
the ferret model [223]. 
Besides the olfactory route, there was also evidence for HPAI H5N1WT virus spread 
via the hematogenous route. The pattern of virus distribution in colon, pancreas, 
heart and liver is indicative for blood-borne spread which correlates with the detec-
tion of viral genomic RNA in serum. Hematogenous spread into the CNS appears to 
be less likely considering the observed virus distribution along the olfactory route. 
This is also in agreement with previous studies that also suggest the olfactory tract 
as a route of entry into the CNS [222,231].
The extra-respiratory spread observed in the HPAI H5N1WT virus inoculated ferrets 
was dependent on the MBCS, since replication was restricted to the respiratory tract 
in H5N1∆MBCS inoculated ferrets. In addition, clinical disease was also dependent 
on the MBCS since ferrets inoculated with H5N1∆MBCS revealed less symptoms 
than H5N1WT inoculated ferrets. The role of the MBCS in H5N1 virus in the extra-
respiratory spread in ferrets corresponds with observations in chickens and mice 
[97,103]. However, the mechanism by which HPAI H5N1 virus spreads beyond the 
respiratory tract varies largely between chickens and mammals. In chickens, the 
acquisition of an MBCS results in an endothelial cell tropism, which facilitates sys-
temic replication in endothelial cells and subsequent replication in extra-respiratory 
organs [238]. In contrast, in mammals—and some bird species—the presence of an 
MBCS in H5N1 virus results in systemic replication of H5N1 virus, without extensive 
replication in endothelial cells [239,240]. Interestingly, the presence of an MBCS 
in a seasonal H3N2 virus did not result in systemic dissemination [220]. This lack 
of systemic dissemination might be due in part to a difference in cell tropism in 
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the respiratory tract. Seasonal H3N2 virus and HPAI H5N1 virus recognize different 
sialic acids and are known to target different cell types in both the upper- and lower 
respiratory tract [147,221]. 
Replication of H5N1∆MBCS virus —which was trypsin dependent in vitro— was 
strongly reduced in the nose (Table 2) both in virus titers and in numbers of influ-
enza virus positive cells in the olfactory mucosa compared to H5N1WT virus (Fig. 
3). However this difference was not observed as clearly in the virus titers from the 
nose swabs, probably due to the overall low viral shedding from the nose. However, 
virus replication in the lower respiratory tract was not reduced early after inocula-
tion compared with H5N1WT inoculated ferrets. Since the HA of H5N1∆MBCS vi-
rus can not be cleaved by intracellular furin-like proteases, activation of the HA of 
this virus is dependent on cell membrane and soluble proteases. This could indi-
cate that expression of these proteases varies between the different anatomical 
sites and cell types in the respiratory tract of ferrets. In rats, the composition of 
proteases and inhibitory compounds varies largely between different anatomical 
sites in the respiratory tract [241]. In humans, mucus on top of the human olfac-
tory epithelium contains protease inhibitors [242]. Further studies are therefore 
required into the protease and protease inhibitor composition and there role in 
cell tropism and pathogenicity of influenza viruses in mammals. Ferrets inoculated 
with H5N1∆MBCS revealed no systemic replication. Lack of virus spread along the 
olfactory tract might be the result of low virus titers in the upper respiratory tract 
and/or the absence of the appropriate proteases outside the respiratory tract in 
ferrets. The low virus titers in the nose might not be sufficient for a spill over to the 
olfactory bulb and CNS. However, it is not known if the appropriate proteases are 
present along the olfactory route in ferrets. Studies in the rat CNS have shown that 
trypsin I, which was able to cleave the HA of multiple influenza viruses, is present 
but not equally distributed throughout cells of- and locations in the CNS [241]. 
In conclusion, HPAI H5N1WT virus is able to directly infect and replicate extensively 
in olfactory receptor neurons in the olfactory epithelium, from which it spreads 
to the olfactory bulb and further to the CNS. Interestingly, this entrance via the 
olfactory route was dependent on the presence of the MBCS in influenza virus A/
Indonesia/5/05. Future studies should reveal whether this CNS invasion is a unique 
feature of HPAI H5N1 virus, or that more influenza viruses are able to enter the CNS 
via the olfactory route.
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CHAPTER 3
Genome reassortment of influenza A viruses
3.1
Possible increased pathogenicity of pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 influenza virus upon reassortment
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AbstrAct 
Since the emergence of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza A virus in April 2009, 
three influenza A viruses – seasonal H3N2, seasonal H1N1, and pandemic H1N1 - 
circulate in humans. Genetic reassortment between these viruses could result in 
enhanced pathogenicity of the virus. Here, four reassortant viruses with favorable 
in vitro replication property were compared with the wild type pandemic virus with 
respect to replication kinetics in vitro and pathogenicity and transmission in ferrets. 
Pandemic H1N1 viruses that contained either PA and PB2 or PB2 alone of seasonal 
H1N1 virus were attenuated in ferrets. In contrast, pandemic virus with NA of sea-
sonal H3N2 virus resulted in increased virus replication and more severe pulmonary 
lesions in ferrets. These data demonstrate that the 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus has 
the potential to reassort with seasonal influenza viruses, possibly resulting in in-
creased pathogenicity while maintaining the capacity of transmission via aerosols 
or respiratory droplets.
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iNtroDUctioN
The 2009 H1N1 virus that caused the first influenza pandemic of the 21st century 
(pH1N1), continues to be detected in a large number of countries around the world 
[48,243]. The 2009 pandemic has been relatively mild, with disease ranging from 
sub-clinical infections to sporadic cases of severe pneumonia and acute respiratory 
distress syndrome [244-249]. The pH1N1 virus is a unique reassortant virus that 
contains the neuraminidase (NA) and matrix (M) genes from the Eurasian swine in-
fluenza virus lineage, while the other six gene segments are derived from the North 
American triple reassortant swine influenza virus lineage [50]. From the start of the 
pandemic, there have been concerns that the pH1N1 virus may mutate, or reassort 
with contemporary influenza viruses to give rise to more pathogenic viruses. 
Co-circulation of multiple strains of influenza A virus in humans provides an oppor-
tunity for viral genetic reassortment: the mixing of genes from 2 (or more) viruses 
[250]. Genetic reassortment of the pH1N1 virus with seasonal H3N2 (H3N2) or sea-
sonal H1N1 (sH1N1) viruses might thus represent a route to enhanced pathogenic-
ity of the pH1N1 virus. To date, no reassortment events between pH1N1 and sea-
sonal viruses have been reported in humans. However, a triple-reassortant swine 
influenza A(H1N1) virus, distinct from the 2009 pandemic virus, containing the HA 
and NA genes of sH1N1 influenza virus was described recently [251]. Dual infections 
by sH1N1 and H3N2 viruses have been reported [22] as well as mixed infections of 
pH1N1 and H3N2 viruses [23,252], thus highlighting the potential for reassortment 
of currently circulating influenza viruses in humans. H1N2 reassortant influenza vi-
ruses with the HA of seasonal H1N1 and the NA of seasonal H3N2 viruses have 
been isolated from humans during previous influenza seasons, thereby confirming 
that such HA/NA combination can emerge in humans [25,253], and H1N2 influenza 
viruses have further been detected frequently in pigs [85].
To investigate the potential of reassortment between seasonal and pandemic in-
fluenza viruses further, here an in vitro selection method for reassortants was em-
ployed, using reverse genetics and serial passaging under limiting dilution condi-
tions. Four reassortants with different gene constellations were identified. These 
reassortants were composed of six or seven gene segments of the pH1N1 virus with 
the PB2 or PB2 and PA gene segments of the sH1N1 virus, or the NA or NA and PB1 
gene segments of H3N2 virus. Pathogenicity and transmission of these viruses were 
tested using a ferret model. Viruses containing the sH1N1 PB2 or PB2 and PA genes 
were attenuated in ferrets, whereas viruses containing the NA gene of the H3N2 
virus displayed increased pathogenicity in vivo. All reassortants were transmitted 
between ferrets via aerosol or respiratory droplets. These results demonstrated 
that some reassortants between pH1N1 and H3N2 were viable, remained transmis-
sible and were more pathogenic than the wild type pH1N1 virus and emphasize the 
importance of monitoring reassortant viruses in surveillance programs, as reassort-
ment events may affect pathogenicity.
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mAteriAls AND methoDs 
cells and viruses
Madin-Darby Canine kidney (MDCK) cells were cultured in EMEM as described pre-
viously [51]. Influenza virus A/Netherlands/602/09 (pH1N1) was isolated from the 
first patient with pandemic H1N1 virus infection in the Netherlands [150]. Influ-
enza virus A/Netherlands/213/03 (H3N2) and influenza virus A/Netherlands/26/07 
(sH1N1) were isolated from patients during epidemics in the Netherlands. After 
passaging these viruses in MDCK cells two times, all eight gene segments were 
amplified by reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction, cloned in a modi-
fied version of the bidirectional reverse genetics plasmid pHW2000 [171,208], and 
subsequently used to generate recombinant virus by reverse genetics as described 
elsewhere [171]. 
generation of the reassortant viruses
Mixtures of reassortant viruses were generated in 293T cells using reverse genetics, 
by co-transfecting eight plasmids that encode the pH1N1 virus genome together 
with seven plasmids encoding the H3N2 or sH1N1 virus genome, omitting their HA 
gene. The 293T cell supernatants were passaged in quadruplicate under limiting 
dilution conditions using ten-fold serial dilutions in MDCK cells three times to en-
able selective outgrowth of viruses with high in-vitro replication rates. After three 
passages, the genome composition of these viruses was determined by sequencing 
using conserved primers targeting the non coding regions of each gene segment. 
Reverse genetics was also used to produce specific reassortant viruses – pH1-
sH1PB2, pH1-sH1PB2PA, pH1-sH3NA, and pH1-sH3NAPB1 – by transfection of 293T 
cells and subsequent virus propagation in MDCK cells.
in vitro characterization of viruses
Multicycle replication curves were generated by inoculating MDCK cells at a multi-
plicity of infection of 0.01 50 percent tissue culture infectious doses (TCID50) per 
cell in 2-fold [51]. 
Virus titers from samples of inoculated MDCK cells as well as nasal and throat swabs 
or homogenized tissue samples from inoculated ferrets, were determined by end-
point titration in MDCK cells in 96-wells plates (Greiner Bio-One )as described else-
where [254]. 
Ferret experiments
All animal studies were approved by an independent Animal Ethics Committee. 
Experiments were performed under ABSL3+ conditions. The ferret model to test 
pathogenicity and transmission of pH1N1 virus was described previously [51,150]. 
To study pathogenicity, groups of six influenza virus seronegative female ferrets 
(Mustella putorius furo) were inoculated intranasally with 106 TCID50 of wild type 
pH1N1 virus, or the reassortant viruses pH1-sH1PB2, pH1-sH1PB2PA, pH1-sH3NA, 
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and pH1-sH3NAPB1, divided over both nostrils (2 x 250 µl). 
In the transmission experiment, four female ferrets for wild type pH1N1 virus and 
two ferrets for each of the reassortant viruses, were individually housed in trans-
mission cages and inoculated intranasally with 106 TCID50 of virus divided over both 
nostrils (2 x 250 µl). 
immunohistochemistry and histopathology
Immunohistochemistry and pathology were performed using lungs of inoculated 
ferrets. For each virus, 3 ferrets were euthanized at 3 and 7 dpi by exsanguination. 
Necropsies and tissue sampling were performed according to a standard protocol. 
After fixation in 10 % neutral-buffered formalin and embedding in paraffin, samples 
were sectioned at 4 µm and stained with an immunohistochemical method using 
a mouse monoclonal antibody against the nucleoprotein of influenza A virus [102]. 
Influenza virus antigen expression in lung sections was scored for bronchial surface 
epithelium, bronchial submucosal gland epithelium, bronchiolar epithelium, alveo-
lar type I pneumocytes, and alveolar type II pneumocytes. Scoring was categorized 
as 0, no positive cells; 1, few positive cells; 2, moderate number of positive cells; 
and 3, many positive cells. Serial lung sections were stained with hematoxylin and 
eosin for detection and description of pathologic changes. Samples were scored for 
influenza-virus-associated inflammation in bronchi (bronchitis), bronchial submu-
cosal glands (bronchoadenitis), bronchioles (bronchiolitis), and alveoli (alveolitis). 
Scoring of severity of inflammation was categorized as 0, no inflammation; 1, mild 
inflammation; 2, moderate inflammation; and 3, marked inflammation. Sections 
were examined without knowledge of the identity of the ferrets.
resUlts
in vitro selection of ph1N1-sh1N1 and ph1N1-h3N2 reassortants
Reassortant viruses were generated in 293T cells using reverse genetics. All eight 
gene segments of the pandemic virus were co-transfected with all segments of a 
seasonal virus, except HA. We omitted HA of the seasonal viruses to ensure that 
only reassortants containing the pH1N1 virus HA could arise, against which a large 
proportion of the human population is still immunologically naïve [255]. After three 
passages under limiting dilution conditions in MDCK cells, the virus genome com-
position within culture supernatants was determined by sequencing (Table 1). The 
proportion of gene segments 1-8 (except HA) analyzed was approximate 60%, 60%, 
65%, 90%, 95%, 100% and 100% respectively. Minor virus variants were not detect-
ed. No point mutations were observed in the proportions of the genome analyzed. 
Upon pH1N1-sH1N1 transfection and passaging, three reassortants contained the 
PB2 gene of sH1N1 virus, two of which had also incorporated the sH1N1 PA gene. 
All four pH1N1-H3N2 reassortants had the NA gene of H3N2 and three of four reas-
sortants also incorporated the H3N2 PB1 gene. 
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in vitro characterisation of ph1N1-sh1N1 and ph1N1-h3N2 reassortants
All viruses shown in table 1 were next generated as clonal viruses using reverse 
genetics: pH1N1, pH1-sH1PB2, pH1-sH1PB2PA, pH1-sH3NA, and pH1-sH3NAPB1. 
Replication kinetics of wild type and reassortant viruses were studied in vitro. The 
replication kinetics of pH1-sH1PB2 and pH1-sH1PB2PA were similar to those of wild 
type pH1N1 virus, while the pH1-sH3NA and pH1-sH3NAPB1 reassortant viruses 
displayed slightly higher virus titers at 24 and/or 48 hours after inoculation, with a 
maximum difference in virus titer of 1.0 10log TCID50 (Figure 1). The fact that each 
reassortant virus replicated at least at the same rate as the wild type pH1N1 virus 
is in agreement with the results from the in-vitro selection experiment described 
above. 
Pathogenicity of the reassortant viruses in ferrets
Pathogenicity of the reassortant viruses was investigated in ferrets. Groups of six 
ferrets were inoculated intranasally with 106 TCID50 of pH1N1, pH1-sH1PB2, pH1-
sH1PB2PA, pH1-sH3NA, and pH1-sH3NAPB1. The animals were weighed daily as 
indicator of disease. 
replicates Pb2 Pb1 PA hA NP NA mA Ns
ph1-sh1 1 sh1 pH1 sh1 pH1 pH1 pH1 pH1 pH1
ph1-sh1 2 sh1 pH1 sh1 pH1 pH1 pH1 pH1 pH1
ph1-sh1 3 sh1 pH1 pH1 pH1 pH1 pH1 pH1 pH1
ph1-sh1 4 pH1 pH1 pH1 pH1 pH1 pH1 pH1 pH1
ph1-sh3 1 pH1 sh3 pH1 pH1 pH1 sh3 pH1 pH1
ph1-sh3 2 pH1 pH1 pH1 pH1 pH1 sh3 pH1 pH1
ph1-sh3 3 pH1 sh3 pH1 pH1 pH1 sh3 pH1 pH1
ph1-sh3 4 pH1 sh3 pH1 pH1 pH1 sh3 pH1 pH1
table 1. Predominant virus genome composition upon in vitro selection of mixtures of pH1N1-sH1N1 and 
pH1N1-H3N2 reassortants
Figure 1. Replication of wild type and reas-
sortant pH1N1 viruses in MDCK cells 
MDCK cells were inoculated in duplicate 
with 0.01 TCID50/cell of the viruses pH1N1 
(dotted line, closed square), pH1-sH1PB2PA 
(open circle), pH1-sH1PB2 (open square), 
pH1-sH3PB1NA (closed circle), and pH1-
sH3NA (closed square), and supernatant 
samples were harvested 6, 12, 24 and 48 
hours later. Supernatant samples were ti-
trated in MDCK cells. Geometric mean tit-
ers and standard deviation were calculated 
from two independent experiments.
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The mean maximum weight loss was 7% for animals inoculated with the pH1N1 
virus. Animals inoculated with pH1-sH1PB2PA, pH1-sH1PB2, pH1-sH3NAPB1 and 
pH1-sH3NA had a maximum weight loss of 4%, 2%, 2% and 6% respectively (data 
not shown). 
Nose and throat swabs were collected from inoculated animals daily, and virus tit-
ers were determined. Infectious virus shedding continued until 6 or 7 days post 
infection (dpi) from the noses (Figure 2A, 2C) and throat (Figure 2B, 2D) of most 
inoculated animals. The total virus shedding from the nose, as calculated from the 
“area under the curve” (AUC) for the ferrets that were in the experiment for 7 days 
(N=3), was significantly lower in animals inoculated with the pH1-sH1PB2 reassor-
tant virus (T-test, p=0.003) and significantly higher in the animals inoculated with 
the pH1-sH3NA virus (T-test, p=0.023), as compared to the animals inoculated with 
wild type pH1N1 virus. The total virus shedding from the throat, as calculated from 
the AUC for the ferrets that were in the experiment for 7 days, was not significantly 
different between the groups of ferrets. 
Figure 2. Virus shedding from the nose and throat of ferrets inoculated with wild type and reassortant 
pH1N1 viruses. 
Virus shedding from nose (A, C) and throat (B, D) for pH1-sH1 (A, B) and pH1-sH3 (C, D) reassortant viruses 
is shown. Colour use is as follows; black: wild type pH1N1, white: pH1-sH1PB2PA, hatched: pH1-sH1PB2, 
dark grey: pH1-sH3PB1NA, light grey: pH1-sH3NA. Geometric mean titers are shown, with error bars to in-
dicate the standard deviation. The lower limit of detection is indicated by the dotted line. After day 3, only 3 
animals remained in each group.
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At 3 and 7 dpi, three ferrets from each group were euthanized, and nasal turbinates, 
trachea and lungs were collected for virological examination. At 7 dpi, virus was 
undetectable or detected at only very low levels in samples from lung, trachea, and 
nasal turbinates in all groups of ferrets. At 3 dpi, no virus or relatively low virus titers 
were detected in the lungs and trachea respectively, of ferrets inoculated with pH1-
sH1 reassortant viruses (Figure 3A, 3B), while titers in the nasal turbinates were 
similar to those for wild type pH1N1 virus (Figure 3C). These data indicate that both 
pH1-sH1 viruses were attenuated with respect to replication in the lower respira-
tory tract of ferrets.
At 3 dpi, virus was detected in the lungs, trachea, and nasal turbinates of ferrets 
inoculated with viruses pH1-sH3NAPB1 and pH1-sH3NA at approximately the same 
levels as upon inoculation with wild type pH1N1 virus (Figure 3D, 3E, 3F). Virus titers 
detected in the lungs and trachea of animals inoculated with the pH1-sH3NA virus 
at 3 dpi were 1.0 10log TCID50 higher as compared to those in animals inoculated 
with wild type pH1N1 virus (not statistically significant). These data indicate that 
both pH1-sH3 viruses tested were not attenuated in ferrets. If anything, shedding of 
pH1-sH3NA virus from the nose (Figure 2C), lungs (Figure 3D), and trachea (Figure 
3E), was higher as compared to wild type pH1N1 virus. 
Figure 3. Virus detection in respiratory tissues of ferrets inoculated with wild type and reassortant pH1N1 
viruses. 
Virus detection in lungs (A, D), trachea (B, E), and nasal turbinates (C, F) for pH1-sH1 (A-C) and pH1-sH3 
(D-F) reassortant viruses is shown. Colour use is as follows; black: wild type pH1N1, white: pH1-sH1PB2PA, 
hatched: pH1-sH1PB2, dark grey: pH1-sH3PB1NA, light grey: pH1-sH3NA. Three ferrets of each group were 
euthanized at 3 and 7 dpi. Geometric mean titers are shown, with error bars to indicate the standard devia-
tion. The lower limit of detection is indicated by the dotted line.
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Pathological changes in the respiratory tract of ferrets inoculated with ph1N1 and 
reassortant viruses 
At 3 and 7 dpi, three ferrets from each group were euthanized, and lung tissue was 
collected for pathologic examination. At 7 dpi, virus antigen expression was unde-
tectable in lung tissue of any of the ferrets, and lesions were absent or resolving. At 
3 dpi, neither viral antigen expression nor lesions were detected in lungs of ferrets 
inoculated with pH1-sH1PB2. Only one of three ferrets inoculated with pH1N1 had 
scant virus antigen expression and mild associated lesions in bronchial submucosal 
glands and bronchioles at 3 dpi (Table 2, Figure 4). In contrast, all three ferrets in-
oculated with pH1-sH3NA had moderate to abundant virus antigen expression in 
bronchial submucosal glands, bronchioles, or both, associated with moderate to 
marked inflammation (Table 2, Figure 4). Virus antigen expression and associated 
lesions in the lungs of ferrets inoculated with pH1-sH3PB1NA were intermediate 
between those of wild-type pH1N1 and pH1-sH3NA (Table 2).
Figure 4. Virus antigen expression and severity of lesions in different tissues of the lungs of ferrets. 
Two of three ferrets inoculated with wild type pH1N1 virus had neither virus antigen expression (first column) 
nor associated lesions (second column) in the lung at day three post inoculation. In contrast, all three ferrets 
inoculated with reassortant pH1-sH3NA virus had virus antigen expression in bronchi, bronchial submucosal 
glands, bronchioles, and alveoli (third column), associated with epithelial degeneration and necrosis and 
infiltration of inflammatory cells, predominantly neutrophils (fourth column).
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The cell types in which virus antigen expression was detected were ciliated epi-
thelial cells of bronchi, epithelial cells of bronchial submucosal glands, ciliated and 
non-ciliated cells of bronchioles, and both squamous and cuboidal epithelial cells 
– interpreted as type I and type II pneumocytes, respectively – of alveoli (Figure 
4). Virus antigen expression also was seen in desquamated epithelial cells and cell 
debris in lumina of above tissues.
The lesions associated with virus antigen expression can be categorized as acute, 
focal or multifocal, necrotizing bronchitis, bronchoadenitis, bronchiolitis, and alveo-
litis. These lesions were characterized by degeneration and necrosis of epithelial 
cells, infiltration of the affected tissues and their lumina by many neutrophils and 
few eosinophils, and exudation of edema fluid and fibrin into tissue lumina.
transmission of the reassortant viruses in ferrets
Transmission of the pH1N1 and reassortant influenza viruses via aerosol or respira-
tory droplets was tested in the ferret model. Groups of 4 ferrets for pH1N1 virus and 
2 ferrets for the reassortant viruses were inoculated intranasally with 106 TCID50 of 
virus. At 1 dpi, a naïve ferret was placed in a cage adjacent to each inoculated fer-
ret. All viruses were transmitted from the inoculated to the naive ferrets in 4 out of 
4 for pH1N1 virus and 2 out of 2 for each of the reassortant viruses. The first day of 
virus detection in the naïve animals was 2 days post exposure (dpe), similar for all 
viruses tested. 
 
DiscUssioN
Here we used an in vitro selection method to identify reassortant viruses between 
pandemic H1N1 influenza virus and seasonal H1N1 and H3N2 viruses of interest 
for testing in a ferret model. Studying the impact of reassortment on changes in 
influenza virus phenotype is cumbersome, as the number of reassortants that can 
cumulative score per tissue
Virus N bronchial surface 
epithelium
bronchial submu-
cosal epithelium
bronchiolar 
epithelium
Alveolar epithe-
lium
ihc* he† ihc he ihc he ihc he
ph1N1 3 0,0,0‡ 0,0,0 0,0,1 0,0,1 0.0.1 0,0,1 0,0,0 0,0,0
ph1-sh1Pb2PA 3 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
ph1-sh1Pb2 3 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
ph1-sh3Pb1NA 3 1,1,0 0,1,0 2,1,0 1,1,0 2,1,0 1,1,0 1,1,0 1,1,1
ph1-sh3NA 3 1,1,1 0,1,1 1,0,3 1,0,3 2,2,3 2,2,3 1,0,1 1,1,1
* IHC = Immunohistochemistry to detected virus antigen expression. 
† HE = Hematoxylin and eosin staining to analyze severity of inflammation
‡ Individual scores (as indicated in the methods section) for three ferrets are listed
table 2. Virus antigen expression and severity of lesion in different tissues of the lung of ferrets inoculated 
with pH1N1 or reassortant pH1N1 viruses
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be generated between 2 viruses is very high; 28 = 256 different viruses. After three 
passages a limited number of specific virus populations were selected in-vitro. Of 
note, minor virus variants representing less than 20 % of the virus population would 
remain undetected in our approach of PCR amplification and direct determination 
of the consensus sequence of the amplicons. However, upon repeating the proce-
dure four times for both reassortment combinations, the seasonal influenza virus 
genes that were selected in the pandemic H1 virus backbone were more or less 
consistent, with NA of H3N2 virus being selected in 4/4 attempts, PB1 of H3N2 and 
PB2 of sH1N1 virus in 3/4 attempts, and PA of sH1N1 virus being selected in 2/4 
attempts. Replication in MDCK cells may not be the best selection criterion for the 
identification of reassortants of interest to human health. Nevertheless, we choose 
this in-vitro selection method, since previous work using the ferret model for selec-
tion of reassortants has shown that pH1N1 outcompetes sH1N1 and H3N2 viruses 
rapidly, reducing the opportunity for reassortment in this model [256]. This growth 
advantage over the seasonal viruses was in agreement with the fact that the select-
ed viruses mostly contained the pH1N1 genes. The use of reverse genetics allows 
the production of all gene segments at approximately similar copy numbers upon 
transfection, while upon double infection with two viruses in vitro or in ovo – the 
classical ways to generate reassortants – viruses may differ in replication capacity, 
resulting in a bias of the reassortants that are produced. 
Interestingly, the polymerase gene segments of sH1N1 and H3N2 viruses frequently 
substituted for the polymerase genes of the pH1N1 virus in vitro. In minigenome 
assays, the polymerase complex activity of the wild type pH1N1 virus was relatively 
low, and replacement of various polymerase genes of the pH1N1 virus increased 
this activity. However, polymerase complexes with the highest activity in minig-
enome assays were not necessarily the ones detected in the reassortant viruses 
(data not shown). This apparent discrepancy is probably a result of the different 
parameters under investigation in the two assays, in particular the production of 
mRNA versus all viral RNAs.
Virus titers for pH1-sH1PB2PA and pH1-sH1PB2 in the lungs and trachea of ferrets 
were lower as compared to titers in ferrets inoculated with wild type pH1N1 virus, 
suggesting that both pH1N1-sH1N1 reassortant viruses were attenuated in ferrets, 
at least for replication in the lower respiratory tract. The reassortants between 
pH1N1 and H3N2 viruses replicated at slightly higher rates than wild type pH1N1 vi-
rus in vitro. Moreover, virus shedding of pH1-sH3NA virus from the nose, lungs, and 
trachea of inoculated ferrets was slightly higher as compared to wild type pH1N1 
virus. Although the differences in replication and shedding were small, and not-
statistically significant due to the relatively small numbers of animals in each group, 
we conclude that the pH1N1-H3N2 viruses were not attenuated in ferrets. 
Inoculation of the reassortant pH1-sH3NA – either with or without the PB1 of H3N2 
virus – resulted in higher expression of virus antigen and more severe lesions at all 
levels of the lower respiratory tract compared to inoculation of wild-type pH1N1 vi-
rus (Table 2, Figure 4). In a previous study, the wild-type pH1N1 virus was detected 
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more abundantly in the lower airways of ferrets as compared to the present study 
[257]. We attribute this difference to the use of a virus isolate rather than a virus 
generated by reverse genetics, and to a different batch of ferrets in the previous 
study. In the present study, all viruses were produced with reverse genetics, and 
can thus be compared directly. Moreover, the reassortant pH1 virus with the NA of 
the H3N2 virus was more pathogenic than both sources of pH1N1 virus, wild-type 
isolate or the virus derived by reverse genetics. Increased severity of lesions may be 
related to higher virus replication in the lung, to stronger host immune responses, 
or both [257]. 
We conclude that the pandemic H1N1 virus has the potential to reassort with sea-
sonal H1N1 and H3N2 influenza viruses, and that such reassortment events could 
result in viruses with increased pathogenicity in ferrets. Although increased patho-
genicity in ferrets can not be extrapolated directly to increased pathogenicity in 
humans, the ferret model is generally thought to be a good animal model for influ-
enza in humans, because ferrets are susceptible to natural infection and develop 
respiratory disease and lung pathology similar to humans when infected with sea-
sonal, avian, or pandemic influenza viruses [210,211]. Patterns of influenza virus 
attachment to cells of the respiratory tract are also similar in ferrets and humans 
[147], and the ferret model has further been used successfully for studies on virus 
transmission via respiratory droplets or aerosols [150,153]. 
Although viruses with the NA gene – with or without the PB1 gene – of H3N2 were 
identified here as potentially “fit” virus reassortants, it is possible that reassortant 
viruses with other gene constellations may have selective advantages in humans as 
well. It is of interest to note that the 1968 H3N2 pandemic virus also continued to 
reassort after the pandemic year, resulting in viruses in 1969-1971 with a different 
N2 gene as compared to those earlier in the pandemic [258]. H1N2 reassortant 
influenza viruses with the HA of seasonal H1N1 and the NA of seasonal H3N2 vi-
ruses have been isolated from humans during previous influenza seasons, thereby 
confirming that reassortant influenza viruses with such HA/NA combination can 
emerge in humans [25,253]. Moreover, H1N2 influenza viruses have frequently 
been detected in pigs around the world [85].
We recommend that reassortment of pandemic 2009 influenza viruses should be 
monitored closely in surveillance programs, in particular when changes in patho-
genicity and/or transmission in humans become apparent. 
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CHAPTER 3
Genome reassortment of influenza A viruses
3.2
Reassortment between avian H5N1 and human 
influenza viruses is mainly restricted to the matrix 
and neuraminidase gene segments
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Albert D.M.E. Osterhaus, Ron A.M. Fouchier and Sander Herfst
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AbstrAct
Highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses have devastated the poultry indus-
try in many countries of the eastern hemisphere. Occasionally H5N1 viruses cross 
the species barrier and infect humans, sometimes with a severe clinical outcome. 
When this happens, there is a chance of reassortment between H5N1 and human 
influenza viruses. To assess the potential of H5N1 viruses to reassort with contem-
porary human influenza viruses (H1N1, H3N2 and pandemic H1N1), we used an in 
vitro selection method to generate reassortant viruses, that contained the H5 he-
magglutinin gene, and that have a replication advantage in vitro. We found that the 
neuraminidase and matrix gene segments of human influenza viruses were pref-
erentially selected by H5 viruses. However, these H5 reassortant viruses did not 
show a marked increase in replication in MDCK cells and human bronchial epithelial 
cells. In ferrets, inoculation with a mixture of H5N1-pandemic H1N1 reassortant 
viruses resulted in outgrowth of reassortant H5 viruses that had incorporated the 
neuraminidase and matrix gene segment of pandemic 2009 H1N1. This virus was 
not transmitted via aerosols or respiratory droplets to naïve recipient ferrets. Alto-
gether, these data emphasize the potential of avian H5N1 viruses to reassort with 
contemporary human influenza viruses. The neuraminidase and matrix gene seg-
ments of human influenza viruses showed the highest genetic compatibility with 
HPAI H5N1 virus.
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iNtroDUctioN
Since the late 1990s, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of the H5N1 
subtype have devastated the poultry industry of numerous countries of the east-
ern hemisphere. After 2004, H5N1 has spread from Asia to Europe, Africa, and the 
Middle East, resulting in the killing or culling of hundreds of millions of domestic 
birds. Occasionally, HPAI H5N1 viruses cross the species barrier and infect humans, 
sometimes with a severe clinical outcome. This direct transmission of HPAI H5N1 
virus to humans was first detected in 1997 [58] and has continued to be reported 
ever since [59]. Luckily, these viruses do not transmit efficiently between humans. 
However, they may gain the ability to spread efficiently among humans through 
either virus adaptation to the new host, genetic reassortment (ie genetic mixing of 
viruses) with contemporary human influenza viruses, or both [234,259-261]. Reas-
sortment has proven to be an important mechanism for influenza viruses to evolve. 
The influenza pandemics of 1957, 1968 and 2009 were the result of reassortment 
events [30,31,50]. 
To date, reassortment of H5N1 viruses with human influenza viruses has not been 
detected in nature. However, co-infection of H5N1 and human viruses in humans 
or pigs may provide a new opportunity for reassortment and the subsequent emer-
gence of viruses with pandemic potential. Therefore, it is important to investigate 
the genetic compatibility of the genes of potential parental strains. 
In previous studies, reassortment of avian H5N1 and human H3N2 has been investi-
gated extensively in vivo [154,262,263]. It was found that H5N1-H3N2 reassortment 
resulted in a more pathogenic H5 virus in mice [262,263]. Furthermore, reassort-
ment was found to occur readily in vivo, with a high probability in the ferret upper 
respiratory tract [154]. However, none of the tested H3N2-H5N1 reassortant viruses 
had gained the ability to be transmitted between ferrets. 
Recent studies have also investigated the replication kinetics of many reassortant 
viruses between the 2009 pandemic H1N1 (pH1N1) and H5N1 influenza virus in 
vitro and in vivo [264-266]. Co-infection of cultured cells with pH1N1 and H5N1 
showed that these two viruses have high genetic compatibility and that some of 
these viruses displayed better replication kinetics in vitro [264]. In addition, in-
creased pathogenicity was observed for a reassortant pH1N1 containing an H5N1 
HA in mice [266]. 
Avian H5N1 and human influenza viruses display different replication characteristics 
in primary cell cultures. Avian influenza viruses can infect human airway epithelium 
cells, although replication may be limited compared to human influenza viruses be-
cause of a nonoptimal cellular tropism [267]. This system offers an alternative to 
study virus and/or host properties required for adaptation or reassortment of in-
fluenza viruses. It was studied that co-infection of cells with viruses carrying HA of 
avian and human influenza viruses take place when the cells provide both receptors 
[268].
Here, we investigated the ability of HPAI H5N1 and contemporary human H3N2, 
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H1N1 and pH1N1 influenza viruses to reassort, by means of an in vitro selection 
method using reverse genetics and serial passaging under limited dilution condi-
tions as described before [269]. In contrast to double infection with 2 viruses, this 
method allows the production of gene segments at approximately similar copy 
numbers upon transfection, after which in vitro or in ovo viruses may differ in rep-
lication capacity. In addition, avian H5N1 outcompetes human influenza viruses in 
co-infection experiments [264]. In this way, a bias towards reassortants produced 
is thus prevented. The reassortants that were selected during this in vitro selection 
experiment were subsequently evaluated for replication kinetics in MDCK cells and 
normal human bronchial epithelial (NHBE) cultures. In addition, to study wether re-
assortants were produced with a replication advantage over the parental viruses in 
vivo, ferrets were inoculated with a mixture of reassortant viruses between pH1N1 
and H5N1. The genetic composition of these reassortant mixtures were followed 
over time. Simultaneously, the transmissibility of these viruses was evaluated in a 
ferret model via aerosols or respiratory droplets.
 
mAteriAl & methoDs
ethics statement
Animals were housed and experiments were conducted in strict compliance with 
European guidelines (EU directive on animal testing 86/609/EEC) and Dutch legisla-
tion (Experiments on Animal Act, 1997). All animal experiments were approved by 
the independent animal experimentation ethical review committee ‘stichting DEC 
consult’ (Erasmus MC permit number EUR 1621) and were performed under ani-
mal biosafety level 3+ conditions as described elsewhere [261]. Animal welfare was 
observed on a daily basis, and all animal handling was performed under light an-
esthesia using ketamine to minimize animal suffering. Influenza virus sero-negative 
6 month old female ferrets (Mustella putorius furo), weighing 800-1000 g., were 
obtained from a commercial breeder. All experiments involving H5N1 transmission 
were conducted prior to the institution of the current moratorium.
 
cells and viruses
Madin-Darby Canine kidney (MDCK) cells were cultured in EMEM (Cambrex, Heer-
hugowaard, the Netherlands) supplemented with 10% FCS, 100 IU/ml penicillin, 100 
μg/ml streptomycin, 2 mM glutamine, 1.5 mg/ml sodiumbicarbonate (Cambrex), 20 
mM Hepes (Cambrex), and 0.1 mM non-essential amino acids (MP Biomedicals Eu-
rope, Illkirch, France). 293T cells were cultured in DMEM (Cambrex) supplemented 
with 10% FCS, 100 IU/ml penicillin, 100 mg/ml streptomycin, 2mM glutamine, 1mM 
sodium pyruvate, and non-essential amino acids.
All eight gene segments of influenza virus isolates A/Netherlands/602/2009 
(pH1N1), A/Netherlands/213/2003 (H3N2), A/Netherlands/26/2007 (sH1N1) and 
A/Indonesia/5/2005 (H5N1) were amplified by reverse transcription polymerase 
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chain reaction, cloned in a modified version of the bidirectional reverse genetics 
plasmid pHW2000 [171,208], and subsequently used to generate recombinant virus 
by reverse genetics as described elsewhere [171]. All in vitro selection experiments, 
growth curves and virus titrations were performed under ABSL3+ conditions.
generation of the reassortant viruses
Reverse genetics was used to generate mixtures of reassortant viruses in 293T cells 
by co-transfecting eight plasmids that encode the H5N1 virus genome together with 
seven plasmids encoding the pH1N1, H3N2 or sH1N1 virus genome. The HA gene 
of these human viruses was omitted to make sure that only viruses with the HA of 
H5N1 virus were generated, as described previously [269]. The 293T cell superna-
tants were subsequently passaged in quadruplicate under limiting dilution condi-
tions by using ten-fold serial dilutions in MDCK cells three times to enable selective 
outgrowth of viruses with high in vitro replication rates. Next, the genome composi-
tion of these viruses was determined by Sanger sequencing using conserved prim-
ers targeting the noncoding regions of each gene segment. Reverse genetics was 
subsequently used to produce reassortant viruses with the different gene composi-
tions as identified by sequencing.
Virus titrations on mDck cells
Virus titers in ferret nasal and throat swabs, or samples from replication curves were 
determined by end-point titration in MDCK cells in 96-well plates (Greiner Bio-One). 
MDCK cells were inoculated with tenfold serial dilutions of each sample, washed 
one hour after inoculation with phosphate-buffered saline (PBS), and cultured in 
200μl of infection medium, consisting of EMEM supplemented with 100 U/ml peni-
cillin, 100 μg/ml streptomycin, 2mM glutamine, 1.5mg/ml sodiumbicarbonate, 20 
mM Hepes, non-essential amino acids, and 20 μg/ml trypsin (Cambrex). Three days 
after inoculation, the supernatants of inoculated cell cultures were tested for ag-
glutinating activity using turkey erythrocytes as an indicator of virus replication in 
the cells. Infectious virus titers were calculated from 4 replicates by the method of 
Spearman-Karber [233].
replication kinetics in mDck cells
Multicycle replication curves were generated by inoculating MDCK cells at a multi-
plicity of infection (MOI) of 0.01 50 percent tissue culture infectious doses (TCID50) 
per cell in duplicate. Supernatants were sampled at 6, 12, 24, and 48 hours after 
inoculation, and virus titers in these supernatants were determined by means of 
end-point titration in MDCK cells as described above.
culture of Nhbe cells
Normal human bronchial epithelial (NHBE) cells were obtained from Clonetics (Ba-
sel, Switzerland) and used at passage 3-4. Undifferentiated NHBE cells were grown 
on 30 μg/ml type I collagen-coated 75 cm2 flasks in serum-free bronchial epithelial 
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cell basal medium (BEBM) supplemented with BEBM SingleQuots (Clonetics). At 
60-80% confluency, cells were trypsinized and seeded at a cell density of 1x104 vi-
able cells onto type I collagen-coated 6.5 mm transwell inserts with 0.4 μm pore 
size (Corning, Amsterdam, The Netherlands). The growth medium consisted of a 1:1 
mixture of complete BEBM and DMEM, supplemented with 15 ng/ml retinoic acid 
(Sigma-Aldrich). The medium was replaced with fresh medium every other day un-
til cells reached confluency. Subsequently, an air-liquid interface (ALI) was created 
by removing medium from the apical side to promote mucocilliary differentiation. 
The medium was refreshed basolaterally and the apical side was washed with Dul-
becco’s PBS (DPBS, Lonza) at 37°C every other day. Well-differentiated (wd-) NHBE 
cells were inoculated with influenza virus, 21 days after ALI, at which stage beating 
cilia and mucus production were clearly detectable.
wdNhbe cell characterization
wdNHBE cells on transwell filters were washed with PBS, fixed with 4% paraformal-
dehyde for 20 min at room temperature (RT) and subsequently washed with PBS 
0.1% Tween and permeabilized with 1% Triton X-100 in PBS. After washing with 
PBS and blocking with PBS 5% BSA-0.1% Tween, ciliated cells were identified by 
staining with mouse monoclonal β-Tubulin antibody (KLINIPATH, Duiven, The Neth-
erlands). Goblet cells were identified by mouse Mucin 5AC antibody (MUC5AC, ITK 
DIAGNOSTIC BV, Uithoorn, The Netherlands). The cultures were subsequently in-
cubated with a secondary goat anti-mouse IgG (H+L) texas red labelled antibody 
(Alexa Fluor ® 594, Invitrogen) to visualize ciliated cells or goblet cells. In addition, 
cell cultures stained for the presence of ciliated cells were double stained to also 
visualize the tight junctions: cells were incubated with a ZO-1 N-Term antibody (In-
vitrogen), followed by incubation with a secondary swine anti-rabbit FITC labelled 
antibody (DAKO, Enschede, Netherlands). The transwell filters were cut off after 
staining, mounted on slides with Prolong Gold Mount (Vectashield, Peterborough, 
UK) and analysed using a fluorescence imaging microscope (Leica Microsystems).
lectin staining of differentiated Nhbe cells
The wdNHBE cultures were washed with DPBS to remove overlaying mucus and 
incubated for 1 hour at 40C with biotin-labeled lectines sambucus nigra agglutinin 
(SNA; specific for sialic acid α2.6 Gal; 4 μg/ml; SANBIO BV, Uden, Netherlands) or 
Maackia amurensis agglutinin II (MAAII; specific for sialic acid α2.3 Gal; 20 μg/ml; 
BIO-CONNECT, Huissen, Netherlands) in Tris-buffered saline (TBS; pH 7.2) contain-
ing 1% BSA and 1 mM Mg2+, Ca2+, and Mn2+. Next, the cells were washed with 
TBS and fixed with 4% paraformaldehyde. After washing, the cultures were incu-
bated for 1 hour at RT with streptavidin-horseradish peroxidise FITC-labeled conju-
gate (DAKO) in 1% BSA-TBS. Cultures were washed, permeabilized and stained for 
cilia as described above and analysed by confocal laser scanning microscopy using 
a LSM700 system fitted on an Axio Observer Z1 inverted microscope (Zeiss). Images 
were generated using Zen software.
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replication kinetics in differentiated Nhbe cells
The wdNHBE cells were washed with DPBS to remove overlaying mucus and dupli-
cates were inoculated via the apical side, with virus of interest at a MOI of 0.02 in 
100 μl. After one hour of incubation at 37 0C the inoculum was removed, cells were 
washed three times with DPBS and once with growth medium. The last wash step 
with growth medium was collected for virus titration as time point t=0. At 6, 12, 24, 
and 48 hours after inoculation, 100 μl of growth medium was added to the apical 
side of the trans well of each culture to collect virus samples. After 10 min of incu-
bation at 37 0C, the medium was collected and stored at -80 0C for virus titration in 
MDCK cells. 
Ferret transmission experiment
The ferret model to test for aerosol or respiratory droplet transmission was de-
scribed previously [150]. In the transmission experiment, two influenza virus sero-
negative female ferrets were individually housed in transmission cages and inocu-
lated intranasally, divided over both nostrils (2 x 250µl), with 107.3 TCID50 of MDCK 
passage 1 (MDCKP1) of the H5N1-pH1N1 reassortant virus mixture (eight H5N1 and 
seven pH1N1 plasmids, without the pH1N1 HA, were transfected in 293T cells and 
supernatant was subsequently passaged on MDCK cells). At 1 day post inoculation 
(dpi), naïve recipient ferrets were individually placed in a transmission cage adja-
cent to a donor ferret. The animals were separated by two stainless steel grids to 
allow airflow from the donor to the recipient ferret but to prevent direct contact- 
and fomite transmission. Nasal and throat swabs were collected at 1, 3, 5 and 7 dpi 
from donor ferrets and at 1, 3, 5 and 7 days post exposure (dpe) from the recipient 
animals. Donor ferrets were euthanized at 7 dpi and recipient ferrets at 7 dpe. Virus 
titers were determined in collected swabs by means of end-point titration in MDCK 
cells.
Analysis of viral genome composition in ferrets by pyrosequencing
Pyrosequencing, a method to detect single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNP)[270], 
was used to determine the exact proportion of H5N1 and pH1N1 gene segments in 
the donor ferrets inoculated with the MDCK P1 H5N1-pH1N1 reassortant mixture. 
RNA was isolated from the throat swabs collected at 1, 3, 5 and 7 days dpi. After 
cDNA synthesis, conserved primers were used for each gene segment to amplify a 
small PCR product of approximately 100 bp (Table 1). These fragments were next 
sequenced using the Pyromark Q24 pyrosequencing platform (Qiagen, Venlo, The 
Netherlands) with a specific sequence primer (Table 1).
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resUlts
in vitro selection of h5 reassortant viruses 
Reverse genetics was used to generate mixtures of reassortant viruses in 293T cells, 
by co-transfecting eight plasmids that encode the H5N1 virus genome together with 
seven plasmids encoding the pH1N1, H3N2 or sH1N1 virus genome, omitting their 
HA gene. The 293T cell supernatants were passaged, in quadruplicate, under limit-
ing dilution conditions to allow selective outgrowth of viruses with high in vitro 
replication rates. After three passages, the genome composition of these viruses 
was determined by sequencing (Table 2). The predominant virus population was 
identified for almost all passaged virus mixtures by sanger sequencing, with minor 
virus variants representing less than 20% of the virus mixture (estimated detec-
tion limit for sanger sequencing). Point mutations were not observed in the pro-
portion of the genome analyzed. Upon H5N1-pH1N1 transfection and passaging of 
the virus mixtures, wild type (wt) H5N1 was recovered in one attempt and H5N1-
pH1N1-reassortants in three attempts (Table 2). These reassortants incorporated 
the pH1N1 matrix (M) gene (H5-pH1M), or the pH1N1 M, neuraminidase (NA) and 
non-structural (NS) genes (H5-pH1NA,M,NS), or the pH1N1 M, NA, NS and polymer-
ase complex genes PB2, PB1 and PA (H5-pH1NA,M,NS,PB2,PB1,PA). 
Primers sequence (5’-3’)
Forward PB2 H5N1/H1N1 GCAGGTCAAATATATTCAATATGG
Reverse PB2 H5N1/H1N1 GATTATGGCCATATGGTCCAC * biotin
Sequence primer TCAATATGGAGAGAATAAAA
Forward PB1 H5N1/H1N1 CAGGATACACCATGGACACAGT
Reverse PB1 H5N1/H1N1 CCTCAGGTAGTGGTCCATCAATC* biotin
Sequence primer ATACACCATGGACACAGT
Forward PA H5N1/H1N1 GTGCGACAATGCTTCAATCCA
Reverse PA H5N1/H1N1 GTGTGCATATTGCAGCAAA * biotin
Sequence primer CAATGCTTCAATCCAA
Forward NP H5N1/H1N1 GAGCTCTCGGACGAAAAGG
Reverse NP H5N1/H1N1 CTCTGCATTGTCTCCGAAGAA * biotin
Sequence primer TGCCTTCCTTTGACAT
Forward NA H5N1/H1N1 GGCATAATAACAGACACTATCAAG
Reverse NA H5N1/H1N1 CCATTACTTGGTCCATC * biotin
Sequence primer GACACTATCAAGAGTTGGAG
Forward MA H5N1/H1N1 GAGTCTTCTAACCGAGGTCGAAAC * biotin
Reverse MA H5N1/H1N1 GTGTTCTTTCCTGCAAAGAC
Sequence primer GCCTGACGGGATGATA
Forward NS H5N1/H1N1 AGGGTGACAAAAACATAATGGA
Reverse NS H5N1/H1N1 CAAGGAATGGGGCATCACCC * biotin
Sequence primer GTGACAAAAACATAATGGA
table 1. Primers used for pyrosequencing
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Upon H5N1-H3N2 transfection and passaging, wtH5N1 was recovered in one at-
tempt, whereas three reassortant viruses were recovered that had the NA gene of 
H3N2 (H5-H3NA). In one of the reassortant viruses that contained the NA gene of 
H3N2, a mixed population was present for the M gene (approximately 50% H5N1 
and 50% H3N2; H5-H3NA,M) (Table 2). 
Four different genome compositions were identified upon H5N1-sH1N1 transfec-
tion and passaging: wtH5N1 was recovered as well as three reassortant viruses 
containing the sH1N1 M or NA or M and NA genes (H5-H1NA, H5-H1M and H5-
H1NA,M) (Table 2).
in vitro characterization of h5 reassortant viruses in mDck cells
The data obtained from the in vitro selection experiments suggest that the NA 
and M genes of all three tested human influenza viruses as well as the NS gene of 
pH1N1 frequently substituted their H5N1 counterparts. Therefore, reverse genet-
ics was used to generate H5 reassortants that contained one (NA, M or NS), two 
(NA and M), or three (NA, M and NS) genes of pH1N1, H3N2 or sH1N1 (Table 3) 
and their replication kinetics was subsequently evaluated in MDCK cells. MDCK cells 
were inoculated with reassortant viruses at an MOI of 0.01, after which the super-
natants were harvested at fixed time points and virus titers were determined in 
MDCK cells. In general, H5 reassortant viruses containing gene segments of pH1N1 
showed similar virus titers compared to wtH5N1 (Fig 1A), although H5-pH1M and 
H5-pH1NA,M,NS reassortant viruses were produced at a slightly higher level at 24 
and 48 hours post-inoculation (pi), whereas H5-pH1NA had a lower replication rate 
compared to wtH5N1. The virus replication of most H5N1-H3N2 reassortant viruses 
was similar to that of wtH5N1 in MDCK cells (Fig 1B), however H5-H3M and H5-
H3NS reassortant viruses had slightly increased virus titers at 24 and 48 hours pi, 
replicates Pb2 Pb1 PA hA NP NA m Ns
h5-ph1 1 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 ph1 H5
h5-ph1 2 ph1 ph1 ph1 H5 H5 ph1 ph1 ph1
h5-ph1 3 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5
h5-ph1 4 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 ph1 ph1 H5/ph1*
h5-h3 1 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 h3 H5 H5
h5-h3 2 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5
h5-h3 3 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 h3 H5/h3** H5
h5-h3 4 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 h3 H5 H5
h5-sh1 1 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 sh1 H5
h5-sh1 2 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 sh1 sh1 H5
h5-sh1 3 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 sh1 H5 H5
h5-sh1 4 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5
table 2. Predominant virus genome composition upon in vitro selection of mixtures of H5N1-pH1N1, H5N1-
H3N2 and H5N1-sH1N1 reassortants
*  A 25/75 population of NS H5 and pH1 was detectable
** A 50/50 population of M H5 and H3 was detectable
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whereas H5-H3NA had a lower virus titer at 48 hours pi. Almost all H5 reassortant 
viruses with sH1N1 gene segments replicated to similar virus titers compared to 
wtH5N1, although H5-sH1NA had a lower virus titer at 48 hours pi, compared to 
wtH5N1. Although the differences in replication kinetics between the wtH5N1 and 
the H5 reassortant viruses were rather small, it seemed that incorporation of any of 
the three NA’s attenuated virus replication at 48 hours pi.
Figure 1. Replication kinetics of H5N1-pH1N1, H5N1-H3N2 and H5N1-sH1N1 reassortant viruses in MDCK 
cells
MDCK cells were inoculated with 0.01 TCID50/cell of H5N1 (black square), H5 reassortant viruses harboring 
the NA (grey square), M (grey circle), NS (white square), NA and M (black circle) and NA, M and NS (white 
circle) of pH1N1 (A), H3N2 (B) or sH1N1 (C) and supernatant samples were harvested 6, 12, 24, and 48 h later. 
Geometric mean titers were calculated from two independent experiments, error bars indicate standard 
deviations. The lower limit of detection is indicated by the dotted line.
reassortant virus Pb2 Pb1 PA hA NP NA m Ns
h5N1 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5
h5-ph1
NA
H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 ph1 H5 H5
h5-ph1
m
H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 ph1 H5
h5-ph1
Ns
H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 ph1
h5-ph1
NA,m
H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 ph1 ph1 H5
h5-ph1
NA,m,Ns
H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 ph1 ph1 ph1
h5-h3
NA
H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 h3 H5 H5
h5-h3
m
H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 h3 H5
h5-h3
Ns
H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 h3
h5-h3
NA,m
H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 h3 h3 H5
h5-h3
NA,m,Ns
H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 h3 h3 h3
h5-sh1
NA
H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 sh1 H5 H5
h5-sh1
m
H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 sh1 H5
h5-sh1
Ns
H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 sh1
h5-sh1
NA,m
H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 sh1 sh1 H5
h5-sh1
NA,m,Ns
H5 H5 H5 H5 H5 sh1 sh1 sh1
table 3. H5 Reassortant influenza viruses rescued via reverse genetics
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in vitro characterization of h5 reassortant viruses in wdhbe cells
Influenza viruses infect cells of the respiratory tract of humans. Therefore, we eval-
uated the replication kinetics of the reassortant viruses in wdNHBE cells. 
To characterize the wdNHBE cells, immunohistochemistry was used to identify 
ciliated cells, mucus-producing goblet cells and tight junctions. Cultures were also 
double stained for ciliated cells and tight junctions. For further characterization, 
the sialic acid (SA) receptor distribution on wdNHBE cells was determined by lectin 
histochemistry using MAL-II which recognizes the α2.3-linked SA and SNA which 
recognizes α2.6-linked SA, the receptors for avian and human influenza viruses re-
spectively. This data is in agreement with the general pattern of SA receptor distri-
bution on wdNHBE cells cultured in vitro: α2.3-linked SA receptors are expressed 
predominantly on ciliated cells and to a lesser extent on nonciliated cells and α2.6-
linked SA receptors are expressed mainly on nonciliated cells and to a lesser extent 
on ciliated cells [267]. 
To study the replication kinetics of the H5 reassortant viruses, wdNHBE cells were 
inoculated with an MOI of 0.02. Growth medium was added for ten minutes to 
harvest virus at fixed time points. None of the H5N1-pH1N1 (Fig 2A), H5N1-H3N2 
(Fig 2B) and H5N1-sH1N1 (Fig 2C) reassortant viruses replicated to higher virus tit-
ers then wtH5N1 in wdNHBE cells. Some H5 reassortant viruses (H5-pH1NS, H5-
H3NA,M,NS and H5-sH1NA,M) even displayed virus titers at 48 hours p.i. that were 
>1.5 log10 TCID50/ml lower compared to the wtH5N1 virus titer. 
 
h5N1-ph1N1 reassortant viruses in ferrets
The ferret model was used to select for H5N1-pH1N1 reassortant viruses with 
highest replication in vivo, and to evaluate the ability of this virus to be trans-
mitted via aerosols or respiratory droplets. Two ferrets were inoculated intrana-
sally with 107.3 TCID50 of the MDCKP1 H5N1-pH1N1 reassortant virus mixture. 
Figure 2. Replication kinetics of H5N1-pH1N1, H5N1-H3N2 and H5N1-sH1N1 reassortant viruses in wdNHBE 
cells
wdNHBE cells were inoculated with 0.02 TCID50/cell of H5N1 (black square), H5N1 reassortant viruses con-
sisting of the NA (grey square), M (grey circle), NS (white square), NA and M (black circle) and NA, M and NS 
(white circle) of pH1N1 (A), H3N2 (B) or sH1N1 (C) and samples were harvested 1, 6, 12, 24, and 48 h later. 
Geometric mean titers were calculated from two independent experiments, error bars indicate standard 
deviations. The lower limit of detection is indicated by the dotted line.
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A recipient ferret was placed in a transmission cage adjacent to each donor fer-
ret one day later. Throat and nose swabs were collected at 1, 3, 5 and 7 dpi and 
dpe. Virus shedding peaked in the inoculated animals at 1 dpi, with virus titers up 
to 104 TCID50/ml in throat swabs (Fig 3), and this shedding continued until 7 dpi. 
Overall, the amount and duration of virus shedding of ferrets inoculated with the 
reassortant H5N1-pH1N1 mixture was lower compared to those of wild type H5N1-
inoculated ferrets in our previous experiment [150].  
None of the viruses in the H5N1-pH1N1 reassortant mixture was transmitted to the 
recipient ferrets via the aerosol or respiratory droplet route, since no virus could be 
detected in the throat and nose swabs collected from the recipient ferrets (Fig 3).
The genetic composition of the H5N1-pH1N1 reassortant viruses in throat swabs 
collected from the donor ferrets as well as in the MDCKP1 virus stock that was used 
as inoculum, was analyzed using pyrosequencing. In the MDCKP1 virus stock, the 
vast majority of the PB2, PB1, PA, NP and NS genes was derived from H5N1, and 
these H5 genes remained dominant in both ferrets until 7 dpi: 95±5%, 100±0%, 
98±2%, 90±4% and 96±3% respectively (Fig 4). In contrast, the NA and M gene seg-
ments of pH1N1 virus origin were dominant in the inoculum. In addition, these 
pH1N1 genes were still present in the reassortant mixture collected from ferrets at 
7 dpi, although the proportion of these genes had decreased during the course of 
infection to 46±4% and 28±4% for NA and M respectively (Fig 4). 
 
DiscUssioN
Genetic reassortment is an important mechanism in the evolution of influenza vi-
ruses yielding strains with novel genetic and phenotypic traits. At least two human 
Figure 3. Replication and transmission of H5N1-pH1N1 reassortant virus 
in ferrets
Two ferrets were inoculated intranasally with 107.3 TCID50 of the MDCKP1 
H5N1-pH1N1 reassortant virus mixture and subsequently housed individu-
ally in transmission cages (A, B). A naïve recipient ferret was added to a 
cage adjacent to each transmission cage at 1dpi (A, B). Virus titers in throat 
(black) and nose swabs (white) of the donor ferrets (lines) and recipient fer-
rets (bars) were determined by endpoint titration in MDCK cells. The lower 
limit of detection is indicated by the dotted line.
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influenza pandemics in the last century were linked to lineages where circulating 
human influenza viruses reassorted with influenza genes of non-human (probably 
avian) origin [30]. To study the potential of reassortment between the HPAI H5N1 
virus and contemporary human influenza viruses (pH1N1, H3N2 and sH1N1), we 
used an in vitro selection method to identify the reassortant viruses that are most 
likely to emerge. The HA of the contemporary human influenza viruses was omitted 
in these experiments to make sure that only viruses containing an H5 HA were gen-
erated. In this way, a mixture of up to 128 (27) possible different reassortant viruses 
was generated that was subsequently passaged in MDCK cells under limiting dilu-
tion conditions to allow selective outgrowth of viruses with high in vitro replication 
rates. It should be noted that virus replication in MDCK cells may not reflect natural 
selection of reassortant viruses in humans. However, we have previously shown 
that with this method, reassortant viruses with enhanced pathogenicity in ferrets 
could be identified, thereby emphasizing the usefulness of this method [269].
Analysis of the genetic composition of the viruses that were obtained using the 
in vitro selection method in the present study, showed that wtH5N1 virus was re-
covered in 1 out of 4 attempts in all three H5N1-human influenza genome mixing 
experiments. In all other attempts, the NA and M genes of pH1N1, H3N2 and sH1N1 
as well as the NS gene of pH1N1 were selected by HPAI H5 virus, after replication in 
Figure 4. Virus composition in ferrets inoculated with H5N1-pH1N1 reassortant virus during the course 
of infection 
Two ferrets were inoculated intranasally with 107.3 TCID50 of the MDCKP1 H5N1-pH1N1 reassortant 
virus mixture. At day 1, 3, 5 and 7 dpi throat swabs were collected from both ferrets (F1 and F2). In 
these throat samples, as well as the MDCKP1 inoculum, the ratio of the H5N1 (grey) and pH1N1 (black) 
gene segments (PB2, PB1, PA, NP, NA, M and NS) was determined by pyrosequencing. ND: no detec-
tion of viral gene segments by PCR.
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mammalian cells (Table 2). 
In addition, the ability of H5N1 and pH1N1 influenza viruses to reassort has recently 
been investigated by others. In this study, MDCK cells were coinfected with these 
two viruses, resulting in the selection of similar reassortant viruses, harboring the 
NA, M, and NS gene segments of pH1N1 [264]. In another study, ferrets were co-
infected with avian H5N1 and human H3N2 resulting in reassortant viruses that had 
also incorporated the NA, M and NS gene segments of a human H3N2 virus [154]. 
Thus, our transfection based approach yielded similar data as with other methods.
When we studied the replication kinetics of the H5 reassortant viruses that were 
detected after in vitro selection in MDCK cells, we found that only a few H5 reassor-
tant viruses had a slightly increased replication capacity compared to the wt H5N1 
virus (Fig 1). This effect could for the most part be attributed to the M gene segment 
of pH1N1 and H3N2. In contrast, when the NA of H5N1 was exchanged by the NA 
of one of the three human influenza viruses, the replication kinetics were slower 
compared to the wtH5N1 virus, which is in agreement with previous findings when 
H5N1-H3N2 reassortment was studied [154]. 
In wdNHBE cells, HPAI H5N1 replicates to lower titers compared to pH1N1, H3N2 
and sH1N1 (data not shown and [271]). However, when the replication capacity of 
H5 reassortant viruses was investigated, no increased replication was demonstrated 
for any of the H5 reassortants, when compared to wtH5N1. It is possible that this 
poor replication of H5N1 virus compared to the human influenza viruses is the re-
sult of the avian receptor specificity of H5N1. Modification of the receptor binding 
preference of H5N1 to the human type receptors may result in increased replication 
in wdNHBE cells, and may to some extent compensate for the need of reassortment 
with human influenza viruses.
The data obtained with the in vitro selection experiments showed that especially 
the M and NA gene segments from human influenza viruses are preferentially se-
lected by avian H5N1. However when these reassortant viruses were investigated 
in vitro none of the reassortant H5 viruses had an apparent increase in replication 
capacity compared to wtH5N1. This observation may explain why wtH5N1 was also 
recovered in all three in vitro selection experiments.
To study if reassortment between H5N1 and pH1N1 can be beneficial for virus rep-
lication in mammals, ferrets were inoculated with a mixture of reassortant viruses 
(MDCKP1 virus stock) and the virus composition was determined at different time 
points during the course of infection using pyrosequencing. In the inoculum, the H5 
polymerase complex genes PB2, PB1 and PA, as well as the H5N1 NP and NS genes 
were predominant, with only a small percentage of these genes being derived from 
pH1N1. Although the H5N1 polymerase genes did not contain the well-known mu-
tations in PB2 (E627K or D701N) that have been shown to be required for optimal 
replication of avian influenza viruses in mammals [104,105], the proportion of the 
pH1N1 polymerase complex genes in the virus mixture remained low during the 
course of infection. In contrast, the proportion of the pH1N1 NA and M genes in the 
MDCKP1 virus mixture were higher than those of the H5N1 counterparts, but this 
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proportion decreased slowly over time. It should be noted that the assessment of 
the preference of reassortant H5 viruses for H5N1 or pH1N1 gene segments would 
be more reliable if all gene segments would be present in equal copy numbers in 
the inoculum. Unfortunately, the generation of reassortants by transfecting 293T 
cells with plasmids harboring the different gene segments apparently resulted in 
a biased virus population with already a strong preferred use of some of the H5 
genes. However, gene segments that represented only a small proportion of the 
population (like the pH1N1 polymerase genes) should have increased in number if 
there would have been an apparent selective advantage for the viruses.
In the same ferret experiment, we investigated whether an airborne-transmissible 
H5N1 virus was present in the reassortant virus mixture. However, no aerosol or 
respiratory droplet transmission was detected, since no virus could be detected in 
respiratory samples collected from the naïve recipient ferrets. This may be the re-
sult of the low amount of virus that was shed by the donor ferrets, combined with 
the receptor binding preference of the H5N1 HA for α2,3-linked SA that are absent 
in the upper respiratory tract of ferrets. This switch in receptor preference was re-
cently shown to be crucial for airborne transmission of H5N1 viruses [259,261]. 
However, H5N1 viruses that were only mutated to acquire a preference for human 
α2,6-linked SA receptors were not transmitted between ferrets, suggesting that ad-
ditional genetic changes are needed [92,261]. Recently Imai et al. showed that in 
addition to receptor binding preference for α2,6-linked SAs, two additional muta-
tions in HA are required to confer a H5N1-pH1N1 reassortant, carrying the H5 HA 
and the other genes from pH1N1, airborne-transmissible between ferrets [259]. 
Moreover, recently we discovered that a fully avian H5N1 virus, with a preference 
for for human α2,6-linked SA receptors, can acquire the ability to be transmitted 
between ferrets without the need for reassortment [261]. 
Although none of the reassortant viruses identified and evaluated in our study have 
an evident replication advantage over their parental viruses, the generated reas-
sortant viruses were also not found to be severely attenuated. Given that only a 
few mutations are necessary to confer airborne transmission of a H5N1-pH1N1 re-
assortant between ferrets, the emergence of reassortant viruses between human 
and avian influenza viruses but also between human and porcine influenza viruses 
should be monitored carefully.
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AbstrAct 
Repeated transmission of animal influenza viruses to humans has prompted inves-
tigation of the viral, host, and environmental factors responsible for transmission 
via aerosols or respiratory droplets. How do we determine – out of thousands of 
influenza virus isolates collected in animal surveillance studies each year – which 
viruses have the potential to become airborne, and hence pose a pandemic threat? 
Here, using knowledge from pandemic, zoonotic and epidemic viruses, we postu-
late that the minimal requirements for efficient transmission of an animal influenza 
virus between humans are: efficient virus attachment to (upper) respiratory tissues, 
replication to high titers in these tissues, and release and aerosolization of single 
virus particles. Investigating airborne transmission of influenza viruses is key to un-
derstand – and predict – influenza pandemics.
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iNtroDUctioN
The virus or virus subtype that will cause the next influenza pandemic is a highly 
debated topic in the field. Some believe that only influenza virus subtypes H1, H2, 
and H3 can cause pandemics in humans, and therefore – beyond isolated cases of 
zoonotic infections – we should not worry about e.g. H5N1, H7N7 or H9N2 viruses 
for human health. Many believe that swine viruses, rather than avian viruses, are 
more likely to cause the next pandemic. However, beyond the fact that there will be 
future pandemics, there is little known in terms of the viral origin, subtype, and vir-
ulence of the next pandemic. One other assumption can be made: the virus will be 
transmissible via aerosols or respiratory droplets (shortened hereafter as airborne 
transmissible). Influenza A viruses are constantly undergoing genetic and phenotyp-
ic changes during their circulation in avian and mammalian species. Our knowledge 
of viral traits necessary for host switching and virulence has increased significantly 
over the last decade. However, what exactly determines airborne transmission of 
influenza viruses in humans has remained largely unknown. Only when we fully 
understand the viral (genetic and phenotypic), host, and environmental factors that 
drive airborne transmission can we start to make predictions about which influenza 
viruses may cause future influenza pandemics. 
Past pandemics
Four major pandemics have been recognized for which viral genome sequence data 
is available. While it was initially proposed that the 1918 H1N1 Spanish influenza 
pandemic was caused by a wholly avian virus that adapted to humans [29], recent 
evidence suggests that some of its genes were derived from mammalian viruses 
circulating as early as 1911 [32]. The 1957 H2N2 Asian influenza pandemic resulted 
from the reassortment of avian HA, NA, and PB1 virus genes with the then circu-
lating seasonal human H1N1 influenza virus [30]. The H3N2 Hong Kong influenza 
pandemic of 1968 was also a product of reassortment between avian and human 
virus genes; HA and PB1 genes of the H2N2 virus were replaced by those of an 
avian H3 virus [30]. In 2009, an H1N1 influenza virus of swine origin caused the first 
pandemic of the 21st century [50]. The gene constellation of this virus showed clear 
evidence of multiple reassortment events that had presumably occurred in pigs 
over a period of years [272] (Figure 1). The role of swine as a mixing vessel for the 
generation of reassortant influenza A viruses with pandemic potential is generally 
accepted, yet still underestimated (reviewed in [20]). However, it should be noted 
that reassortment can conceivably take place in avian or human hosts; for pandem-
ics prior to 2009, there is no evidence that reassortment events occurred in pigs. 
Regardless of the identity of the mixing vessel it is important to emphasize that 
most, if not all, recent influenza pandemics were caused by reassortant viruses. The 
expansion in surveillance efforts in pigs in response to the 2009 pandemic will most 
likely reveal many more reassortant viruses that may or may not have the potential 
to infect and spread in humans. 
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But how, out of thousands of animal influenza viruses from surveillance studies, can 
we select the ones we should prepare for as potential causes of new pandemics?
Viral determinants of transmission
Retrospective analysis of pandemic H1 (1918), H2 and H3 viruses has revealed that 
only one to two mutations in the HA receptor binding site are required to confer 
binding preference for virus receptors on cells of the upper respiratory tract (URT) 
Figure 2. Reassortment and adaptation events of pandemic influenza A viruses 
For the 1918 H1N1 “Spanish influenza” pandemic, evidence for two mutually exclusive scenarios has been 
presented: the gradual adaptation of avian genes to the human host and a reassortment event between 
avian and mammalian viruses. After 1918, the same H1N1 virus caused seasonal epidemics until 1957, when 
the H2N2 virus emerged upon reassortment between the seasonal H1N1 and an avian H2N2 virus, introduc-
ing the avian HA, NA, and PB1 genes. This H2N2 virus circulated in humans until 1968, when reassortment of 
the H2N2 with an avian H3 virus resulted in exchange of the H3 HA and PB1 genes to yield a new pandemic 
virus of subtype H3N2. The 2009 H1N1 pandemic virus included the NA and M genes of the Eurasian swine 
lineage, and the other genes of a “triple reassortant” swine influenza virus that had previously acquired its 
genes upon reassortment between human, avian, and (classical) swine viruses. Grey colour in virus particles 
indicates uncertainty of viral gene segment origin or lack of data. Dotted arrows indicate uncertain scenarios 
and solid arrows indicate events that are supported by scientific evidence. Dashed arrows represent pan-
demic viruses circulating in subsequent influenza seasons.
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of humans, α2,6-linked sialic acids (SAs) [89]. Partially borrowing from this knowl-
edge, several mutations in the HA protein, including Q226L, G228S, E190D, K193R, 
S227N and N182K, have been shown to change and/or increase receptor binding 
of avian H9N2 and H5N1 viruses to human URT tissues [74,90-93] with changes 
like Q226L improving replication and transmission of H9 viruses [273]. However, to 
date, none of the “designer” H5N1 viruses carrying these mutations have resulted 
in airborne transmission [92,274]. Efficient H5 transmission may thus require more 
subtle differences in receptor preference than simple α2,3 versus α2,6 SA linkage 
specificity. 
Previous research has also pointed to key changes in the polymerase proteins that 
increase virus replication efficiency at 33 0C, the accepted temperature for efficient 
replication in the mammalian URT [111,275]. These changes at positions 627, 701 
and 591 of PB2 have also been shown to support transmission of multiple subtypes 
in mammalian models [108,110,151]. A decrease in association of the PB2 and NP 
proteins in mammalian cells is thought to be the mechanism behind the increase in 
replication efficiency [276]. 
PA and NP genes have also been associated with viral host restriction but the key 
amino acids have yet to be identified. Even fewer experiments have looked at the 
roles of NA, M and NS proteins in determining host range and transmission. It is like-
ly that virus tropism, efficiency in replication, amount of virus shed, and the dura-
tion of shedding are important factors for transmission efficiency. A longer duration 
of peak virus shedding will increase the chance for the virus to reach susceptible 
host(s) and therefore increase transmission events [277].
Airborne transmission; size does matter
Human-to-human transmission of influenza viruses can occur through contact, di-
rect or indirect, and/or respiratory droplets (large droplets and aerosols). The role 
of each has been well studied in mammalian models, focusing on the ferret and 
guinea pig (reviewed in [146] and Table 1). Opinions differ on the importance of 
each mode and data has been published to support each (reviewed in [278,279]). 
Efficient aerosolization of viral particles is however crucial for a virus with trans-
mission efficiency and pandemic potential. There is no exact particle size cut-off at 
which transmission changes from exclusively large droplet to aerosol. However it is 
generally accepted that for infectious particles with a diameter of 5µm or less, trans-
mission occurs through aerosols. Large aerosol droplets do not remain suspended 
in air and typically travel < 1m before settling on the mucosa of close contacts or 
environmental surfaces. In contrast, smaller particles, < 5µm, have a slow settling 
velocity and can thus travel further than large droplets [280]. Humans exhale drop-
lets of widely varying size and quantity [281] and the generation of aerosol particles 
by coughing or sneezing has been well documented, with the majority of particles 
expelled during breathing and sneezing measured at < 1µm [282,283]. Evidence to 
support the role of aerosols in influenza transmission include the prolonged persist-
ence of infectivity in aerosolized influenza at low humidity [284,285], transmission 
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to volunteers by aerosols reproducing the disease at doses much less than required 
by intranasal infections [286] and the abolishment of transmission when virus aero-
solization is blocked with UV treatment of upper room air [278]. 
 
h?N?, the next pandemic
The continuing spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 viruses in 
poultry and the consistent, albeit infrequent, transmission to humans with high 
mortality rates [59,287] has kept HPAI H5N1 on high alert as the next potential 
pandemic. It has been suggested that human-to-human transmission between fam-
ily members in close contact has occurred [60-62] however, sustained human-to-
human transmission has not been confirmed. It is this lack of human-to-human 
transmission that has prevented extensive infection, and therefore prevented an 
H5N1 pandemic. 
The inefficient airborne transmission of HPAI H5N1 virus has been confirmed in 
model/species Virus subtype transmissiona reference
mouse (mF-1/cFW)1 H1N1 Seasonal A1 [295-298]
H2N2 Seasonal A1      [297]
Pandemic A1 [297]
mouse (balb/c) H1N1 Seasonal None [289]
Pandemic None [289]
H3N2 Pandemic None [289]
H5N1 HPAI None [289]
Ferret H1N1 Seasonal A [299,300]
Pandemic A [88,150,256,301]
H3N2 Seasonal A [149,273,274]
Pandemic
H1/H3 Oseltamivir resistant D/None [302-304]
H2N2 Pandemic D/A [152]
H7N7 HPAI D [305]
H7N2 D/None [305]
H9N2 D/A [153,273]
guinea Pigs H1N1 Seasonal D2/A2 [289,307,308]
Pandemic D/A [309]
H3N2   Seasonal D/A [289,307,308]
H1/H3  Oseltamivir resistant D [310]
H5N1 HPAI D2/None [275,309]
H1  Swine A2/None [108,308]
H3N2 Swine None [308]
H9N2 None [308]
hamsters H1N1  Seasonal D2 [311]
H3N2  Seasonal D [311]
table 1. Mammalian Models for Influenza Transmission
a A = aerosol, D = direct contact transmission, None = no transmission direct or aerosol
1 Transmission may have been due to differences in mouse strain and/or husbandry techniques (bacterial 
co-infections were likely to play a role in the 1960s studies)
2 Partial transmission found
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several mammalian models including ferrets, mice and guinea pigs (Table 1). Nu-
merous studies with wild type H5N1 viruses, reassortants between H5N1 and hu-
man viruses, H5N1 viruses adapted by repeated passage, and “designer” H5N1 
viruses with mutations known to increase virus binding and/or replication have 
failed to yield airborne H5 viruses, showing direct contact transmission at best 
[108,154,274,288,289]. This highlights the complexity of the mechanism(s) of influ-
enza virus transmissibility and confirms that H5N1 viruses require further adapta-
tion to become a pandemic threat. 
Along with H5N1, H9N2 viruses have become enzootic in poultry in large parts of 
Eurasia [290]. These H9N2 viruses increasingly display human-like receptor spe-
cificity [74,273] and have occasionally transmitted to humans and pigs [71,291] 
with most human cases likely going unreported due to the relatively mild symp-
toms associated with infection. In the laboratory, H9N2 viruses have been shown to 
transmit to direct contact ferrets with no prior adaptation or mutations [273] and 
compared to H5N1 virus, were easily adapted after reassortment in a human H3N2 
backbone to become airborne in the ferret model [153]. Recent work indicates that 
reassortment of an H9N2 virus, within the backbone of the pandemic 2009 H1N1 
virus, supports aerosol transmission in the ferret without any further adaptation 
[292]. Therefore, currently circulating avian H9N2 viruses are able to create a po-
tentially pandemic virus when provided the opportunity for reassortment with a 
human-adapted virus. 
Virus design; why and how do influenza viruses become airborne?
The major challenges for influenza virus transmission research going forward are 
the types of studies needed to elucidate mechanisms for transmission. In our opin-
ion, the focus should be on “gain of function” approaches rather than “loss of func-
tion”. For the purpose of virus transmission studies, loss of function experiments 
are like destroying a car engine; remove any crucial part and the engine will stop 
running. In analogy, mutating a transmissible virus so it no longer transmits is a 
pointless exercise, giving us none to little mechanistic information; there are a thou-
sand ways to accomplish that.  Gain of function experiments mimic tuning the car’s 
engine; only one or a few parts need tuning but the key is determining which part(s) 
out of the possible thousand they are. To investigate which viral parts need “a tune 
up” before it becomes transmissible, at least two options are available, and both 
should be followed. First, we could “replay” the evolutionary events leading to the 
pandemic viruses of e.g. 1957 and 1968. Which genetic changes in the avian-origin 
viral genes made these reassortant viruses airborne? Such experiments are now on-
going in several laboratories. Secondly, we can hypothesize, based on accumulated 
data, which viral characteristics would facilitate airborne transmission. Below, we 
discuss several of these features that we believe are important for influenza to be-
come airborne. We postulate that the minimal requirements for airborne influenza 
viruses are 1) Attachment to and replication in appropriate cells of the URT; 2) High 
virus yields in the URT; 3) Virus shedding as single particles.
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Attachment and Replication 
Viruses with binding preference for α2,3 SAs can infect and replicate in human 
lungs and can lead to severe clinical symptoms and even death, yet these viruses 
are limited in their ability to infect the URT and subsequently transmit via aerosols 
(Figure 2A). Thus far, all transmissible viruses bind to α2,6 SAs and are capable of 
attaching to, replicating in, and transmitting from the URT (Figure 2B). However, the 
gross receptor binding profile alone does not guarantee transmission. Therefore, 
efficient transmission may require more subtle differences in receptor preference 
than α2,3 or α 2,6 SA linkage only. Glycan arrays and other assays for virus attach-
ment may facilitate investigation of these subtle differences in binding specificity, 
but identification of the critical influenza virus receptors on the cells of the URT and 
LRT is needed to facilitate future research on host and tissue specificity as well as 
transmission.
High virus yields in the URT
When the extent of virus replication of airborne viruses is low – e.g. investigated 
through vaccination -, transmission generally does not occur [293,294] (Fig 2C). To 
date, all pandemic viruses have established efficient and productive infections in 
the URT (Fig 2D). The mechanism necessary for URT tropism has been linked to af-
finity for α2,6-SAs and adaptive mutations supporting replication at ~33oC, which 
optimizes molecular interactions between viral proteins and cellular host factors 
[108,110,111,151]. High levels of virus replication in the URT may ensure that large 
amounts of progeny virus are released into aerosols from the nose and mouth upon 
sneezing, coughing, or breathing.
Figure 2. Proposed minimal requirements for influenza viruses to become airborne
Virus attachment to ferret URT is visualized with FITC-labeled viruses. (A) Shows no attachment of virus 1 
(non-transmissible virus) to URT whereas (B) shows red staining indicative for attachment of virus 2 (trans-
missible virus) to the ferret URT. Virus yield in the URT of ferrets is shown for virus 1 (C) and virus 2 (D), 
with grey bars representing virus shedding from nose swabs and black bars from throat swabs. Electron 
microscopy of viruses budding from human 293T cells.  (E) Shows viral aggregates released in clusters of 
spherical particles of virus 1 while (F) shows single virus 2 particles being released from the infected cell as 
both spherical and filamentous virions. 
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Virus shedding as single particles 
Low NA activity can result in inefficient cleavage of SAs and as a consequence, inef-
ficient release and aggregation of virus particles resulting in little to no successive 
rounds of replication (Figure 2E). The substrate specificity and activity of NA and HA 
must be in some balance with respect to receptor binding and cleavage in order to 
maximize the yield of progeny shedding as single virus particles that are efficiently 
transmitted (Figure 2F). In addition to HA, the NA’s role in virus transmission war-
rants further investigation.
Unknowns 
There are many unknowns when it comes to airborne transmission. The above fac-
tors are only a starting point for research. More work is needed to elucidate the 
relative contribution of human influenza virus transmission via contact, (large) res-
piratory droplets, and aerosols. With respect to airborne routes, how much does 
sneezing and coughing add to transmission in comparison to breathing alone? How 
representative are the available animal models (guinea pigs, ferrets) for transmis-
sion in humans?  Guinea pigs generally do not sneeze upon influenza virus infection 
yet transmit viruses via the airborne route and some viruses are not transmitted 
between ferrets despite frequent sneezing of the animals [146]. Neither of these 
results provide definitive proof for a role of coughing and sneezing in transmission. 
Other important questions are whether airborne viruses come from one or many 
cell types, whether virus shape is important for transmission, or specific virus stabil-
ity and whether key changes that drive transmission of one viral subtype applicable 
to every other virus (subtype).  Research and attention are focused on answering 
these questions regarding the mechanisms involved in airborne transmission, and it 
is crucial to sustain the current funding, energy and collaboration in order to answer 
these key questions.
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AbstrAct
Highly pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N1 virus can cause morbidity and mortality 
in humans, but thus far has not acquired the ability to be transmitted by aerosol or 
respiratory droplet (“airborne transmission”) between humans. To address the con-
cern that the virus could acquire this ability under natural conditions, we genetically 
modified A/H5N1 virus by site-directed mutagenesis and subsequent serial pas-
sage in ferrets. The genetically modified A/H5N1 virus acquired mutations during 
passage in ferrets, ultimately becoming airborne transmissible in ferrets. None of 
the recipient ferrets died after airborne infection with the mutant A/H5N1 viruses. 
Four amino acid substitutions in the host receptor-binding protein hemagglutinin, 
and one in the polymerase complex protein PB2, were consistently present in air-
borne transmitted viruses. The transmissible viruses were sensitive to the antiviral 
drug oseltamivir and reacted well with antisera raised against H5 influenza vaccine 
strains. Thus, avian A/H5N1 influenza viruses can acquire the capacity for airborne 
transmission between mammals without recombination in an intermediate host, 
and therefore constitute a risk for human pandemic influenza. 
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Influenza A viruses have been isolated from many host species including humans, 
pigs, horses, dogs, marine mammals, and a wide range of domestic birds, but wild 
birds in the orders Anseriformes (ducks, geese, and swans) and Charadriiformes 
(gulls, terns, and waders) are thought to form the virus reservoir in nature [2]. In-
fluenza A viruses belong to the family Orthomyxoviridae, which have a segment-
ed RNA genome consisting of eight gene segments [5,312]. Segments 1-3 encode 
the polymerase proteins: basic polymerase 2 (PB2), basic polymerase 1 (PB1) and 
acidic polymerase (PA) respectively. These proteins form the RNA-dependent RNA 
polymerase complex responsible for transcription and replication of the viral ge-
nome. Segment 2 also encodes a second small protein, PB1-F2, which has been 
implicated in the induction of cell death [15,313]. Segments 4 and 6 encode the vi-
ral surface glycoproteins hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) respectively. 
HA is responsible for binding to sialic acids, the viral receptors on host cells, and 
for fusion of the viral and host cell membranes upon endocytosis. NA is a sialidase, 
responsible for cleaving sialic acids from host cells and virus particles. Segment 5 
codes for the nucleocapsid protein (NP) that binds to viral RNA, and together with 
the polymerase proteins forms the ribonucleoprotein complexes (RNPs). Segment 
7 codes for the viral matrix structural protein M1, and the ion channel protein M2 
that is incorporated in the viral membrane. Segment 8 encodes the non-structural 
protein NS1 and the nucleic export protein (NEP) previously known as NS2. NS1 
is an antagonist of host innate immune responses and interferes with host gene 
expression, while NEP is involved in the nuclear export of RNPs into the cytoplasm 
prior to virus assembly [5,312].
Influenza A viruses show pronounced genetic variation of the surface glycoproteins 
HA and NA [2]. Consequently the viruses are classified based on the antigenic vari-
ation of the HA and NA proteins. To date, 16 major antigenic variants of HA and 
nine antigenic variants of NA have been recognized in wild birds, and are found in 
numerous combinations that are designated as virus subtypes (e.g., H1N1, H5N1, 
H7N7, H16N3), which are used in influenza A virus classification and nomenclature 
[1,2]. This classification system is biologically relevant, as natural host antibodies 
that recognize one HA or NA subtype will generally not cross-react with other HA 
and NA subtypes.
Influenza A viruses of the H5 and H7 subtypes can be further classified based on 
their virulence in chickens into highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) and low 
pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses. Viruses of subtypes H1-H4, H6, and H8-
H16 are LPAI viruses. The vast majority of H5 and H7 influenza A viruses are also 
of the LPAI phenotype. HPAI viruses are generally thought to arise in poultry after 
domestic birds become infected by LPAI H5 and H7 viruses from the wild bird res-
ervoir [176,314]. The HA protein of influenza A viruses is initially synthesized as a 
single polypeptide precursor (HA0), which is cleaved into HA1 and HA2 subunits 
by trypsin-like proteases in the host cell. The switch from the LPAI to the HPAI vi-
rus phenotype occurs upon the introduction of basic amino acid residues into the 
HA0 cleavage site, also known as the multibasic cleavage site (MBCS). The MBCS 
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in HA can be cleaved by ubiquitously expressed host proteases, and this cleavage 
facilitates systemic virus replication and results in mortality of up to 100% in poultry 
[98,156].
Since the late 1990s, HPAI A/H5N1 viruses have devastated the poultry industry of 
numerous countries of the eastern hemisphere. To date, A/H5N1 has spread from 
Asia to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, resulting in the death of hundreds of 
millions of domestic birds. In Hong Kong in 1997, the first cases of human deaths di-
rectly attributable to avian A/H5N1 virus were recorded [58]. Since 2003, more than 
600 laboratory-confirmed cases of HPAI A/H5N1 virus infections in humans have 
been reported from 15 countries [59]. Although limited A/H5N1 virus transmission 
between persons in close contact has been reported, sustained human-to-human 
transmission of HPAI A/H5N1 virus has not been detected [60-62]. Whether this 
virus may acquire the ability to be transmitted via aerosols or respiratory drop-
lets among mammals, including human beings, to trigger a future pandemic is a 
key question for pandemic preparedness. Although our knowledge of viral traits 
necessary for host switching and virulence has increased substantially in recent 
years [315,316], what determines airborne transmission of influenza viruses among 
mammals, a trait necessary for a virus to become pandemic, has remained largely 
unknown [92,153,154,274]. Therefore, investigations of routes of influenza virus 
transmission between animals and on the determinants of airborne transmission 
are high on the influenza research agenda.
The viruses that caused the major pandemics of the past century emerged upon 
reassortment (i.e., genetic mixing) of animal and human influenza viruses [234]. 
However, given that viruses from only four pandemics are available for analyses, we 
cannot exclude the possibility that a future pandemic may be triggered by a wholly 
avian virus without the requirement of reassortment. Several studies have shown 
that reassortment events between A/H5N1 and seasonal human influenza viruses 
do not yield viruses that are readily transmitted between ferrets [92,154,274,288]. 
Here, we investigated if A/H5N1 virus could change its transmissibility characteris-
tics without any requirement for reassortment. 
We chose influenza virus A/Indonesia/5/2005 for our study because the incidence 
of human A/H5N1 virus infections and fatalities in Indonesia remains fairly high [59] 
and there are concerns that this virus could acquire molecular characteristics that 
would allow it to become more readily transmissible between humans and initiate 
a pandemic. Since no reassortants between A/H5N1 viruses and seasonal or pan-
demic human influenza viruses have been detected in nature, and because our goal 
was to understand the biological properties needed for an influenza virus to be-
come airborne transmissible in mammals, we decided to use the complete A/Indo-
nesia/5/2005 virus that was isolated from a human case of HPAI A/H5N1 infection.
The ferret (Mustela putorius furo) was used as the animal model in our studies. 
Ferrets have been used in influenza research since 1933, because they are suscep-
tible to infection with human and avian influenza viruses [317]. Following infection 
with human influenza A virus, ferrets develop respiratory disease and lung pathol-
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ogy similar to that observed in humans. Ferrets can also transmit human influenza 
viruses to other ferrets that serve as sentinels with or without direct contact [318] 
(Fig. S1) [150,210]. Host restriction of replication and transmission of influenza A 
viruses is in part determined by specific sialic acid (SA) receptors on the surface of 
susceptible cells. The affinity of influenza viruses for these receptors varies accord-
ing to the species from which they are isolated. Influenza viruses of avian origin 
preferentially bind to α-2,3-linked SA receptors, whereas human influenza viruses 
recognize α-2,6-linked SA receptors. The receptor distribution in ferrets resembles 
that of humans in that the α-2,6-linked SA receptors are predominantly present 
in the upper respiratory tract (URT), and the α-2,3-linked SA receptors are mainly 
present in the lower respiratory tract. In chickens and other birds, α-2,3-linked SAs 
predominate, but both α-2,3-linked SA and α-2,6-linked SA are present throughout 
the respiratory and enteric tracts (Fig. S2) [319]. The differences in receptor distri-
bution between humans and avian species are thought to determine the host re-
striction of influenza A viruses. A switch in receptor specificity from the avian α-2,3- 
to the human α-2,6- SA receptors, which can be acquired by specific mutations in 
the receptor binding site (RBS) of the HA, is expected to be necessary for an avian 
virus to become transmissible and thus gain the potential to become pandemic in 
humans.
Besides a switch in receptor specificity to facilitate infection of cells in the URT, in-
creased virus production in the URT and efficient release of virus particles from the 
respiratory tract to yield airborne virus, may also be required [234]. Such traits are 
likely to be determined by the viral surface glycoproteins and the proteins that form 
the viral polymerase complex. Amino acid substitutions in the polymerase proteins 
have already been shown to be major determinants of host range and transmission, 
including for pandemic influenza viruses [108,110,151]. Whereas avian viruses in 
principle replicate at temperatures around 410C, the temperature in the intestinal 
tract of birds, for replication in humans the viruses need to adapt to 33 0C, the 
temperature of the human URT. Amino acid substitution E627K in the polymerase 
complex protein PB2 has been associated with increased virus replication in mam-
malian cells at such lower temperatures [104,315,316]. In addition, when newly 
formed virus particles bud from the host cell membrane after virus replication, the 
NA that is present on the virus membrane facilitates the release of particles. For A/
H5N1, this process is rather inefficient, and released particles tend to form virus 
aggregates [234]. Therefore a balance between the properties endowed by HA and 
NA may be required to generate single particles. These established effects were 
therefore used as the basis for the initial substitutions chosen in the current study.
Human-to-human transmission of influenza viruses can occur through direct con-
tact, indirect contact (via fomites: contaminated environmental surfaces) and/or 
airborne transmission via small aerosols or large respiratory droplets. The pandem-
ic and epidemic influenza viruses that have circulated in humans in the past century 
were all transmitted via the airborne route, in contrast to many other respiratory 
viruses that are exclusively transmitted via contact. There is no exact particle size 
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cut-off at which transmission changes from exclusively large droplet to aerosol. 
However, it is generally accepted that for infectious particles with a diameter of 5 
μm or less, transmission occurs via aerosols. Since we did not measure particle size 
during our experiments we will use the term ‘airborne transmission’ throughout 
this manuscript. 
Biosafety and biosecurity concerns have remained foremost in our planning for this 
research program. The details are explained in the supporting online material and 
are summarized here. The enhanced Animal Biosafety Laboratory level 3 (ABSL3+) 
facility at Erasmus Medical Center (MC) Rotterdam was constructed for the specific 
purpose of containing pathogenic and transmissible influenza viruses and other 
pathogens of concern. The facility consists of a negatively pressurized laboratory 
with an interlock room. All in vivo and in vitro experimental work is carried out in 
negatively pressurized class 3 isolators or class 3 biosafety cabinets respectively. 
The facility is secured by procedures recognized as appropriate by the institutional 
biosafety officers and facility management at Erasmus MC and Dutch ad United 
States government inspectors. 
Before and during the research, biosafety officers of Erasmus MC and inspectors 
from the Dutch government, as well as from the United States Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, approved the facilities and procedures. Explicit permits 
for research on genetically modified airborne-transmissible A/H5N1 virus were 
obtained from the Dutch government. The research was performed strictly in ac-
cordance with the Dutch Code of Conduct for Biosecurity [320]. All personnel were 
instructed and trained extensively for working in the ABSL3+ facility, for handling 
(highly pathogenic) influenza virus, and in incident control (e.g., spills). To further 
prevent occupational risks, personnel use protective equipment and are offered 
seasonal and A/H5N1 influenza vaccines [318]. For emergency purposes, Erasmus 
MC holds supplies of oseltamivir and has quarantine hospital rooms. 
Using a combination of targeted mutagenesis followed by serial virus passage in 
ferrets we investigated whether A/H5N1 virus can acquire mutations that would 
increase the risk of mammalian transmission [321]. We have previously shown that 
several amino acid substitutions in the RBS of the HA surface glycoprotein of A/
Indonesia/5/2005 change the binding preference from the avian α2,3-linked SA re-
ceptors to the human α2,6-linked SA receptors [90]. A/Indonesia/5/2005 virus with 
amino acid substitutions N182K, Q222L/G224S, or N182K/Q222L/G224S (numbers 
refer to amino acid positions in the mature H5 HA protein) in HA display attachment 
patterns similar to those of human viruses to cells of the respiratory tract of ferrets 
and humans [90]. Of these changes, we know Q222L and G224S together switch the 
receptor binding specificity of H2 and H3 subtype influenza viruses, as this switch 
contributed to the emergence of the 1957 and 1968 pandemics [13]. N182K has 
been found in a human case of A/H5N1 virus infection [322]. 
Our experimental ratonale to obtain transmissible A/H5N1 viruses was to select 
a mutant A/H5N1 virus with receptor specificity for α2,6-linked SA shed at high 
titers from the URT of ferrets. Therefore, we used the QuickChange multi site-di-
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rected mutagenesis kit to introduce amino acid substi tuti ons N182K, Q222L/G224S, 
or N182K/Q222L/G224S in the HA of wildtype A/Indonesia/5/2005, resulti ng in A/
H5N1HA N182K, A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S and A/H5N1HA N182K,Q222L,G224S. Ex-
perimental details for experiments 1 to 9 are provided in the Supplemental Online 
Material (SOM, [318]). For experiment 1, we inoculated these mutant viruses and 
the A/H5N1wildtype virus intranasally into groups of six ferrets for each virus (Fig. 
S3). Throat and nasal swabs were collected daily, and virus ti ters were determined 
by end-point diluti on in Madin Darby canine kidney (MDCK) cells, to quanti fy vi-
rus shedding from the ferret URT. Three animals were euthanized aft er day 3 to 
enable ti ssue sample collecti on. All remaining animals were euthanized by day 7 
when the same ti ssue samples were taken. Virus ti ters were determined in the na-
sal turbinates, trachea, and lungs collected post-mortem from the euthanized fer-
rets. Throughout the durati on of experiment 1, ferrets inoculated intranasally with 
A/H5N1wildtype virus produced high ti ters in nose and throat swabs, by up to ten 
ti mes more than A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S, which was the mutant that yielded the 
highest virus ti ters of all three mutants during the 7-day period (Fig. 1). However, 
no signifi cant diff erence was observed between the virus shedding of ferrets in-
oculated with A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S or A/H5N1HA N182K, during the fi rst three 
days when six animals per group were present. Of the viruses with specifi city for 
α2,6-linked SA, A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S thus yielded the highest virus ti ters in the 
ferret URT (Fig. 1). 
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Figure 1. In experiment one, we inoculated groups of six ferrets intranasally with 1 x 106 TCID50 
of (A) infl uenza A/H5N1wildtype virus and the three mutants (B) A/H5N1HA N182K, (C) A/H5N1HA 
Q222L,G224S, and (D) A/H5N1HA N182K,Q222L,G224S. Three animals were euthanized at day 3 
for ti ssue sampling and at day 7, when this experiment was stopped. Virus ti ters were measured 
daily in nose swabs (top) and throat swabs (middle), and on 3 and 7 dpi in respiratory tract ti ssues 
(bott om) of individual ferrets. Virus ti ters in swabs and nasal turbinates (NT), trachea (T), and lung 
(L) were determined by end-point ti trati on in MDCK cells. (One animal inoculated with A/H5N1HA 
N182K,Q222L,G224S died at 1 dpi, due to circumstances not related to the experiment (D).) Top two 
rows: virus shedding from the URT as determined by virus ti ters in nasal and throat swabs was high-
est in A/H5N1wildtype-inoculated animals. The mutant that yielded the highest virus ti ters during 
the 7-day period was A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S, but ti ters were ~1 log lower than for the A/H5N-
1wildtype–inoculated animals. In the fi rst 3 days, when 6 animals per group were present, no signifi -
cant diff erences were observed between A/H5N1HA N182K- and A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S-inoculated 
animals as calculated by comparing the viral ti ter (Mann-Whitney test, P=0.589 and P=0.818 for nose 
and throat ti ters respecti vely). Bott om row: no marked diff erences in virus ti ters in respiratory ti ssues 
were observed between the four groups. Each bar color marks a single animal.
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As described above, amino acid substitution E627K in PB2 is one of the most consist-
ent host-range determinants of influenza viruses [108,110,151]. For experiment 2 
(Fig. S4), we introduced E627K into the PB2 gene of A/Indonesia/5/2005 by site-di-
rected mutagenesis, and produced the recombinant virus A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S 
PB2 E627K. The introduction of E627K in PB2 did not significantly affect virus shed-
ding in ferrets, since virus titers in the URT were similar to those seen in A/H5N1HA 
Q222L,G224S-inoculated animals (up to 1 x 104 fifty-percent tissue culture infec-
tious doses (TCID50)) (Mann-Whitney, p=0.476) (Fig. 1, Fig. S5). When four naïve 
ferrets were housed in cages adjacent to those with four inoculated animals to test 
for airborne transmission as described previously [150], A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S 
PB2 E627K was not transmitted (Fig. S5).
Since the mutant virus harboring the E627K mutation in PB2 and Q222L and G224S 
in HA did not transmit in experiment 2, we designed an experiment to force the 
virus to adapt to replication in the mammalian respiratory tract and to select virus 
variants by repeated passage (10 passages in total) of the constructed A/H5N1HA 
Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K virus and A/H5N1wildtype virus in the ferret URT (Fig. 
2, Fig. S6). In experiment 3, one ferret was inoculated intranasally with A/H5N-
1wildtype and one ferret with A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K. Throat and 
nose swabs were collected daily from live animals until 4 days post inoculation (dpi), 
at which time the animals were euthanized to collect samples from nasal tur-
binates and lung. The nasal turbinates were homogenized in 3ml of virus transport 
medium, tissue debris was pelleted by centrifugation, and 0.5 ml of the superna-
tant was subsequently used to inoculate the next ferret intranasally (passage 2). 
Figure 2. Experiment 3, virus passaging in ferrets. Since no airborne transmission was observed 
in experiment 2, A/H5N1wildtype and A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K were serially pas-
saged in ferrets to allow adaptation for efficient replication in mammals. Each virus was inocu-
lated intranasally with 1 x 106 TCID50 in one ferret (2 x 250 μl, divided over both nostrils). Nose 
and throat swabs were collected daily. Animals were euthanized at 4 dpi and nasal turbinates 
and lungs were collected. Nasal turbinates were homogenized in virus transport medium, and 
this homogenate was used to inoculate the next ferret, resulting in passage 2 (Fig. S6). Subse-
quent passages 3 - 6 were performed in the same way. From passage six onwards, nasal washes 
were collected at 3 dpi in addition to the nasal swabs. To this end, 1 ml of PBS was delivered 
drop wise into the nostrils of the ferrets, thereby inducing sneezing. Approximately 200 μl of the 
‘sneeze’ was collected in a Petri dish, and PBS was added to a final volume of 2 ml. For passage 
7 through 10, the nasal wash sample was used for the passages in ferrets. The passage-10 nasal 
washes were subsequently used for sequence analyses and the transmission experiments to be 
described in experiment 4. For details, see SOM.
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This procedure was repeated until passage 6. From passage 6 onwards, in addition 
to the samples described above, a nasal wash was also collected at 3 dpi. To this 
end, 1 ml of phosphate-buffered saline (PBS) was delivered drop wise to the nostrils 
of the ferrets to induce sneezing. Approximately 200 μl of the ‘sneeze’ was collected 
in a Petri dish, and PBS was added to a final volume of 2 ml. The nasal wash samples 
were used for intranasal inoculation of the ferrets for the subsequent passages 7 
through 10. We changed the source of inoculum during the course of the experi-
ment, because passaging nasal washes may facilitate the selection of viruses that 
were secreted from the URT. Since influenza viruses mutate rapidly, we anticipated 
that ten passages would be sufficient for the virus to adapt to efficient replication 
in mammals.
Virus titers in the nasal turbinates of ferrets inoculated with A/H5N1wildtype ranged 
from ~1 x 105 – 1 x 107 TCID50/gram tissue throughout the ten serial passages (Fig. 
3A, Fig. S7). In ferrets inoculated with A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K virus, a 
moderate increase in virus titers in the nasal turbinates was observed as passage 
Figure 3. Virus titers in (A) the nasal turbinates collected at day 4 
and (B) nose swabs collected daily until day 4, from ferrets inocu-
lated with A/H5N1wildtype (in grey) and A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S 
PB2 E627K (in black) throughout the ten serial passages described 
in Figure 2. Virus titers were determined by end-point titration in 
MDCK cells. After inoculation with A/H5N1wildtype, virus titers in 
the nasal turbinates were variable but high, ranging from 1.6 x 105 
to 7.9 x 106 TCID50/gram tissue (panel A), with no further increase 
observed with repeated passage. After inoculation with A/H5N1HA 
Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K, virus titers in nasal turbinates averaged 
1.6 x 104 in the first three passages, 2.5 x 105 in passage four to 
seven and 6.3 x 105 TCID50/gram tissue in the last three passages, 
suggestive of improved replication and virus adaptation. A similar 
pattern of adaptation was observed in the virus titers in the nose 
swabs of animals inoculated with A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S PB2 
E627K (panel B). These titers also increased during the successive 
passages, with peak virus shedding of 1 x 105 TCID50 at 2 dpi af-
ter ten passages. Altogether, these data indicate that A/H5N1HA 
Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K adapted to more efficient replication in 
the ferret URT upon repeated passage, with evidence for such adap-
tation by passage number 4. In contrast, analyses of the virus titers 
in the nose swabs of the ferrets collected at 1-4 dpi throughout the 
ten serial passages with A/H5N1wildtype revealed no changes in 
patterns of virus shedding. The asterisk indicated that a nose wash 
was collected before the nose swab was taken. This may influence 
the virus titer that was detected.
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number increased. These titers ranged from 1 x 104 TCID50/gram tissue at the start 
of the experiment to 3.2 x 105,1 x 106 TCID50/gram tissue in the final passages (Fig. 
3A, Fig. S7). Strikingly, virus titers in the nose swabs of animals inoculated with A/
H5N1HA Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K also increased during the successive passages, 
with peak virus shedding of 1 x 105 TCID50 at 2 dpi after ten passages (Fig. 3B).
These data indicate that A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K was developing great-
er capacity to replicate in the ferret URT after repeated passage, with evidence for 
such adaptation becoming apparent by passage number 4. In contrast, virus titers in 
the nose swabs of the ferrets collected at 1-4 dpi throughout the ten serial passages 
with A/H5N1wildtype revealed no changes in patterns of virus shedding.
Passaging of influenza viruses in ferrets should result in the natural selection of 
heterogeneous mixtures of viruses in each animal with a variety of mutations: so-
called viral quasispecies [323]. The genetic composition of the viral quasispecies 
present in the nasal washes of ferrets after ten passages of A/H5N1wildtype and A/
H5N1HA Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K was determined by sequence analysis using the 
454/Roche GS-FLX sequencing platform (Table S1, S2). The mutations introduced 
in A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K by reverse genetics remained present in 
the virus population after 10 consecutive passages at a frequency >99.5% (Table 
S1, Fig 4). Numerous additional nucleotide substitutions were detected in all viral 
gene segments of A/H5N1wildtype and A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K after 
passaging, except in segment 7 (Table S1, S2). Of the 30 nucleotide substitutions 
selected during serial passage, 53% resulted in amino acid substitutions. The only 
amino acid substitution detected upon repeated passage of both A/H5N1wildtype 
and A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K was T156A in HA. This substitution re-
moves a potential N-linked glycosylation site (Asn-X-Thr/Ser) in HA and was de-
tected in 99.6% of the A/H5N1wildtype sequences after ten passages. T156A was 
detected in 89% of the A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K sequences after ten 
passages and the other 11% of sequences possessed the substitution N154K, which 
removes the same potential N-linked glycosylation site in HA.
In experiment 4 (see SOM), we investigated if airborne transmissible viruses were 
present in the heterogeneous virus population that was generated during virus pas-
saging in ferrets (Fig. S4). Nasal wash samples, collected at 3 dpi from ferrets at 
passage 10, were used in transmission experiments to test if airborne-transmissible 
virus was present in the virus quasispecies. For this purpose, nasal wash samples 
were diluted 1:2 in PBS and subsequently used to inoculate six naïve ferrets intra-
nasally: two for passage 10 A/H5N1wildtype and four for passage 10 A/H5N1HA 
Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K virus. The following day a naïve recipient ferret was placed 
in a cage adjacent to each inoculated donor ferret. These cages are designed to 
prevent direct contact between animals but allowed airflow from a donor ferret to 
a neighboring recipient ferret (Fig. S1) [150]. Although mutations had accumulated 
in the viral genome after passaging of A/H5N1wildtype in ferrets, we did not detect 
replicating virus upon inoculation of MDCK cells with swabs collected from naïve 
recipient ferrets after they were paired with donor ferrets inoculated with passage 
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ten A/H5N1wildtype virus (Fig. 5A, 5B). By contrast, we did detect virus in recipi-
ent ferrets paired with those inoculated with passage ten A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S 
PB2 E627K virus. Three (F1 - F3) out of four (F1-F4) naïve recipient ferrets became 
infected as confirmed by the presence of replicating virus in the collected nasal and 
throat swabs (Fig. 5C, 5D). 
virus passage transmission 1 transmission 2
P0
P10
F1
F3
F5
F6
F2 F7
transmission 3
F4
F8
Figure 4. Summary of the substitutions detected upon serial passage and airborne transmission of A/H5N-
1HA Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K virus in ferrets. The eight influenza virus gene segments and substitutions are 
drawn approximately to scale (top to bottom PB2, PB1, PA, HA, NP, NA, M, NS). Viruses in blue, orange, and 
red represent the initial recombinant A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K virus (P0), ferret passage ten virus 
(P10), and P10 virus after airborne transmission to recipient ferrets respectively. Viruses in grey indicate 
that virus was not transmitted to the recipient ferret. First, we tested if airborne transmissible viruses were 
present in the heterogeneous virus population of ferret P10. We inoculated four donor ferrets intranasally, 
which were then housed in transmission cages and paired with four recipient ferrets. Transmissible viruses 
were isolated from three out of four recipient ferrets (F1, F2 and F3). Next, we took a throat swab sample 
from F2 (this sample contained the highest virus titer among the positive recipient ferrets) and this virus was 
used to inoculate two more donor ferrets intranasally. In a transmission experiment, these donors infected 
two recipient ferrets via airborne transmission (F5 and F6). Virus isolated from F5 was passaged once in 
MDCK cells and was subsequently used in a third transmission experiment in which two intranasally inocu-
lated donor ferrets transmitted the virus to one out of two recipient ferrets (F7). The genetic composition 
of the viral quasispecies present in the nasal wash of ferret P10 was determined by sequence analysis using 
the 454/Roche GS-FLX sequencing platform. Conventional Sanger sequencing was used to determine the 
consensus sequence in one high titer nasal or throat swab sample for each ferret. Thick and thin black verti-
cal bars in genes indicate amino acid and nucleotide substitutions respectively. Substitutions introduced by 
reverse genetics are shown in yellow. Substitutions detected in passage ten and all subsequent transmissions 
are shown in green. 
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A throat swab sample obtained from recipient ferret F2, which contained the highest 
virus titer among the ferrets in the first transmission experiment, was subsequently 
used for intranasal inoculation of two additional donor ferrets and both of these 
animals, when placed in the transmission cage set up (Fig. S1), again transmitted 
the virus to the recipient ferrets (F5, F6)(Fig. 6A, 6B). A virus isolate was obtained 
after inoculation of MDCK cells with a nose swab collected from ferret F5 at 7 dpi. 
The virus from F5 was inoculated intranasally into two more donor ferrets. One day 
later, these animals were paired with two recipient ferrets (F7, F8) in transmission 
cages, one (F7) of which subsequently became infected (Fig. 6C, 6D).
Conventional Sanger sequencing was used to determine the consensus genome 
sequences of viruses recovered from the six ferrets (F1-F3, F5-F7) that acquired 
virus via airborne transmission (Fig. 4, Table S3). All six samples still harbored sub-
stitutions Q222L, G224S, and E627K that had been introduced by reverse genetics. 
Surprisingly, only two additional amino acid substitutions, both in HA, were consist-
ently detected in all six airborne-transmissible viruses; H103Y that forms part of the 
HA trimer interface and T156A that is proximal, but not immediately adjacent to 
the RBS (Fig S8). Although several other mutations were observed, their occurrence 
was not consistent among the airborne viruses. This indicates that of the hetero-
geneous virus populations generated by passaging in ferrets, viruses with different 
genotypes were transmissible. In addition, a single transmission experiment is not 
sufficient to select for clonal airborne-transmissible viruses, since, for example, the 
consensus sequence of virus isolated from F6 differed from the sequence of paren-
tal virus isolated from F2. 
Together, these results suggest that as few as five amino acid substitutions: four
Figure 5. Airborne transmission of A/H5N1 vi-
ruses in ferrets. Transmission experiments are 
shown for A/H5N1wildtype (A, B) and A/H5N1HA 
Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K (C, D) after 10 passages 
(P10) in ferrets. Two or four ferrets were inoculat-
ed intranasally with nasal wash samples collected 
from P10 virus of A/H5N1wildtype and A/H5N1HA 
Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K respectively, and housed 
individually in transmission cages (A, C). A naïve 
recipient ferret was added to each transmission 
cage adjacent to a donor ferret at 1dpi (B, D). Virus 
titers in throat (black bars) and nose swabs (white 
bars) were determined by end-point titration in 
MDCK cells and geometric mean titers and stand-
ard deviations of positive samples are shown. The 
number of animals infected via airborne transmis-
sion is indicated in panel D for each time point 
after exposure; the drop from 3 animals infected 
at day 7 to 1 animal at day 9 and 0 animals at day 
11 is explained by the fact that the animals that 
became infected via airborne transmission, had 
cleared the virus by the end of the experiment 
and therefore, detectable amounts of virus were 
no longer present. The dotted line indicates the 
lower limit of virus detection. 
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in HA and one in PB2, may be sufficient to confer airborne transmission of HPAI 
A/H5N1 virus between mammals. The airborne-transmissible virus with the least 
number of amino acid substitutions, compared to the A/H5N1wildtype, was recov-
ered from ferret F5. This virus isolate had a total of nine amino acid substitutions; 
in addition to the three mutations that were introduced (Q222L and G224S in HA 
and E627K in PB2) this virus harbored H103Y and T156A in HA, H99Y and I368V in 
PB1 and R99K and S345N in NP (Table S3). Reverse genetics will be needed to iden-
tify which of the five to nine amino acid substitutions in this virus are essential to 
confer airborne transmission. During the course of the transmission experiments 
with the airborne-transmissible viruses, ferrets displayed lethargy, loss of appetite, 
and ruffled fur after intranasal inoculation. One of eight inoculated animals died 
upon intranasal inoculation (Table 1). In previously published experiments, ferrets 
inoculated intranasally with wildtype A/Indonesia/5/2005 virus at a dose of 1 x 106 
TCID50, showed neurological disease and/or death [222,324]. It should be noted 
that inoculation of immunologically naïve ferrets with a dose of 1 x 106 TCID50 of 
A/H5N1 virus, and the subsequent course of disease is not representative for the 
natural situation in humans. Importantly, although the six ferrets that became in-
fected via respiratory droplets or aerosol also displayed lethargy, loss of appetite, 
and ruffled fur, none of these animals died within the course of the experiment. 
Moreover, previous infections of humans with seasonal influenza viruses are likely 
to induce heterosubtypic immunity that would offer some protection against the 
development of severe disease [325,326]. It has been shown that mice and ferrets 
previously infected with an A/H3N2 virus are clinically protected against intranasal 
challenge infection with an A/ H5N1 virus [327,328]. 
Figure 6. Comparison of airborne transmission of experimental passaged A/H5N1 and 2009 pandemic A/
H1N1 viruses in individual ferrets. A throat swab sample from ferret F2 at 7 dpe (Fig. 5D) was used for 
the transmission experiments shown in (A, B) and a virus isolate obtained from a nose swab collected 
from ferret F5 at 7 dpi (Fig. 6A) was used for the experiments in (C, D). For comparison, published data 
on transmission of 2009 pandemic A/H1N1 virus between ferrets is shown (E-H) (27). Data for individual 
transmission experiments is shown in each panel, with virus shedding in inoculated and airborne virus-
exposed animals shown as lines and bars, respectively. For the transmission experiments with airborne-
transmissible A/H5N1 (A - D), nose or throat swabs were not collected at 2 dpi and 2 dpe. Open circles and 
bars represent shedding from the nose and closed circles and bars represent shedding from the throat. 
The asterisk indicates the inoculated animal that died five days after intranasal inoculation.
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After intra-tracheal inoculation (experiment 5, Fig. S9), six ferrets inoculated with 1 
x 106 TCID50 of airborne-transmissible virus F5 in a 3 ml volume of PBS died or were 
moribund at day three. Intratracheal inoculations at such high doses do not repre-
sent the natural route of infection, and are generally only used to test the ability of 
viruses to cause pneumonia [211], as is done for vaccination-challenge studies. At 
necropsy, the 6 ferrets revealed macroscopic lesions affecting 80-100 % of the lung 
parenchyma with average virus titers of 7.9 x 106 TCID50/gram lung (Fig. S10). These 
data are similar to those described previously for A/H5N1wildtype in ferrets (Table 
1). Thus, although the airborne-transmissible virus is lethal to ferrets upon intratra-
cheal inoculation at high doses, the virus was not lethal after airborne transmission. 
To test the effect of the mutations in HA in the airborne-transmissible virus on its 
sensitivity to antiviral drugs, we used virus isolated from F5 (experiment 6). This 
airborne-transmissible virus with nine amino acid substitutions displayed a sensi-
tivity to the antiviral drug oseltamivir similar to that of A/H5N1wildtype (Table S4). 
In experiment 7, we evaluated the recognition of the airborne-transmissible virus 
by antisera raised against potential A/H5N1 vaccine strains. Since only HA recogni-
tion by antibodies is evaluated in this assay, chimeric viruses were generated based 
on six gene segments of the mouse-adapted A/Puerto Rico/8/34 (PR8) virus with 
the HA and PB2 genes of the transmissible virus harboring amino acid substitutions 
H103Y, T156A, Q222L and G224S in HA and E627K in PB2. We replaced the MBCS 
of the HA by a monobasic cleavage site, to allow us to do these experiments under 
BSL2 conditions. The chimeric PR8/H5 virus reacted well with ferret antisera raised 
against A/Indonesia/5/2005 and several other pre-pandemic vaccine strains (Table 
S5). In fact, the presence of the four HA mutations increased the reactivity with H5 
antisera by two-fold or more. We subsequently used the same PR8/H5 chimeric 
virus in experiment 8 to evaluate the presence of existing immunity against the 
inoculation route Virus
Dead or moribund 
(No. dead/No. tested)
Day of death post inocula-
tion (No.)
intratracheal
A/h5N1
wildtype
6/61 2(N=2), 3(N=4)
A/h5N1/F5 6/6 3(N=6)
intranasal
A/h5N1
wildtype
/P10 2/22 6(N=2)
A/h5N1
hA Q222l,g224s Pb2 e627k
/P10 0/4 N.A.
A/h5N1/F2 0/2 N.A
A/h5N1/F5 1/2 6(N=1)
Airborne
A/h5N1
wildtype
N.A. N.A.
A/h5N1
hA Q222l,g224s Pb2 e627k
/P10 0/3 N.A.
A/h5N1/F2 0/2 N.A.
A/h5N1/F5 0/1 .N.A.
table 1. Lethality of wildtype and airborne-transmissible A/H5N1 virus in ferrets upon inoculation via differ-
ent routes.
1. These data refer to a published study [211].
2. These ferrets were inoculated with passage 10 H5N1wildtype virus, but data are consistent with previous 
studies using larger groups of animals inoculated with the original strain [222,324].
N.A.; not applicable.
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airborne-transmissible virus in sera obtained from human volunteers over 70 years 
of age. The introduction of receptor-binding site mutations Q222L/G224S and the 
mutations H103Y and T156A in HA, acquired during ferret passage, did not result in 
increased cross-reactivity with human antisera (Table S6), indicating that humans 
do not have antibodies against the HA of the airborne-transmissible A/H5N1 virus 
that was selected in our experiments.
Substitutions Q222L and G224S have previously been shown to be sufficient to 
switch receptor-binding specificity of avian influenza strains (i.e., α2,3-linked SA) 
to that of human strains (i.e., α2,6-linked SA)[90,92,329,330]. Amino acid position 
103 is distal from the RBS, forms part of the trimer interface, and is unlikely to affect 
receptor specificity (Fig. S8). T156 is part of a N-glycosylation sequon and T156A (as 
well as N154K) would delete this potential glycosylation site (Fig. S8); amino acid 
T156 is proximal but not immediately adjacent to the RBS. Loss of N-glycosylation 
sites at the tip of HA has been shown to affect receptor binding of A/H1 [331,332] 
and the virulence of A/H5 virus [333]. We evaluated the impact of the HA mutations 
that emerged during passaging in ferrets in a modified turkey red blood cell (TRBC) 
assay (Table 2). In this assay, the binding of influenza viruses, with a mutated HA, 
to normal TRBCs (expressing both α2,3-linked SA and α2,6-linked SA) and modified 
TRBC with either α2,3-linked SA or α2,6-linked SA on the cell surface was evaluated 
and compared to two reference viruses with known receptor binding preference: 
avian A/H5N1 and human A/H3N2 viruses. As expected and shown before, intro-
duction of the Q222L and G224S mutations in the HA of A/H5N1 changed the recep-
tor binding preference from α2,3-linked SA to α2,6-linked SA [90]. Furthermore, in 
our hands, the introduction of substitutions H103Y and T156A not only enhanced 
binding of A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K to α2,6-linked SA as expected from 
glycan array studies [93], but also increased the affinity for α2,3-linked SA. When 
these two mutations were introduced in the A/H5N1wildtype HA, the affinity for 
α2,3-linked SA also increased.
Substitutions Q222L and G224S have previously emerged in avian A/H2 and A/H3 
viruses in nature [13,89] and mutations associated with similar changes in receptor 
binding specificity have been detected repeatedly in A/H5 viruses, e.g., substitu-
hA titer (hAU/50µl)
Virus subtype trbc α2,3-trbc α2,6-trbc
A/Netherlands/213/03 h3N2 64 0 64
A/Vietnam/1194/04 h5N1 64 64 0
A/h5N1
Pb2 e627k
h5N1 64 16 0
A/h5N1
hA h103Y,t156A Pb2 e627k
h5N1 64 48 0
A/h5N1
hA Q222l,g224s Pb2 e627k
h5N1 64 0 24
A/h5N1
hA h103Y,t156A,Q222l,g224s Pb2 e627k
h5N1 64 4 32
table 2. Receptor specificity of the different mutant A/H5N1 viruses as determined by a modified turkey red 
blood cell (TRBC) hemagglutination assay. Introduction of Q222L and G224S in the A/H5N1 HA resulted in a 
receptor binding preference switch from the avian α2,3- to the human α2,6-sialic acid receptor. Subsequent 
substitution of H103Y and T156A resulted in an increased affinity for α2,3- and α2,6-sialic acids, in agreement 
with glycan array studies [93]. For details, see SOM experiment 9.
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tion N182K has been reported nine times [93,322], which is why we initially se-
lected it for our investigations. The other three substitutions we found consistently 
in airborne-transmissible viruses have all previously been detected in HPAI A/H5N1 
viruses circulating in the field [334]. Only a minor fraction of the A/H5N1 viruses 
that have circulated in outbreaks have been sequenced (estimated to be <0.001 
%) [334,335]. Yet the individual substitutions we obtained, as well as combinations 
of T156A and H103Y or T156A and E627K, have already been reported in public 
sequence databases [334], thus we conclude that these mutations do not appear to 
have a detrimental effect on virus fitness. Substitution H103Y has only been found 
once, in combination with T156A in a duck in China [334]. Substitution E627K in PB2 
has been found in ~27% of avian A/H5N1 virus sequences and in ~29% of human 
A/H5N1 viruses [334]. Substitution T156A in HA has been reported in >50% of the 
viruses sequenced, and was detected in 100% of the viruses from human cases in 
Egypt [334]. 
Investigations of viral quasispecies during a massive avian influenza A/H7N7 virus 
outbreak in The Netherlands indicated that viruses with human adaptation markers, 
including HA mutations that alter receptor specificity and mutations in polymerase 
proteins that increase polymerase activity like E627K in PB2, emerged rapidly in 
poultry [95,336,337]. Given the large numbers of HPAI A/H5N1 virus-infected hosts 
globally, the high viral mutation rate, and the apparent lack of detrimental effects 
on fitness of the mutations that confer airborne transmission, it may be simply a 
matter of chance and time for a human-to-human transmissible A/H5N1 virus to 
emerge. 
The specific mutations we identified in these experiments that are associated with 
airborne transmission represent biological traits that may be determined by a set 
of different amino acid substitutions. For example, amino acid substitutions D701N 
or S590G/R591Q in PB2 yield a similar phenotype as E627K [110]. N182K and other 
substitutions in the RBS of HA may yield a similar phenotype to Q222L/G224S [90]. 
Such mutations should be considered for A/H5N1 surveillance studies in outbreak 
areas. Imai et al. recently identified different RBS changes (N220K, Q222L) along with 
N154D (affecting the same N-glycosylation sequon as T156A) and T314I in HA as de-
terminants of airborne transmission of an A/H5 virus [259]. This airborne virus con-
tained seven genes of the 2009 pandemic A/H1N1 virus (which has S590G/R591Q in 
PB2 rather than E627K), with the HA of A/H5N1 virus A/Vietnam/1203/2004 [259]. 
These data indicate that different lineages of A/H5N1 virus and different amino acid 
substitutions that affect particular biological traits (receptor binding, glycosylation, 
replication) can yield airborne transmissible A/H5N1 viruses.
Although our experiments showed that A/H5N1 virus can acquire a capacity for air-
borne transmission, the efficiency of this mode remains unclear. Previous data has 
indicated that the 2009 pandemic A/H1N1 virus transmits efficiently among ferrets, 
and that naïve animals shed high amounts of virus as early as 1 or 2 days after expo-
sure [150]. When we compare the A/H5N1 transmission data with that of reference 
[150], and keeping in mind that our experimental design for studying transmission 
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is not quantitative, the data shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 suggest that A/H5N1 airborne 
transmission was less robust, with less and delayed virus shedding compared with 
pandemic A/H1N1 virus.
Although airborne transmission could be tested in a second mammalian model sys-
tem such as guinea pigs [289], this would still not provide conclusive evidence that 
transmission among humans would occur. The mutations we identified need to be 
tested for their effect on transmission in other A/H5N1 virus lineages [338], and ex-
periments are needed to quantify how they affect viral fitness and virulence in birds 
and mammals. For pandemic preparedness, antiviral drugs and vaccine candidates 
against airborne-transmissible virus should be evaluated in depth. Mechanistic 
studies on the phenotypic traits associated with each of the identified amino acid 
substitutions should provide insights into the key determinants of airborne virus 
transmission. Our findings indicate that HPAI A/H5N1 viruses have the potential to 
evolve directly to transmit by aerosol or respiratory droplets between mammals, 
without reassortment in any intermediate host, and thus pose a risk of becoming 
pandemic in humans. Identification of the minimal requirements for virus transmis-
sion between mammals may have prognostic and diagnostic value for improving 
pandemic preparedness [321].
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risk assessments prior to start of research
The research on transmission of H5N1 virus has been discussed among staff mem-
bers of the Department of Virology at Erasmus MC since 1998. The work did not 
commence until much later because we considered the laboratory facilities avail-
able at the Rotterdam site at that time inappropriate for this type of work. Between 
1998 and 2007, the H5N1 transmission experiments were discussed explicitly and 
extensively among the staff members of the Department of Virology, followed by 
discussions with biosafety officers and facility managers of Erasmus MC, as well as 
with numerous specialists from the influenza and general infectious disease fields 
around the globe [339]. Throughout these discussions, and upon site-visits of facili-
ties where research with class 3 and class 4 pathogens is conducted routinely, a plan 
was drawn to develop adequate research facilities, to obtain permits for working 
with genetically modified organisms (GMO), and for review of research proposals. 
Following a Broad Agency Announcement of the National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases and National Institutes of Health (BAA NIH-NIAID-DMID-07-20) 
in 2005, the Department of Virology, along with partners in the USA, drafted a re-
search proposal to become an NIAID/NIH Center of Excellence for Influenza Re-
search and Surveillance to support the research agenda of the US Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) Pandemic Influenza Plan in the USA. This pro-
posal was reviewed favorably by NIAID/NIH in consultation with HHS and supported 
by external expert advisors. Upon signing the research contract, a new GMO permit 
– explicitly for conducting work with airborne-transmissible H5N1 virus and early 
pandemic viruses – was obtained from the Dutch Ministry for Infrastructure and the 
Environment (I&M) in 2007. To this end, I&M was advised by the Committee Genet-
ic Modification (COGEM), which is an independent scientific advisory committee for 
the Dutch government. I&M and COGEM concluded that the proposed work could 
be performed with negligible risk to humans and the environment under the condi-
tions realized (permit IG-07-038). The COGEM advice is available on-line [340].
In 2007, a “Code of Conduct for Biosecurity” was drafted by the Royal Netherlands 
Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) upon request of the Dutch Ministry of Educa-
tion, Culture and Science (OCW) as required by the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention (BTWC) ratified in 1972 and the Statement on Biosecurity issued by the 
InterAcademy Panel (IAP) in 2005 [320]. As R.A.M. Fouchier was a member of the 
Biosecurity Focus Group that advised during the conception of this Code of Conduct 
for Biosecurity, the department of Virology of Erasmus MC was well aware of the 
Code prior to its publication in 2007, and adhered strictly to this Code at all times. 
The principles and procedures outlined in the Dutch Code of Conduct are similar to 
those agreed upon in the USA.
biosafety and biosecurity measures
All experiments were conducted within the enhanced animal biosafety level 3 
(ABSL3+) facility of Erasmus MC that was completed in 2007. The ABSL3+ facility 
consists of a negative pressurized (-30Pa) laboratory in which all in vivo and in vitro 
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experimental work is carried out in class 3 isolators or class 3 biosafety cabinets, 
which are also negative pressurized (< -200Pa). Air released from the class 3 units is 
filtered twice by High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters and then leaves via the 
facility ventilation system, again via double HEPA filters. Only authorized personnel 
that have received the appropriate training can access the ABSL3+ facility. For animal 
handling in the facilities, personnel always work in pairs. The facility is secured by 
procedures recognized as appropriate by the institutional biosafety officers and facil-
ity management at ErasmusMC and Dutch and United States government inspectors. 
All facilities, procedures, training records, safety drills, inventory records, and log-
books, are subject to inspection and oversight by the institutional biosafety officers 
of Erasmus MC in close consultation with the facility management. The facilities, 
personnel, and procedures are further inspected by the US Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (CDC) every 3 years in agreement with the US select agent regu-
lations for oversees laboratories and by the Dutch government (VROM inspection). 
The most recent CDC inspections took place in February 2011 and March 2012 at 
which time no shortcomings in biosafety and biosecurity measures were identified.
occupational health risk
Although the laboratory is considered ‘clean’ because all experiments are conducted 
in closed class 3 cabinets and isolators, special personal protective equipment, in-
cluding laboratory suits, gloves and FFP3 facemasks, is used and all personnel are 
offered seasonal and prototype A/H5N1 influenza vaccines with informed consent. 
Additional immunizations with A/H5N1 vaccine were administered if seroconversion 
could not be demonstrated. Consent records are held by the Department of Virology 
at ErasmusMC.
All personnel are given basic training in laboratory safety under BSL2 conditions. Em-
ployees are trained for a further 3 months under standard BSL3 conditions, super-
vised by highly experienced personnel. Following initial BSL3 training and a period 
of independent work under BSL3 conditions, employees are trained for a further 3 
months in the ABSL3+ facility, again under the constant supervision of highly experi-
enced personnel with >8 years of research experience. These training programs con-
sist of hands-on work under supervision, following theory components on facilities, 
procedures and safety drills. Upon completion of the supervised training period, the 
supervisors judge whether trainees fulfill all requirements for working independent-
ly in the facilities. Annual refreshment training sessions on biosafety and biosecurity 
are provided by the principal investigators, biosafety officers, and facility managers.
All equipment in the facilities is monitored electronically and both acoustic and tel-
ephone alarms are employed to ensure that workers do not enter the facilities if 
equipment is malfunctioning. All personnel have been instructed and trained how to 
act in case of incidents. All incidents are handled with consultation between a senior 
staff member of the Virology Department, a clinical microbiologist, the biosafety 
officers, and the facility management. Antiviral drugs (oseltamivir and zanamivir) 
are directly available. Erasmus MC has isolation hospital rooms (negative pressure 
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rooms with interlocks) with trained nursing and medical staff to be used in case of 
serious incidents and to quarantine the infected individual to prevent further dis-
semination of the pathogen. 
mAteriAls AND methoDs
Viruses
Influenza virus A/Indonesia/5/2005 (A/H5N1) was isolated from a human case of 
HPAI virus infection and passaged once in embryonated chicken eggs followed by a 
single passage in Madin-Darby Canine Kidney (MDCK) cells. All eight gene segments 
were amplified by reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction and cloned in a 
modified version of the bidirectional reverse genetics plasmid pHW2000 [171,208]. 
Mutations of interest (N182K, Q222L, G224S in HA and E627K in PB2) were intro-
duced in reverse genetics vectors using the QuikChange multi-site-directed muta-
genesis kit (Aligent, Amstelveen, The Netherlands) according to the instructions of 
the manufacturer. Recombinant viruses were produced upon transfection of 293T 
cells and virus stocks were propagated and titrated in MDCK cells as described [171]. 
cells
MDCK cells were cultured in Eagle’s minimal essential medium (EMEM, Lonza Ben-
elux BV, Breda, the Netherlands) supplemented with 10% fetal calf serum (FCS), 
100 IU/ml penicillin, 100 μg/ml streptomycin, 2 mM glutamine, 1.5 mg/ml sodium 
bicarbonate (Lonza), 10 mM Hepes (Lonza), and non-essential amino acids (MP Bio-
medicals Europe, Illkirch, France). 293T cells were cultured in Dulbecco modified 
Eagle’s medium (DMEM, Lonza) supplemented with 10% FCS, 100 IU/ml penicillin, 
100 mg/ml streptomycin, 2mM glutamine, 1mM sodium pyruvate, and non-essen-
tial amino acids.
Virus titration in mDck cells
Virus titrations were performed as described previously [150]. Briefly, MDCK cells 
were inoculated with tenfold serial dilutions of virus preparations, homogenized 
tissues, nose swabs, and throat swabs. Cells were washed with PBS one hour after 
inoculation and cultured in 200μl of infection media, consisting of EMEM supple-
mented with 100 U/ml penicillin, 100 μg/ml streptomycin, 2mM glutamine, 1.5mg/
ml sodium bicarbonate, 10mM Hepes, non-essential amino acids, and 20 μg/ml 
trypsin (Lonza). Three days after inoculation, supernatants of infected cell cultures 
were tested for agglutinating activity using turkey erythrocytes as an indicator of vi-
rus replication in the cells. Infectious virus titers were calculated from four replicates 
each of the homogenized tissue samples, nose swabs, and throat swabs and for ten 
replicates of the virus preparations by the method of Spearman-Karber [233].
Ferret experiments
An independent animal experimentation ethical review committee, approved by 
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Dutch Government (Stichting DEC Consult) approved all animal studies. All experi-
ments with ferrets were performed under animal biosafety level 3+ conditions in 
class 3 isolator cages.
SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURES AND DATA
Figure s1. Schematic presentation (A) and a photograph (B) of paired transmission cages. The transmis-
sion cages were specifically designed to allow transmission experiments to be conducted in negatively 
pressurized isolator cages (1.6m x 1m x 1m) in the ABSL3+ facility. The ferrets are housed in clear Perspex 
cages, in which each inoculated animal was housed individually next to a naive ferret. Each ferret cage was 
30 cm x 30 cm x 55 cm (W x H x L) and the two cages were separated by two stainless steel grids (1), with 
a grid size of 0.5 cm2, 10 cm apart. Negative pressure within the isolator cage is used to direct a modest 
(< 0.1 m/sec) flow of HEPA-filtered air (2) from the inoculated to the naive ferret. The outlet airflow (3) 
is HEPA filtered to prevent continuous circulation of infectious influenza A virus particles and to prevent 
cross-contamination. Animals are housed on solid rubber floor tiles, which do not generate dust and avoid 
unwanted fomite transmission among animals. Arrows indicate airflow.
= α 2,3 SA  = α 2,6 SA
Figure s2. Influenza virus receptor distribution in the respiratory and 
enteric tract of chickens, and the respiratory tract of ferrets and hu-
mans. Avian and human influenza viruses preferentially bind to α-2,3-
linked (red) and α-2,6-linked (blue) sialic acid (SA) receptors, respec-
tively. In chicken, although both α-2,3-linked SA and α-2,6-linked SA 
are present throughout the respiratory tract and gut, α-2,3-linked SA 
are expressed more abundantly. In contrast, humans and ferrets pre-
dominantly express α-2,6-linked SA receptors in the upper respiratory 
tract (URT) and trachea, and α-2,3-linked SA receptors in the lower 
respiratory tract [319]. The size of the red and blue symbols correlates 
with the relative abundance of SA receptors.
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experiment 1
To evaluate the effect of receptor binding site (RBS) mutations on A/H5N1 virus 
replication in the ferret respiratory tract, four groups of six influenza virus seron-
egative female ferrets (Mustela putorius furo) were inoculated intranasally with 1 x 
106 TCID50 of A/H5N1wildtype, A/H5N1HA N182K, A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S, or A/
H5N1HA N182K,Q222L,G224S (2 × 250 μL, divided over both nostrils), respectively 
(Fig. S3). Nose and throat swabs were collected daily and immediately suspended 
in 1 ml of virus transport medium (VTM) containing glycerol and antibiotics. Three 
animals of each group were euthanized at 3 and 7 days post inoculation (dpi), and 
nasal turbinates (narrow and curled bone shelves that stick out into the breathing 
passage of the nose), trachea and lungs were collected, homogenized in 3 ml of 
VTM, after which the supernatant was collected and stored at -80°C. Virus titers in 
swabs and respiratory tissues were determined by end-point titration in MDCK cells 
as described above.
experiment 2
Amino acid substitution E672K in PB2 is one of the most consistent host-range de-
terminants of influenza viruses. To test its effect on airborne-transmission of an A/
H5N1 virus with specificity for the human α2,6-linked SA receptor, we introduced 
this E627K mutations in virus A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S that was used in experiment 
1. Airborne transmission experiments were performed as described previously 
[150]. In short, four female adult ferrets were inoculated intranasally with 1 x 106 
TCID50 of A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K by applying 250μL of virus suspen-
sion to each nostril. Each donor ferret was then placed in a transmission cage (Fig. 
S1). One day after inoculation, one naïve recipient ferret was placed opposite each 
inoculated ferret. Each transmission pair was housed in a separate transmission 
cage designed to prevent direct contact between the inoculated and naïve ferrets 
but allowing airflow from the donor to the recipient ferret. Nose and throat swabs 
were collected on 1, 3, 5, and 7 dpi for donor ferrets and on 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11 days 
post exposure (dpe) for the recipient ferrets as described for experiment 1. Virus 
Figure s3. Schematic overview of experiment 1 to evaluate replication of A/
H5N1wildtype, A/H5N1HA N182K, A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S, or A/H5N1HA 
N182K,Q222L,G224S in ferrets. NT; nasal turbinates.
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titers in swabs were determined by end-point titration in MDCK cells. If virus shed-
ding was detected in the recipient ferrets upon exposure to the donor ferrets, this 
was judged as evidence for airborne transmission. 
experiment 3
Since no airborne transmission was observed in experiment 2, A/H5N1wildtype and 
A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K were serially passaged in ferrets to allow ad-
aptation for efficient replication in mammals. Each virus was inoculated intranasally 
with 1 x 106 TCID50 in one ferret (2 x 250 μl, divided over both nostrils). Nose and 
throat swabs were collected daily, as described for experiment 1. Animals were eu-
thanized at 4 dpi and nasal turbinates and lungs were collected as described for 
experiment 1. Nasal turbinates were homogenized in VTM, and this homogenate 
was used to inoculate the next ferret intranasally, resulting in passage 2 (Fig. 2, 
Fig. S6). Subsequent passages 3 - 6 were performed in the same way. From pas-
sage six onwards, nasal washes were collected at 3 dpi in addition to the nasal 
swabs. To this end, one milliliter of PBS was delivered drop wise to the nostrils of 
the ferrets, thereby inducing sneezing. Approximately 200 μl of the ‘sneeze’ was 
Figure s4. Schematic overview of experiments to test airborne transmission of 
influenza virus in experiments 2 and 4. 
Figure s5. Shedding of influenza virus A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K in 
ferrets in transmission experiments (experiment 2). (A) Nose (white bars) and 
throat swabs (black bars) were collected on days 1, 3, 5, and 7 after inoculation 
from ferrets inoculated intranasally and (B) on days 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11 after 
exposure for naïve ferrets in an adjoining cage. Virus titers were determined by 
end-point titration in MDCK cells. The geometric mean titers of positive samples 
are displayed, with error bars indicating standard deviations. Numbers in panel 
B indicate the number of ferrets infected via airborne transmission. 
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collected in a Petri dish, and PBS was added to a fi nal volume of 2 ml. For passage 
7 through 10, the nasal wash sample was used for the following passages in ferrets. 
The passage-10 nasal washes of the ferrets inoculated with A/H5N1wildtype and A/
H5N1HA Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K were used for sequence analyses using the 454/
Roche GS-FLX sequencing platf orm, as well as for transmission experiments (experi-
ment 4).
Figure s6. Schemati c overview of experiment 3 to allow adaptati on for effi  cient replicati on in the 
upper respiratory tract by serial passaging in ferrets. NT; nasal turbinates.
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Figure s7. Virus ti ters in the nasal turbinates (A, B) and lungs (C, D) collected 
on day 4 from ferrets inoculated with A/H5N1wildtype (A, C) and A/H5N1HA 
Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K (B, D) throughout the ten serial passages as num-
bered on the x axes. Virus ti ters were determined by end-point ti trati on in 
MDCK cells. The total virus dose for each inoculati on is shown below panels C 
and D; these numbers also correspond to parts A and B, respecti vely. This virus 
dose was given in a 0.5 ml volume (0.25 ml/nostril). Aft er inoculati on with A/
H5N1wildtype, virus ti ters in the nasal turbinates were variable but high, rang-
ing from 1.6 x 105 to 7.9 x 106 TCID50/gram ti ssue (panel A), with no further 
increase observed with repeated passage. Aft er inoculati on with A/H5N1HA 
Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K, virus ti ters in nasal turbinates averaged 1.6 x 104 
in the fi rst three passages, 2.5 x 105 in passage four to seven and 6.3 x 105 
TCID50/gram ti ssue in the last three passages, suggesti ve of improved replica-
ti on and virus adaptati on. In the lungs, no apparent adaptati on was observed 
for animals inoculated with either virus. Virus ti ters in lungs were highly vari-
able; presumably it was a matt er of chance whether the virus reached the 
lower airways.
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Sequencing of virus quasispecies using a 454 sequencing platform
Viral RNA was extracted from nasal washes of ferrets after 10 passages with influ-
enza viruses A/H5N1wildtype and A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K using the 
High Pure RNA Isolation Kit (Roche). RNA was subjected to reverse transcriptase 
polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), using 32 primer sets that cover the full viral ge-
nome [341]. These fragments, approximately 400-600 nucleotides in length, were 
sequenced using the 454/Roche GS-FLX sequencing platform. The fragment library 
was created for each sample according to the manufacturer’s protocol without DNA 
fragmentation (GS FLX Titanium Rapid Library Preparation, Roche). The emulsion 
PCR (Amplification Method Lib-L) and GS junior sequencing runs were performed 
according to instructions of the manufacturer (Roche). 
segment reference mutation Frequency coverage  nt position aa position aa aa subst
PB2 G A 26.4 416 252 75 Gln S1
PB2 G A 99.6 260 1906 627 Glu Lys
PB1 C T 45.0 464 319 99 His Tyr
PB1 G T 34.3 542 885 287 Arg Ser
PB1 G A 39.2 102 982 320 Ala Thr
PB1 A G 50.8 177 1126 368 Ile Val
PB1 C T 18.2 390 1500 492 Phe S
PA G A 10.6 416 579 185 Arg S
PA C T 15.0 360 1569 515 Thr S
PA T C 54.6 646 1653 543 Leu S
PA A G 27.7 913 1864 614 Asn Asp
HA C T 85.3 225 383 103 His Tyr
HA C A 11.1 814 538 154 Asn Lys
HA A G 89.9 975 542 156 Thr Ala
HA A T 99.9 932 741 222 Gln Leu
HA G A 99.7 998 746 224 Gly Ser
HA A C 99.9 1033 748 224 Gly Ser
HA G A 15.1 436 977 301 Glu Lys
HA C T 12.9 708 1020 315 Thr Ile
HA G A 17.4 619 1156 360 Gln S
HA G A 11.8 977 1611 512 Gly Glu
NP C T 11.1 36 29 NCR2   
NP G A 18.1 1189 341 99 Arg Lys
NP G A 22.2 1083 1430 462 Gly Glu
NP A G 12.0 1296 1431 462 Gly S
NA A G 21.7 650 981 321 Asn Asp
NS G A 41.4 596 219 65 Val Met
table s1. Sequence analysis of virus quasispecies present in nasal wash sample of a ferret after 10 passages 
with A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K virus, using the 454/Roche GS-FLX sequencing platform (ferret P10 
in figure 4 of the main text). The viral gene segment is indicated, along with the nucleotide substitutions, the 
frequency (percent) of sequence reads with the detected mutations, the coverage (total number of sequence 
reads covering the position), and the nucleotide (nt) and amino acid (aa) positions. All changes from A/H5N-
1wildtype are shown that have a frequency > 10; the introduced mutations are underlined.
1. S; silent substitution, 2. NCR; non-coding region.
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Sequence reads from the GS-FLX sequencing data were sorted by bar code and 
aligned to reference sequence A/Indonesia/5/2005 using CLC Genomics software 
4.6.1. The sequence reads were trimmed at 30 nucleotides from the 3’ and 5’ ends 
to remove all primer sequences. The threshold for the detection of single nucle-
otide polymorphisms was manually set at 10% (Table S1, Table S2). 
experiment 4
Nasal wash samples collected at 3 dpi from ferrets at passage ten (experiment 3) 
were used in transmission experiments, to test if airborne-transmissible virus was 
present in the virus quasispecies. Transmission experiments were done as described 
above for experiment 2 (Fig. S4). Four and two donor ferrets were inoculated intra-
nasally with nasal wash samples collected from passage 10 (P10) of the A/H5N1HA 
Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K and A/H5N1wildtype virus, respectively. As shown in fig-
ure 5 of the main text, three out of four recipients ferrets became infected upon 
airborne transmission of the P10 A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K virus (F1, F2 
and F3). As shown in Figure 6A and 6B of the main text, virus isolated from a throat 
swab collected at 3 dpi from ferret F2 was subsequently used to inoculate two ad-
ditional donor ferrets and both of these animals again transmitted the virus to two 
other recipient ferrets (F5, F6). As shown in figure 6C and 6D of the main text, a 
virus isolate from F5 that was passaged once in MDCK cells, was next inoculated 
intranasally into two more donor ferrets. When these ferrets were paired with two 
recipient ferrets (F7, F8) the next day, one of them (F7) became infected. See Figure 
4 of the main text for overall summary.
Sanger sequencing to determine the consensus genome sequences of airborne-
transmissible viruses 
To determine the consensus sequence of airborne-transmissible viruses in throat 
segment reference mutation Frequency coverage
 nt posi-
tion
aa position aa aa subst
PB2 A G 100.0 415 1296 423 Arg S1
PB2 G A 100.0 37 2008 661 Ala Thr
PB1 T C 99.8 567 303 93 Ala S
PB1 A G 12.1 174 1398 458 Gly S
PA G A 100.0 522 816 264 Thr S
PA G A 99.8 515 1821 599 Glu S
HA A G 99.6 926 542 156 Thr Ala
HA T C 99.5 605 1123 349 Asp S
NP G A 17.9 1497 1430 462 Gly Glu
NA C T 100.0 561 1337 439 Asp S
table s2. Sequence analysis of virus quasispecies present in nasal wash sample of a ferret after 10 passages 
with A/H5N1wildtype virus, using the 454/Roche GS-FLX sequencing platform. The viral gene segment is indi-
cated, along with the nucleotide substitutions, the frequency (percent) of sequence reads with the detected 
mutations, the coverage (total number of sequence reads covering the position), and the nucleotide (nt) and 
amino acid (aa) positions. All changes from A/H5N1wildtype are shown that have a frequency > 10.
1. S; silent substitution
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and nose swabs obtained from recipient ferrets in experiment 4, viral RNA was ex-
tracted using the High Pure RNA Isolation Kit (Roche). All eight influenza virus gene 
segments were amplified by RT-PCR [342] using 32 primer sets that cover the full 
viral genome [341] and sequenced using a BigDye Terminator v3.1 Cycle sequenc-
ing kit (Applied Biosystems, Nieuwerkerk a/d IJssel, the Netherlands) and a 3130XL 
genetic analyzer (Applied Biosystems), according to the instructions of the manu-
facturer (Table S3, Fig. 4). 
segment
nt   
pos
nt     
wildtype
nt      
mutant
aa   
pos
aa         
wildtype
aa          
mutant transmission 1 transm 2 transm 3
    F1 F2 F3 F5 F6 F7
PB2 1298 C T 424 Ala Val x
PB2 1884 A G 619 Leu S1 x
PB2 1906 G A 627 Glu Lys x x x x x x
PB1 319 C T 99 His Tyr x x x
PB1 591 G A 189 Arg S x x x
PB1 885 G T 287 Arg Ser x x
PB1 982 G A 320 Ala Thr x
PB1 1113 G A 363 Lys S x
PB1 1126 A G 368 Ile Val x x x x
PB1 1500 C T 492 Phe S x
PB1 1672 C T 550 Leu S x x x x
PA 1719 G A 565 Val S x
PA 1864 A G 614 Asn Asp x
HA 383 C T 103 His Tyr x x x x x x
HA 538 C A 154 Asn Lys x
HA 542 A G 156 Thr Ala x x x x x x
HA 741 A T 222 Gln Leu x x x x x x
HA 746 G A 224 Gly Ser x x x x x x
HA 748 A C 224 Gly Ser x x x x x x
HA 1020 C T 315 Thr Ile x
NP 29 C T NCR2 C T x
NP 341 G A 99 Arg Lys x x x x x
NP 1079 G A 345 Ser Asn x x
NA 324 A G 102 Ile Val x
NA 447 G A 143 Val Met x
NA 995 G A 325 Gly S x
NS1 219 G A 65 Val Met x x
table s3. Sanger sequence analysis of full viral genomes of airborne transmitted influenza viruses. Data are 
shown for individual ferrets (F1-F3, F5-F7) upon three subsequent transmission experiments, as described 
in figure 4 of the main text. The consensus sequence was determined for viruses isolated from the follow-
ing samples: F1: throat swab 7 dpi, F2: throat swab 3 dpi, F3: throat swab 5 dpi, F5: throat swab 5 dpi, F6: 
nose swab 5 dpi and F7: throat swab 5 dpi. Substitutions detected in the virus samples that differ from the 
wildtype A/Indonesia/5/2005 virus are marked with “x”. The introduced mutations are underlined.
1. S; silent substitution, 2. NCR; Non-coding region
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experiment 5
To test whether the airborne-transmissible H5N1 virus could cause pneumonia upon 
high-dose intra-tracheal challenge, six ferrets were inoculated with 1 x 106 TCID50 
of virus in a 3 ml volume (Fig. S9). This virus was obtained from a nose swab col-
lected from ferret F5 at 7 dpi (experiment 4) and passaged once in MDCK cells. After 
inoculation, animals were monitored daily for clinical signs. We initially planned to 
euthanize 3 ferrets each at 3 and 7 dpi, however two animals were found dead at 3 
dpi and all other animals were moribund, requiring euthanasia at 3 dpi. Necropsies 
were performed and nasal turbinates, trachea and lungs were collected for virologi-
cal examination (Fig S9).
Figure s8. Cartoon representation of a model of the trimer structure HA of A/Indonesia/5/2005 (68) (PDB ID: 
1JSM). One monomer is colored cyan for clarity. The structure of the three-sugar glycan NeuAcα2,6Galβ1-
4GlcNAc is docked into the receptor binding site (RBS). The substitutions discussed in the text are shown as 
sticks and balls and colored red (H103, T156, Q222 and G224). N154 of the 154-156 potential N-glycosylation 
site at the tip of HA is also shown as sticks and balls and colored green. Amino acid T156 is proximal but not 
immediately adjacent to the RBS and does not interact directly with the three-sugar glycan that is depicted in 
the figure. Thus, T156A is unlikely to affect binding to three sugar glycans. Longer glycans may interact with 
positions as distal from the RBS as amino acid position 156, but little is currently known for such binding. Resi-
due T156 is part of a N-glycosylation sequon (Asn-X-Thr/Ser) and mutation at T156A (as well as N154K) would 
delete this potential glycosylation site. Wang et al. have shown that this N-glycosylation site is used in H5N1 
viruses [343]. Loss of N-glycosylation sites at the tip of HA has been shown to enhance virulence of strains of 
H1 [331,332] and H5 [333]. Mir-Shekari et al. [332] postulated that large, complex N-linked glycans at a site so 
close to the RBS may occlude binding to the cells, and loss of such a site may improve binding to sialic acids. 
The T156A substitution was detected in 99.6% of the A/H5N1wildtype sequences after ten passages. While 
T156A was detected in only 89% of the A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K sequences after ten passages, 
the other 11% of sequences had N154K, which removes the same potential N-linked glycosylation site in HA.
Substitutions Q222L and G224S have previously been shown to be sufficient to switch receptor-binding spe-
cificity of avian influenza strains to that of human strains [90,92,329,330] G224S can form an additional 
polar interaction with atom O9 of the NeuAc sugar and Q222L forms favorable van der Waals interactions 
with the C8 atom of NeuAc as well as the C6 atom of the α2,6 linkage [329]. Amino acid position 103 is distal 
from the RBS and thus H103Y is unlikely to affect receptor specificity directly. This amino acid forms part of 
the trimer interface, making both hydrophobic interactions and charge interactions with neighboring amino 
acids. H103Y maintains the aromatic characteristic at this position but with a slight increase in size. Thus, we 
expect H103Y would largely maintain its ability to form polar interactions. 
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experiment 6
MDCK cells were seeded at 3x104 cells per well in 96-well plates (Greiner Bio-One )
and cultured overnight. Virus stocks of interest were diluted to 1 x 103 TCID50/ml, 
Figure s9. Schematic overview of experiment 5, to test whether airborne-transmissible H5N1 
virus caused pneumonia upon high dose intra-tracheal inoculation. The experiment was halt-
ed at day 3.
Figure s10. (A) Virus titers and (B) relative lung weight in six ferrets inoculated intra-
tracheally with 1 x 106 TCID50 (in 3 ml) airborne-transmissible H5N1 virus obtained 
from the nose swab of transmission ferret F5 (A/H5N1F5 7dpi nose), which was pas-
saged once in MDCK cells and used as inoculum. At 3 dpi, lungs, nasal turbinates 
(NT) and trachea were collected and virus titers were determined by means of end-
point titration in MDCK cells. Geometric mean titer ± SD is indicated. At 3 dpi, two 
out of six ferrets had succumbed to the infection. The four remaining animals were 
euthanized at this time point since they were moribund. Intra-tracheal inoculation 
with the wild-type A/H5N1 A/Indonesia/5/2005 virus had a similar effect [211]. In 
this previous work two and four animals were euthanized when they were moribund 
at 2 and 3 dpi respectively. Mean virus titers in the lungs of animals inoculated with 
the airborne-transmissible A/H5N1 virus obtained in this passage experiment (6.9 ± 
0.4 log10 TCID50/gram) were slightly but not significantly higher than titers found in 
A/H5N1wildtype-inoculated animals (6.2 ± 0.6 log10 TCID50/gram) (p=0.093, Mann-
Whitney). The relative lung weights of animals inoculated with A/H5N1wildtype 
were slightly higher compared to those of the A/H5N1F5 7dpi nose-inoculated ani-
mals (0,024 ± 0,006 and 0,018 ± 0,004 respectively, p=0.180, Mann-Whitney) [211].
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and added to cells in a volume of 100 µl per well. After incubation for one hour at 
37 0C, 100 µl of serially diluted oseltamivir carboxylate was added (range 170pM 
- 50µM) in four replicates. After three days of incubation at 370C, the presence of 
virus was determined in the supernatant of cell cultures using the agglutinating 
activity of turkey erythrocytes as an indicator of virus replication in the cells to cal-
culate the 50% inhibitory concentration (IC50).
experiment 7 
The hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay is based on the ability of the influenza 
virus HA protein to cause agglutination of red blood cells (RBCs) and of specific an-
tisera to block this reaction. HI assays were performed as described previously [19]. 
Briefly, serum samples were first pre-treated with Vibrio cholerae neuraminidase 
to remove non-specific inhibitors of hemagglutination activity. Two-fold serial dilu-
tions of the antisera (in 50 µL) were incubated with four hemagglutinating units of 
virus (in 25 µL) and incubated at 37 0C for 30 minutes. Next, 25 µL of turkey RBCs 
were added, followed by one hour incubation at 4 0C. The highest serum dilution 
able to block the agglutination of RBCs was recorded as the HI-titer. For these exper-
iments, ferret antisera raised against potential H5N1 vaccine strains were used to 
evaluate if pre-pandemic H5 vaccine candidates sufficiently matched the airborne-
transmissible virus (Table S5). For all HI assays, we used recombinant viruses with 
six gene segments of influenza virus A/PR/8/34 and the HA and PB2 gene segments 
of A/H5N1 virus with or without substitutions Q222L, G224S, H103Y, T156A, and 
E627K. The multi basic cleavage site in HA was removed by changing the cleavage 
site PQRERRRKKR↓G in the H5 HA to PQIETR↓G by RT-PCR with specific primers as 
described [90]. Due to this genetic modification, the HI assays could be performed 
under BSL2 conditions.
experiment 8
The effect of the introduced RBS mutations Q222L/G224S and co-mutations H103Y 
and T156A in HA on cross-reactivity with human sera was tested using HI assays 
as described for experiment 7. For this purpose, the reactivity of 24 human sera 
obtained from individuals over 70 years of age (chosen because these persons are
Virus ic50 (nm)
A/h5N1
wildtype
5000
A/h5N1
hA h103Y,t156A,Q222l,g224s Pb2 e627k
1100
A/h5N1
hA Q222l,g224s Pb2 e627k
1700
A/Netherlands/602/2009 5000
A/Netherlands/602/2009
NA h275Y
≥ 50000
A/Netherlands/602/2009
NA i223r
≥ 50000
table s4. Evaluation of the 50% inhibi-
tory concentration (IC50) of oseltami-
vir for A/H5N1wildtype, A/H5N1HA 
H103Y,T156A,Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K and 
A/H5N1HA Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K. The 
2009 pandemic A/H1N1 virus A/Nether-
lands/602/2009 was used as a control in this 
assay. Introduction of the well-known H275Y 
mutation or the I223R mutation in the A/Neth-
erlands/602/09 NA resulted in a decreased 
susceptibility for oseltamivir as described pre-
viously [344]. Introduction of mutations found 
in airborne-transmissible A/H5N1 viruses did 
not affect the sensitivity of A/H5N1 virus to 
oseltamivir.
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more likely to have had a history of exposure to pandemic influenza viruses), to 
the HA of the airborne-transmissible A/H5N1 and to the currently circulating 2009 
pandemic A/H1N1, seasonal A/H1N1 and seasonal A/H3N2 viruses was investigated 
(Table S6).
experiment 9
For the experiment shown in Table 2 of the main text, modified turkey red blood 
cells (TRBC) were prepared as described previously [345]. Briefly, all α2,3-, α2,6-, 
α2,8-, and α2,9-linked sialic acids (SA) were removed from the surface of TRBC by 
incubating 62.5 µl of 1% TRBC in PBS with 50 mU Vibrio cholerae neuraminidase 
(VCNA; Roche, Almere, Netherlands) in 8 mM calcium chloride at 37°C for 1 hour. 
Removal of sialic acids was confirmed by observation of complete loss of hemag-
glutination of the TRBC by control influenza A viruses. Subsequently, resialylation 
was performed using 0.5 mU of α2,3-(N)-sialyltransferase (Calbiochem, San Diego, 
CA) or 2mU of α2,6-(N)-sialyltransferase (Japan Tobacco, Inc., Shizuoka, Japan) 
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1)
A/h5N1
wildtype
<10 <20 10 1280 <10 10 <10 <10 <10
A/h5N1
hA h103Y,t156A,Q222l,g224s Pb2 e627k
20 80 80 2560 480 120 <10 <10 <10
A/h5N1
hA h103Y,t156A, Pb2 e627k
<10 <20 10 1280 160 10 <10 <10 <10
serum control <10 10 <10 <10 <10 <10 <10 <10 <10
table s5. Hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay with ferret antisera raised against a panel of candidate H5N1 
vaccine viruses for pandemic preparedness selected by the WHO network. Reactivity of ferret post-infection 
sera is shown for PR8/H5 recombinant influenza viruses with HA and PB2 of A/H5N1wildtype, A/H5N1HA 
H103Y,T156A,Q222L,G224S PB2 627K and A/H5N1HA H103Y,T156A PB2 E627K. Numbers in bold indicate 
HI-titers to wildtype A/Indonesia/5/2005 virus antiserum. The antiserum to A/Indonesia/5/2005 reacted 
with high titers with the HA of airborne-transmissible virus. HA of airborne-transmissible virus cross-reacted 
better with sera raised against other candidate vaccine viruses representing other clades of A/H5N1 virus, 
compared with A/H5N1wildtype (indicated in italic), presumably owing to changes in the receptor binding 
site and loss of the potential glycosylation site [343].
boekje5.indd   138 8/27/2013   3:22:27 PM
Airborne transmission of influenza A/H5N1 virus between ferrets 139
Ch
ap
te
r 
4.
2
and 1.5 mM CMP-sialic acid (Sigma-Aldrich, Zwijndrecht, Netherlands) at 37°C in 
75 µl for 2 h to produce α2,3-TRBC and α2,6-TRBC, respectively. After a washing 
step, the TRBC were resuspended in PBS containing 1% bovine serum albumin to 
a final concentration of 0.5% TRBC. Resialylation was confirmed by hemagglutina-
tion of viruses with known receptor specificity; chimeric PR8 viruses with the HA 
of A/Vietnam/1194/2004 (H5N1, no MBCS; affinity for α2,3-TRBC) or A/Nether-
lands/213/2003 (H3N2; affinity for α2,6-TRBC). The receptor specificity of recom-
binant viruses with six gene segments of PR8 and the HA and PB2 gene segments 
of A/H5N1 virus with or without substitutions Q222L, G224S, H103Y, T156A, and 
E627K, was tested by performing a standard hemagglutination assay with the modi-
fied TRBC. Serial two-fold dilutions of virus in PBS were made in a 50 µl volume; 50 
µl of 0.5% TRBC was added, followed by incubation for 1 hour at 4°C before deter-
mining the hemagglutination titer.
serum# serum control h5N1 sh1N1 ph1N1 h3N2
1 <10 <10 80 80 240
2 <10 <10 <10 20 320
3 <10 <10 30 20 10
4 <10 <10 30 40 60
5 <10 <10 10 <10 <10
6 <10 <10 30 <10 10
7 20 <30 80 <30 <30
8 <10 <10 80 40 160
9 40 <60 80 <60 <60
10 30 <40 40 <40 <40
11 120 <160 <160 <160 <160
12 <10 <10 40 <10 640
13 <10 <10 <10 30 1920
14 20 <30 30 240 640
15 <10 <10 <10 10 40
16 <10 <10 20 40 40
17 <10 <10 <10 20 240
18 <10 <10 640 40 <10
19 <10 <10 20 40 160
20 80 <120 <120 <120 <120
21 <10 <10 20 <10 <10
22 <10 <10 40 120 160
23 <10 <10 80 320 320
24 <10 <10 20 160 80
table s6. Hemagglutination inhibition assay using sera from human volunteers older than 70 years 
of age. The virus tested was a PR8/H5 recombinant influenza virus with HA and PB2 of A/H5N1HA 
H103Y,T156A,Q222L,G224S PB2 E627K. Titers of human sera against the vaccine strains NYMC-IVR-148 (sea-
sonal A/H1N1, A/Brisbane/059/2007), NYMC X-181 (pandemic A/H1N1, A/California/7/2009) and NYMC 
X-187 (seasonal A/H3N2, A/Victoria/210/2009) were included as controls. Human sera did not react with the 
HA of airborne-transmissible H5N1 virus. In contrast, 22 of 24 human sera reacted with one or more A/H1N1 
and A/H3N2 viruses (numbers in boldface). 
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sUmmAriziNg DiscUssioN
The evolution of influenza viruses is an ongoing saga as (i) the RNA synthesis by the 
RNA polymerase is error-prone, (ii) the RNA genome of influenza A viruses is seg-
mented thus allowing genome reassortment, and (iii) influenza A viruses circulate 
in multiple hosts.
Viral genome reassortment and the accumulation of point mutations contribute 
to the emergence of new influenza virus variants that might cause epidemics or 
pandemics. Moreover, the threat of an influenza A virus that can cross the species 
barrier is continuously present.
subtype specific emergence of hPAi viruses
Avian influenza A viruses of the H5 and H7 subtypes have the ability to become high-
ly pathogenic. The transition from low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses to 
highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses has been observed only after intro-
duction of LPAI viruses from wild birds into poultry. Despite extensive circulation in 
poultry of non-H5 and -H7 subtypes (e.g. H6N1 and H9N2), HPAI viruses have never 
emerged from these LPAI viruses. The highly pathogenic phenotype is the result of 
the introduction of a multibasic cleavage site (MBCS) in the HA gene. The absence 
of an MBCS in non-H5 or -H7 subtypes was at first thought to be due to compro-
mised HA function. However, we describe in chapter 2.1 that the introduction of an 
MBCS in a non-H5 or -H7 avian influenza virus is not deleterious. We demonstrated 
that the insertion of an MBCS in an LPAI mallard H6N1 virus (H6N1MBCS) resulted 
in trypsin independency in vitro comparable to that of an HPAI H5N1 virus. An IVPI 
of 1.41 confirmed the highly pathogenic phenotype of H6N1MBCS, although, HPAI 
H5 and H7 viruses induce an even more pathogenic phenotype in chickens with 
IVPIs reaching the maximum of 3.00. After intranasal inoculation of chickens with 
H6N1MBCS virus, low virus shedding from the upper respiratory tract (URT) and low 
levels of systemic replication, indicated that further adaptation might be required 
for the H6 mallard virus to induce a full highly pathogenic phenotype in chickens. 
Other studies demonstrated that non-H5 and -H7 subtypes could support a highly 
pathogenic phenotype only in the appropriate HPAI viral background [346,347]. 
Veits et al. showed that the introduction of an MBCS in non-H5/H7 HAs, rescued in a 
low pathogenic chicken influenza virus backbone, was not sufficient to yield a highly 
pathogenic phenotype after oculonasal inoculation in chicken. However, an HPAI 
virus H5 HA in the same low pathogenic chicken influenza virus backbone did also 
not result in high virulence in chickens. This finding underlines the fact that other 
virulence and host-range factors or compensatory mutations need to be present to 
confer the highly pathogenic phenotype, which is in agreement with a study of Bogs 
et al [216]. However, it remains uncertain whether such additional virulence factors 
need to be obtained before or after the introduction of an MBCS. 
For instance, when a modified H9N2 virus, with four basic amino acid residues at 
the HA cleavage site, was serially passaged in chickens, a highly pathogenic pheno-
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type was acquired [348]. This was due to the loss of a glycosylation site near the 
cleavage site, which most likely contributed to the accessibility of HA to host pro-
teases, as was shown previously [157,349-351]. 
We and others demonstrated that the restriction of HPAI viruses to the H5 and 
H7 subtypes is not the result of an inability of the HA to harbor an MBCS. Since 
the introduction of an MBCS into non-H5 and -H7 subtypes may result in a highly 
pathogenic phenotype, the emergence of HPAI viruses with other influenza virus 
subtypes is plausible. However, the observed HA subtype restriction in naturally 
occurring HPAI viruses indicates a unique predisposition of H5 and H7 HAs for an 
MBCS. This restriction might be due to a specific sequence and/or RNA structure of 
the H5 and H7 HAs. An MBCS acquisition does not always occur when LPAI viruses 
of H5 or H7 subtypes are introduced in poultry [352], suggesting that there are pos-
sible sequential and/or structural differences among viruses within one subtype. 
The mechanism responsible for the incorporation of the MBCS in H5 and H7 is also 
unknown. However, several mechanisms have been proposed for the acquisition of 
an MBCS; (i) slippage of the influenza virus polymerase complex [179,353,354], (ii) 
stepwise introduction of amino acid substitutions [353,355] or (iii) recombination 
[356]. For H7 viruses, the manifestation of the highly pathogenic phenotype can be 
the result of recombination of the HA gene with ribosomal RNA [180]. Recombina-
tion between the HA gene and other viral genes, e.g. NP and MA, have also been 
described [181,356].
Under experimental conditions HPAI virus could be generated after sequential pas-
saging of seal influenza virus in chicken embryo cells [357]. Similarly, after passaging 
of a wild swan LPAI H5N3 (R-E-T-R), a virus with a typical HPAI cleavage site (R-R-K-K-
R) was obtained. However, this LPAI wild swan strain only became highly pathogenic 
in chickens after 24 consecutive passages by air sac inoculation, followed by five 
passages in the brain of one-day old chicks [358]. So far, HPAI viruses could only be 
obtained under experimental conditions that do not resemble the natural situa-
tion. Nevertheless, the mechanism by which the MBCS is acquired has still not been 
elucidated.
With the continuing emergence of HPAI viruses in poultry it is important to under-
stand why and how the H5 and H7 subtypes have the ability to obtain an MBCS in 
nature.
hPAi viruses in mammals
Occasionally, HPAI viruses of the H5 and H7 subtypes are introduced from poultry 
into humans causing severe disease and even death. Other mammalian species in-
cluding ferrets, mice, leopards, tigers, domestic dogs and cats, palm civets, stone 
marten, and foxes are also susceptible to HPAI H5N1 virus infection. In these species 
HPAI H5N1 virus can cause severe and/or fatal disease, with systemic viral replica-
tion [66,205]. In mice, removal of the MBCS from HA of an HPAI H5N1 virus resulted 
in a virus that caused only respiratory tract infection, in contrast to the systemic 
replication of the HPAI H5N1 virus, indicating that the MBCS is a major virulence 
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factor in mice [103]. However, experimental infection of non-human primates with 
HPAI H5N1 causes respiratory tract disease only [102]. The association between 
HA cleavability and replication outside the respiratory tract is less straightforward 
for influenza viruses in mammals than for poultry. In chapter 2.2, we demonstrate 
that the highly pathogenic phenotype is not supported by a human influenza virus 
in ferrets. Incorporation of an MBCS in the HA of a human influenza H3N2 virus 
(H3N2MBCS) resulted in trypsin independency of the virus in vitro, similar to that 
of HPAI H5N1 virus. However, the insertion of an MBCS did not result in increased 
virulence or a change in tissue tropism compared to the wildtype H3N2 virus. These 
findings suggest that, in addition to an MBCS, other factors are involved to induce 
systemic spread in ferrets. Groups of ferrets inoculated with either wildtype H3N2 
or H3N2MBCS did not demonstrate virus replication in the lower respiratory tract 
(LRT), most likely due to the human receptor specificity of these viruses. Whether 
the LRT replication of HPAI H5N1 viruses contributes to systemic spread in ferrets 
remains to be determined. Since the avian receptor preference of the HPAI H5N1 
virus is responsible for the robust infection of the LRT, it is plausible that the bind-
ing preference of influenza viruses plays an important role in the tissue tropism and 
subsequently the virulence of the virus. 
In chapter 2.3, we determined by which routes HPAI H5N1 virus can spread systemi-
cally and demonstrated the role of the MBCS in extra-respiratory tract replication in 
ferrets. As the central nervous system (CNS) is the most common extra-respiratory 
site of replication in mammals, the olfactory route of infection was studied closely 
to show how HPAI H5N1 virus travels through the CNS. A clade 2.1 HPAI H5N1 virus 
replicated in the olfactory receptor neurons of ferrets which provided a direct route 
for H5N1 virus into the olfactory bulb from where it spread to the cerebrum and 
cerebellum. Infectious virus was isolated from cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) which is 
consistent with a case report in which HPAI H5N1 virus was detected in the CSF of 
a child [237]. Recently, Yamada et al. also showed the olfactory route as the main 
route of infection for ferrets that develop encephalitis [359]. They used a clade 1 
HPAI H5N1 virus, demonstrating that virus entry via the olfactory route may be a 
general feature of HPAI H5 viruses. They also detected virus antigen in the epithelial 
cells of the Eustachian tube, the cochlea and the vestibulocochlear nerve, suggest-
ing a second anterograde route of invasion, namely the vestibulocochlear pathway. 
The spread of HPAI H5N1 virus to the CNS via the olfactory route is a feature shared 
by the pandemic H1N1 virus. Van den Brand et al. observed virus replication in the 
olfactory mucosa, cerebrum and cerebellum suggesting that pandemic 2009 H1N1 
also has the ability to become neurotropic and enter the CNS via the olfactory route 
[360]. This is consistent with findings in children with severe forms of encephalopa-
thy associated with pandemic H1N1 virus [361,362]. However the pandemic H1N1 
virus does not harbor an MBCS, indicating that the replication of this virus in the 
CNS is likely the result of another factor. In addition, some influenza viruses of the 
H1 subtype have this neurotropic feature by facilitating cleavage of HA through an 
additional mechanism which could depend on the viral NA [34,140].
boekje5.indd   144 8/27/2013   3:22:32 PM
Summarizing Discussion 145
Ch
ap
te
r 
5
In our study, HPAI H5N1 virus was also shown to spread via the hematogenous route 
in ferrets, as viral replication was observed in the pancreas, colon, liver and heart. 
These findings are consistent with other studies [214,359] and further investigation 
is needed to clarify the hematogenous spread in systemic infection with H5N1 virus. 
Suggested routes for the hematogenous spread of H5N1 virus are either via lymph, 
or directly into blood from a spill-over from alveolar capillaries. 
The MBCS in HPAI H5N1 virus appears to be important for systemic spread in ferrets, 
since deletion of the MBCS from HPAI H5N1 (H5N1ΔMBCS) virus resulted in replica-
tion that was restricted to the respiratory tract. Replication of H5N1ΔMBCS virus 
in the URT of ferrets was reduced compared to wildtype H5N1; virus titers in the 
nose as well as the number of influenza virus-positive cells in the olfactory mucosa 
were lower in H5N1ΔMBCS-inoculated ferrets. As cleavage of HA of H5N1ΔMBCS 
virus is dependent on trypsin-like proteases, expression of these proteases is likely 
to be variable between different anatomical sites and cell types in the respiratory 
tract of ferrets. Although we cannot exclude that the H5N1ΔMBCS virus might be 
somewhat attenuated due to deletion of the MBCS.
The lack of systemic replication of H5N1ΔMBCS virus in mammals is most likely due 
to the absence of appropriate proteases outside the respiratory tract. The distri-
bution of furin-like proteases and pro-protein convertases (PCs), which recognize 
multi basic motifs, plays an important role in pathogenicity and tissue tropism of 
influenza viruses [101,363,364]. These ubiquitously expressed proteases have the 
ability to cleave the consensus multi-basic motif present in HPAI viruses of subtypes 
H5 and H7, thus allowing these viruses to cause systemic infections. Novel type II 
transmembrane serine proteases, MSPL and TMPRSS13 have been recognized as 
HA processing proteases and are highly expressed in the lungs, brain and vascular 
epithelial cells of humans and chickens [365]. These proteases recognize a broader 
range of basic motifs from HPAI viruses. Further studies are required to determine 
the protease composition in extra-respiratory tract tissues and the role of proteases 
in cell tropism and pathogenicity of influenza viruses in mammals. 
The extra-respiratory tract infection of HPAI H5N1 virus in mammals is most likely 
caused by multiple factors, in which the MBCS is essential. However, the presence 
of the appropriate receptors for virus attachment, presence of the proper proteases 
and the local innate immune response also influence the ability of influenza virus 
to replicate systemically. Additional studies are required to obtain a better insight 
into the expanded tissue tropism of HPAI H5N1 viruses in which the distribution of 
influenza virus receptors and proteases in extra-respiratory tract tissues should be 
determined. 
reassortment
The influenza A virus RNA genome is segmented, which allows the exchange of 
genes between different viruses when they co-infect a cell. This process, called reas-
sortment, contributes to the emergence of new variants with potentially increased 
virulence and/or altered host range that might cause epidemics or pandemics. The 
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2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza virus (pH1N1) has a unique combination of gene 
segments originating from swine, avian and human influenza viruses. The viral PB2 
and PA gene segments originate from north American avian viruses, the PB1 gene 
segment from a human H3N2 virus, the HA, NP and NS genes from classical swine 
viruses, and the NA and M genes from Eurasian avian-like swine viruses [50,272]. 
Since the pH1N1 virus co-circulated with seasonal H3N2 and H1N1 viruses, further 
reassortment with these viruses could possibly give rise to a more virulent virus.
After the emergence of pH1N1 virus, concurrent infections with the seasonal H1N1 
and H3N2 viruses have been detected, thereby providing a possibility for reassort-
ment to occur [23,24,252,366]. Reassortment between pH1N1 and seasonal H3N2 
viruses has been observed in humans where co-infection resulted in reassortants 
that consisted of the HA and NA of seasonal H3N2 viruses and the remaining genes 
of pH1N1 virus [367]. However, these reassortant influenza viruses did not persist 
in the human population.
It is difficult to predict which potential reassortant variants could have a replica-
tion and/or transmission advantage over the wildtype pH1N1 virus as the genera-
tion and characterization of each reassortant (28=256 viruses) makes this approach 
cumbersome. To force reassortment, co-infections of ferrets with pH1N1 and either 
seasonal H1N1 or H3N2 virus can be conducted. However, when such experiments 
were performed, pH1N1 was able to outcompete the seasonal influenza viruses and 
to become the dominant virus [256]. To prevent the outgrowth of one dominant 
virus, we decided to design an in vitro selection method, as described in chapter 3.1 
and 3.2. This method, using reverse genetics, allowed us to produce all gene seg-
ments at approximately similar copy numbers after transfection. Hereafter, newly 
formed reassortant influenza viruses with high replication efficiency were selected 
by serial passaging under limited dilution conditions. 
In chapter 3.1, we describe that reassortment of pH1N1 with seasonal H3N2 virus 
can lead to an H1N2 virus, which is more virulent in ferrets compared to the pH1N1 
virus. Reassortant viruses of pH1N1 with seasonal H1N1 PB2 (either with or without 
PA of seasonal H1N1) were found to be somewhat attenuated in ferrets compared 
to wildtype pH1N1 virus. Ferrets that were inoculated with a reassortant pH1N1 
virus with seasonal H3N2 NA (H1N2) (either with or without the PB1 of seasonal 
H3N2) demonstrated higher virus antigen expression and more severe lesions in the 
lower respiratory tract compared to ferrets inoculated with wildtype pH1N1 virus. 
All reassortant pH1N1 viruses maintained the ability to be transmitted between 
ferrets. Altogether, this in vitro selection method allowed us to select reassortants 
between pH1N1 and seasonal H1N1 or H3N2 viruses and such reassortment events 
resulted in viruses with potentially increased virulence in ferrets.
Recently, Angel et al. attempted to overcome the problem that pH1N1 outcompetes 
the seasonal strains by performing co-infection studies in ferrets with viruses car-
rying the HA and NA genes of a seasonal H3N2 in the background of a pH1N1 virus 
and vice versa [368]. Surprisingly, after serial passage in ferrets, a dominant H1N2 
virus population was observed where the NA and PB1 gene segments originated 
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from the seasonal H3N2 virus and the other six gene segments were derived from 
pH1N1 virus. Interestingly, by means of two different techniques, the pH1N1 virus 
was found to preferentially incorporate the NA and PB1 gene segments of a sea-
sonal H3N2 virus.
The pH1N1 virus emerged as a result of reassortment of several influenza viruses 
from swine lineages where the PB1 gene segment was provided by a human H3N2 
virus [50,272]. This could explain the selective replacement of the PB1 pH1N1 gene 
segment by its seasonal H3N2 virus counterpart.
The functional balance between the HA and NA proteins is essential for efficient 
replication of influenza virus [138,139]. It was shown that the pH1N1 HA and NA 
gene segments co-adapted, suggesting that a functional balance between HA and 
NA was required to initiate this pandemic. There is a functional match of low HA 
avidity and low NA activity of pH1N1 virus that corresponds to a similar balance 
of HA and NA activities observed for pandemic viruses of the last century [369]. 
Surprisingly, in the studies described above, another NA segment was preferentially 
selected to reassort with the pH1N1 virus. Although the functional balance of HA 
and NA is likely a required factor for efficient transmission of pH1N1 [370], trans-
mission efficiency of the reassortant H1N2 virus was not altered. The interplay of 
the HA and NA genes from the reassortant H1N2 virus was likely to be enhanced, 
since both in vitro and in vivo replication of this virus was increased compared to 
that of the pH1N1 virus. To elucidate the exact mechanism that drives the enhanced 
interaction of the HA and NA gene segments derived from the H1N2 virus, func-
tional studies should be performed. 
Since the pH1N1 virus emerged after extensive reassortment in swine, it is impor-
tant to continue the surveillance in swine to monitor novel swine influenza viruses 
which might have the ability to infect humans. A recent study showed rapid reas-
sortment between co-circulating H1N1, H1N2, and H3N2 viruses in swine [371]. As 
a result, it is likely that further reassortment events will occur between currently 
circulating swine/human influenza viruses and the pH1N1 virus. 
At least three of the previous pandemics emerged as the result of reassortment 
between animal and human influenza viruses. With the occasional HPAI H5N1 virus 
infection of humans, concerns have arisen of reassortment between avian H5N1 
and human influenza viruses. In chapter 3.2 we describe the genetic compatibility 
between the gene segments of HPAI H5N1 virus and pH1N1, seasonal H3N2 or sea-
sonal H1N1 viruses. Using the in vitro selection method as described above, only 
reassortant viruses that contained the H5 HA gene could be produced. We demon-
strated that the NA and M gene segments of human influenza viruses were prefer-
entially incorporated by H5 viruses. However, when the replication kinetics of these 
H5 reassortant viruses were studied in primary cell cultures, no increase in replica-
tion was observed. Previous in vitro or in vivo co-infection studies of HPAI H5N1 
with either pandemic or seasonal H3N2 viruses also resulted in a preference for NA 
and M gene segments [154,264]. To study if reassortment between HPAI H5N1 and 
pH1N1 can be beneficial for virus replication in mammals and possibly confer air-
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borne transmissibility, ferrets were inoculated with a mixture of reassortant viruses 
between HPAI H5N1 and pH1N1, from which the H1 HA was omitted. The genetic 
composition of reassortant viruses collected from infected ferrets, demonstrated 
the presence of the NA and M gene segments of pH1N1 virus at different time 
points during the course of infection. None of the viruses in the H5N1-pH1N1 reas-
sortant mixture was found to be transmitted to the recipient ferrets via the airborne 
route.
Fortunately, HPAI H5N1 viruses have not reassorted with contemporary human in-
fluenza viruses in nature. This is partly contributed to the low probability of double 
infections of human and avian influenza viruses in one host. In addition, influenza 
viruses have to infect the same cell and similar level of adaptation to the host of are 
necessary to initiate gene reassortment. HPAI H5N1 viruses have undergone sub-
stantial reassortment with avian influenza viruses showing that they do have the 
capacity to reassort. This inter-subtype reassortment plays an important role in the 
evolution and variation of HPAI H5N1 virus and has been detected frequently. Since 
the emergence of HPAI H5N1 in 1997, reassortant influenza viruses have been de-
tected in migratory birds, ducks, geese, chickens and other poultry, that contained 
the original H5 HA gene and the additional genes from other avian influenza viruses 
[372-374]. The extensive genetic reassortment of HPAI H5N1 viruses has lead to 
many H5N1 genotypes that resulted into multiple genetically distinct clades that 
have spread to at least 60 countries [260,375-378]. This inter-subtype reassortment 
is a characteristic shared by other influenza virus subtypes, like human H3N2 virus, 
since multiple reassortment events occurred between different lineages of H3N2 
viruses [27,28]. This is in contrast to occasional reassortment events among differ-
ent influenza virus subtypes, which suggests a preference for inter-subtype reas-
sortment. Although a remarkable high rate of reassortment among avian influenza 
A viruses in wild birds was documented [379].
As both avian and human influenza viruses have the ability to infect swine, the risk 
of reassortant viruses arising from pigs is always present. Swine might play a critical 
role as a mixing vessel, since swine are susceptible to infection with both human 
and avian influenza viruses, as receptors for both viruses are present in swine tra-
chea. However, the role of swine as mixing vessel in transmission of avian influenza 
viruses to humans may not be unique as humans can be infected with HPAI H5N1 
and H7N7 viruses directly from an avian reservoir [380]. To further elucidate the 
potential role of swine in the emergence of human/avian influenza virus reassor-
tants with pandemic potential, reassortment studies in ex vivo cultures from swine 
respiratory tract might be considered. 
Airborne transmission of avian influenza virus 
Human influenza A viruses are able to transmit via direct contact, indirect contact 
via fomites (contaminated environmental surfaces) and/or via aerosols or respirato-
ry droplets (airborne transmission). Investigating the viral, host, and environmental 
factors responsible for transmission of animal influenza viruses between humans 
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is crucial. Only when we understand the underlying transmission mechanisms can 
we start to estimate the risk that animal influenza viruses pose for future human 
pandemics. The virus or virus subtype that will cause the next influenza pandemic 
is a highly debated topic in the field. Some scientist think that only influenza virus 
subtype H1, H2, and H3 can cause pandemics in humans, and therefore there is no 
need to be concerned about subtypes such as H5, H7, or H9. 
Our knowledge of the viral traits required for host switching has increased signifi-
cantly over the last decade. However, what exactly determines airborne transmis-
sion of influenza viruses in humans remains largely unknown. In chapter 4.1 we pos-
tulated the requirements for efficient airborne transmission of an animal influenza 
virus between humans [234]. We hypothesized that the minimal requirements for 
efficient transmission in mammals are: efficient virus attachment to (upper) respira-
tory tissues, replication to high titers in these tissues, and release and aerosoliza-
tion of single virus particles. 
The continuing spread of HPAI H5N1 viruses in poultry and the occasional trans-
mission to humans resulting in severe disease has made HPAI H5N1 virus a top 
candidate to potentially cause a future pandemic. It is the lack of human-to-human 
transmission that has prevented an H5N1 pandemic so far. In chapter 4.2, we de-
scribe that a fully HPAI H5N1 virus can acquire the capacity for airborne transmis-
sion between mammals without the need of reassortment in an intermediate host. 
First, we genetically modified an HPAI H5N1 virus HA to obtain human receptor 
specificity (Q222L and G224S). Since the amino acid substitution E627K in PB2 has 
been associated with increased virus replication of avian viruses in mammalian 
cells, which might also be required for airborne transmission, this mutation was 
also introduced in the HPAI H5N1 virus. However, since the mutant virus harboring 
E627K in PB2 together with Q222L and G224S in HA did not transmit, we designed 
an experiment to force the virus to adapt to replicate in cells of the mammalian 
URT by repeated passage in ferrets. We found that the genetically modified HPAI 
H5N1 virus obtained additional mutations after passage and acquired the ability 
to transmit between ferrets. Surprisingly, besides the three mutations that were 
introduced by reverse genetics, only two additional mutations in HA (H103Y and 
T156A) were consistently detected in six airborne-transmissible virus isolates. The 
airborne-transmissible virus with the lowest number of amino acids substitutions 
had only nine mutations. Additional studies are necessary to identify which of the 
five to nine amino acid substitutions in this virus are essential to allow airborne 
transmission. In addition, it is important to determine whether these mutations 
would allow airborne transmission in other H5N1 genotypes and in other avian in-
fluenza A virus subtypes. 
Around the same time, researchers at the university of Wisconsin-Madison report-
ed that a virus containing the HPAI H5 HA (A/Vietnam/1203/2004) and the remain-
ing seven gene segments from a pH1N1 virus, could confer airborne transmission in 
ferrets [259]. The HA of this airborne-transmissible virus had only four amino acid 
substitutions compared to the wildtype HA. The two publications on transmissible 
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H5N1 viruses indicate that different lineages of HPAI H5N1 viruses which contained 
functionally equivalent amino acid substitutions that affect receptor binding, gly-
cosylation and replication, can become transmissible via the airborne route. The 
different amino acid substitutions from these studies and others that could confer 
the same biological traits are discussed below.
As we postulated in chapter 4.1, efficient virus attachment to cells in the URT might 
be required for airborne transmission between mammals. Therefore, as described 
above, we changed the binding preference of HPAI H5N1 virus from avian to human 
receptors, by introducing amino acid substitutions Q222L and G224S. From previous 
pandemics, we know that only two mutations in the HA receptor binding site may 
be required to confer binding preference for receptors on human URT cells [89]. 
When previous pandemic viruses were evaluated for their receptor recognition pat-
tern, it was demonstrated that amino acid substitutions in HA resulting in a human 
receptor binding preference were a prerequisite for cross-species transmission and 
human adaptation of avian influenza viruses [88,152]. However, just changing the 
receptor specificity of HPAI H5N1 virus was not enough to confer airborne transmis-
sion in ferrets [92,259,261]. Inefficient transmission was observed between ferrets 
for a virus containing a clade 2.2 H5N1 influenza virus HA with human receptor 
specificity, a human NA and six other gene segments from a clade 1 HPAI H5N1 
virus [92]. This study elaborated on the complexity of genetic changes in influenza 
viruses that could be responsible for the same biological traits and subsequently 
affect transmission. Imai et al showed that similar changes in the HA that affected 
the receptor binding preference (N220K and Q222L) could also yield an airborne-
transmissible H5, however additional substitutions were present in HA [259]. To 
summarize, several studies have demonstrated that a human receptor preference 
is a prerequisite, but on its own not sufficient for an influenza A virus to become 
airborne-transmissible in the ferret model. 
After serial passage in ferrets, two additional substitutions, H103Y and T156A, were 
consistently present in six H5 airborne-transmissible virus isolates [261]. The 103Y 
residue is part of the HA trimer interface and could alter the stability of the HA 
glycoprotein. Similarly, a T315I substitution was identified by Imai et al., which ap-
peared to be essential for airborne transmission [259]. This amino acid substitu-
tion compensates for the altered stability of HA caused by the receptor binding 
mutations. Whether the H103Y substitution restores the same HA stability has not 
yet been elucidated, however preliminary data suggests that the H103Y residue is 
involved in HA stability as well. T156 is part of a putative N-glycosylation site that 
is located near the receptor-binding site, and mutation T156A would delete this 
glycosylation site. As shown previously, loss of the glycosylation site combined with 
acquisition of human receptor specificity enhances H5N1 virus binding to α-2,6–
linked SA [343]. In addition, loss of this glycosylation site was found to be critical 
for H5N1 virus transmissibility in a guinea pig direct contact model [275] and H5N1 
virus virulence in mice [333]. Interestingly, Imai et al. demonstrated that their H5 
airborne-transmissible virus acquired a N154D substitution, that deletes the same 
boekje5.indd   150 8/27/2013   3:22:33 PM
Summarizing Discussion 151
Ch
ap
te
r 
5
glycosylation site as T156A, suggesting that the loss of this glycosylation site is criti-
cal for H5 airborne transmission between mammals.
The E627K amino acid substitution is known to contribute to the host-range restric-
tion of influenza A viruses. However, it has to be elucidated if this substitution is 
crucial for H5N1 airborne transmission and whether it can be substituted by func-
tionally equivalent mutations. In the study of Imai et al, the airborne-transmissible 
virus contained the PB2 protein of an pH1N1 virus (which has G590S/Q591R rather 
than E627K) which also suggests the requirement of a human-adapted PB2 [259]. 
This was confirmed by a previous study on human H3N2 influenza virus, in which 
the introduction of the reverse mutation (K627E) resulted in less efficient transmis-
sion in guinea pigs. [108]. In addition, the K627E mutation was found to reduce 
transmission in a direct contact model for HPAI H5N1 virus. In contrast, introduc-
tion of D701N in combination with the K627E mutation resulted in more efficient 
transmission in mammals, a phenotype more similar to that of the wildtype viruses, 
suggesting that this residue can compensate for the absence of 627K. These data 
suggest that amino acids 627 and 701 in PB2 are determinants of mammalian trans-
mission in diverse virus backgrounds; however we have to take into account that 
current transmission models are qualitative rather than quantitative. 
In terms of virulence, it has been shown that E627K in PB2 is a critical virulence de-
terminant for clade 2.3.4 H5N1 viruses, whereas D701N in PB2 and other unknown 
virulence determinants appear to be involved in the high pathogenicity of clade 1 
H5N1 viruses [381]. 
The above-mentioned substitutions (E627K, D701N, and G590S/Q591R) have been 
shown to compensate for the lack of efficient polymerase activity of avian influ-
enza A viruses in mammalian cells [104,110,115,382]. However, more studies are 
required to identify genetic determinants of efficient replication and transmission 
of avian influenza viruses in mammals. For this purpose we can use sequences of 
human and avian influenza viruses to identify species-specific amino acids. For ex-
ample, 32 residues from PB2, PA, NP, M1 and NS1 were identified to be different 
between human and avian viruses where 13 were conserved among 1918, 1957 
and 1968 pandemic influenza viruses [383]. These host-specific markers can help 
us identify the minimal requirements for virus adaptation and transmission of avian 
viruses to mammals and may have prognostic and diagnostic value for improving 
pandemic preparedness.
New research questions that arose after this research are important and should 
be addressed in the near future. An important question is whether the airborne 
H5N1 virus has retained its high virulence. Ferret experiments conducted with air-
borne H5N1 virus showed that it was highly virulent after intratracheal inoculation 
as ferrets were moribund or died by day 3. However, intratracheal inoculations at 
such high doses do not represent the natural route of infection and are generally 
only used to test the ability of viruses to cause pneumonia [211]. Noteworthy, the 
airborne H5N1 virus was not lethal after airborne transmission in ferrets. As shown 
previously, the route of inoculation determines the pathogenicity of H5N1 viruses 
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in ferrets [222]. Whereas the majority of ferrets will develop pneumonia after in-
tratracheal inoculation, which was also shown in our experiments, ferrets that are 
inoculated intranasally with the wildtype H5N1 virus are likely to develop neuro-
logical symptoms, which indicates infection of the CNS as described in chapter 2.3. 
In addition, after intranasal inoculation of ferrets with wildtype HPAI H5N1 virus, 
blood-borne spread could be demonstrated. Inoculation of ferrets via an airborne 
route mimics the natural situation more closely, and should therefore be used to 
determine the virulence of airborne H5N1 virus. It is of importance to note that 
these studies have limitations since the virulence may vary with the dose of virus 
inoculation, and that virulence may be strain dependent. Innovative strategies are 
needed to further investigate the virulence of influenza viruses. For example, to 
study the virulence of airborne H5N1, ferrets could be inoculated using aerosol gen-
erators, to better mimic the natural situation.
The airborne H5N1 virus showed enhanced binding to α-2,6–linked SA but also re-
tained some affinity for α-2,3–linked SA, most likely due to the loss of the putative 
N-glycosylation site. This affinity for both receptors will may result in a broader tis-
sue tropism for the airborne H5N1 virus compared to H5N1 virus with a human 
receptor preference only. In chapter 2.3, we showed that wildtype HPAI H5N1 virus 
is able to infect the URT of ferrets. However, the majority of the infected cells were 
located in the olfactory epithelium that lines the caudal extremity of the nasal tur-
binates. It is plausible that the receptor specificity of airborne H5N1 virus facilitates 
replication in cells of the respiratory epithelium that line in the front of the nasal 
turbinates which would facilitate airborne transmission. 
Another important determinant of the highly pathogenic phenotype of H5N1 virus 
is the MBCS. The airborne H5N1 virus has an MBCS, implying the ability to replicate 
systemically. However, we demonstrated in chapter 2.2 that an H3N2 virus with 
human receptor preference containing an MBCS was not able to induce systemic 
spread. Whether the human receptor specificity of airborne H5N1 virus will limit 
virus replication to the respiratory tract has yet to be elucidated. 
The impact of the MBCS on transmissibility between mammals is unknown, since 
no highly pathogenic influenza viruses ever had the ability to be transmitted be-
tween mammals in nature. In chickens, it is plausible that the acquisition of an 
MBCS provides selective advantage for transmission via the respiratory tract since 
the oral-faecal route of transmission of LPAI viruses as observed in waterfowl may 
be suboptimal for poultry roaming in dry pens at high densities. A single amino 
acid substitution in the MBCS significantly reduced virulence without changing the 
transmission of an HPAI H5N1 virus in chickens [384]. It can be hypothesized that, 
in mammals, the MBCS might be disadvantageous for influenza virus transmission 
since the balance of the virulence and transmission should be optimal otherwise 
the basic reproduction number (R0) will decrease.
Whether an HPAI H5N1 virus with the ability of human-to-human transmission will 
ever emerge in nature remains unanswered. Several H5N1 strains with enhanced 
binding affinity to human-type α-2,6 receptors have been described in Indonesia 
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[322]. In addition, in Egypt new sublineages of HPAI H5N1 viruses have emerged in 
local bird populations with enhanced α-2,6–linked SA binding that retained binding 
affinity for α-2,3–linked SA [385]. These viruses expanded their receptor specificity 
from receptors in the human alveoli to the trachea. The emergence of these viruses 
was associated with an increase of human cases of H5N1 virus infection. In addi-
tion, some viruses that circulate in Egypt lost their putative N-glycosylation site and 
acquired the E627K substitution in PB2; both amino acid substitutions have been 
shown to be important in facilitating virus transmission in ferrets [259,261,386]. 
Phylogenetic analysis suggests that avian H5N1 viruses from Egypt lacking the gly-
cosylation site transmit more readily from poultry to human than those that pos-
ses the glycosylation site [386]. These viruses, however, did not cause human-to-
human transmission, which implies that these viruses require additional mutations. 
Together with our collaborators at the University of Cambridge and the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison, we assessed the likelihood that the substitutions, which confer 
airborne transmission between ferrets, could arise in nature [387]. A mathematical 
model of virus evolution in the host was used to study factors that could influence 
the probability of the remaining substitutions evolving after the virus infected a 
mammalian host. These factors combined with the presence of some of the sub-
stitutions in circulating H5N1 viruses, make a virus evolving in nature an actual po-
tential threat. This data highlights critical research areas such as the importance 
of conducting routine surveillance and obtaining genetic data. Surveillance is the 
basis of infection control in the field. However, although genetic data is informa-
tive, the characterization of HPAI H5N1 viruses including antigenicity, pathogenicity, 
receptor binding preference and transmission is as important for investigating the 
evolution of HPAI H5N1 viruses. The continuous evolution of HPAI H5N1 virus, the 
increase in host range, and repeated infections of humans could eventually drive 
the virus to be transmitted between humans.
Identification and culling of infected and exposed flocks would limit the likelihood 
for humans and other mammals to become infected with HPAI H5N1 virus. How-
ever, this approach becomes difficult if the virus becomes enzootic in wild bird 
populations. China, Indonesia, Egypt, and Vietnam implemented vaccination after 
HPAI H5N1 became enzootic in domestic poultry [388]. Although vaccination helps 
to prevent virus transmission from infected animals, there are quite some draw-
backs; (i) antigenically different groups of viruses, which are not cross-reactive, co-
circulate in enzootic areas, (ii) H5N1 infects a variety of bird species and the optimal 
vaccination protocol may vary per species and (iii) vaccine driven evolution of avian 
influenza viruses may be stimulated [389].
The results of our work helps to better assess the risk posed by the current HPAI 
H5N1 epizootics for human health. In addition, it increases our fundamental un-
derstanding of the contribution of particular mutations or reassortments and their 
biological traits to transmission of the influenza virus. With the threat of avian-ori-
gin influenza viruses to cause future pandemics, this work has augmented value to 
estimate the potential risk. Recently, a novel reassortant avian origin influenza A 
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(H7N9) virus emerged in China. This novel reassortant H7N9 virus is associated with 
severe and fatal respiratory disease and is responsible for 108 confirmed human 
cases, which resulted in death of 22 cases up to now [70,390]. The introduction of 
this subtype to humans in Asia has not been observed previously. There is no indi-
cation thus far that it can be transmitted between people, however the pandemic 
potential should not be underestimated. Phylogentic analyses showed that there 
have been at least two introductions in human from different sources. The H7N9 
virus has several characteristic amino acid substitutions in HA and PB2 which prob-
ably facilitate binding to the human receptor and efficient replication in mammals 
[391]. These viruses predominantly possess the Q222L residue that is responsible 
for human receptor specificity. Moreover, a T156A mutation leads to the loss of a 
glycosylation site, which results in increased virus binding properties. In addition, 
the human adaptation residue E627K was found in these human cases. Altogether, 
these H7N9 viruses possess several characteristic features of pandemic influenza 
viruses and airborne H5N1 virus, which may contribute to their ability to infect and 
transmit between mammals and therefore concerns rise regarding the pandemic 
threat. Our work on the H5N1 virus may help to better assess risks and may have 
value for prediction and prevention of a potential pandemic, and to evaluate inter-
vention options.
Since it is impossible to predict which influenza viruses will preferentially emerge 
and may cause the next pandemic, it is key to continuously monitor the genetic 
composition of circulating influenza strains and to assess their infection and trans-
mission potential in animal models. Some variables that are important for the 
probability of pandemic virus emergence upon reassortment are; (i) rate of reas-
sortment, (ii) transmissibility of reassortant influenza viruses, (iii) the existence of 
cross-immunity acquired through previous infections [392]. Whether the next pan-
demic will be induced after genome reassortment only remains questionable, since 
a future pandemic might be triggered by direct transmission of a wholly avian virus 
to a human host without the requirement of reassortment.
Future perspectives
Here we provide insights into possible mechanisms of virulence, host adaptation, 
and airborne transmission of influenza A viruses. There is an increasing knowledge 
of the process by which influenza viruses emerge, although there is a need to bet-
ter understand why, when, and where certain mutations and reassortments arise. 
With the public and animal threats posed by HPAI viruses, more knowledge is re-
quired about how and why these HPAI viruses emerge in poultry. Furthermore, ad-
ditional information is needed on other virulence determinants and the factors that 
drive the natural selection of these biological traits in different hosts. Moreover, 
the process of gene reassortment is still incompletely understood and should be 
investigated in the near future. There is a tendency for more frequent reassortment 
within an influenza virus subtype compared to reassortment between different in-
fluenza virus subtypes. This may be related to compatibility of the packaging signals 
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and the functional balance between different gene segments, in particular between 
polymerase proteins and between HA and NA.
The studies on H5N1 virus transmission are of importance to elucidate mechanisms 
of transmission of influenza viruses. To identify the molecular basis for airborne 
transmission, reverse genetics will be needed to identify which amino acid substitu-
tions in airborne H5N1 virus are essential. Second, the virulence and tissue tropism 
of the airborne H5N1 virus should be investigated in detail in ferrets and chickens. 
Third, the mutations we identified need to be tested for their effect on transmis-
sion in other genetic clades of H5N1 viruses. Importantly, the biological properties 
identified for the airborne H5N1 virus could be general characteristics of airborne 
viruses, and therefore mechanistic studies on the phenotypic traits associated with 
each of the identified amino acid substitutions from previous pandemics should be 
investigated. 
Data on the biological properties of the transmissible H5N1 virus may be extrapo-
lated to the new avian H7N9 virus in order to assess the risk of a new pandemic and 
to implement appropriate control measurements in time. 
Transmission of influenza virus between humans may occur via respiratory drop-
lets and/or aerosols. However, which sizes of exhaled particles are important for 
influenza virus transmission are unknown. More efforts should be dedicated to de-
termine in which sizes of aerosols and/or droplets the infectious influenza virus is 
transmitted most effectively. In addition, it is conceivable that the stability of the 
influenza virus HA plays an important role in the airborne spread between humans. 
Monitoring exhaled virus aerosols, divided in size fractions, and their culturability 
will provide a better understanding of influenza virus transmission. Although it is 
known that influenza morphology affects virus production, the role in influenza vi-
rus transmission is still unclear. Studies showed that most influenza strains isolated 
from humans are predominantly filamentous and, upon continual passage in egg 
or tissue culture, adopt a more spherical morphology which correlated with an in-
crease in virus titer [393]. Thus, it is possible that the increased levels of influenza 
virus production by spherical influenza strains will results in more efficient influenza 
virus transmission. The contribution of residues in the MA gene segment in virus 
morphology and consequently transmission should be evaluated.
Which influenza virus subtype will emerge and cause the next pandemic is still im-
possible to predict. Therefore, new influenza virus vaccine strategies are required 
that induce a broader immune response than the current influenza vaccines. The 
ultimate goal of this work should be to design a universal vaccine that would induce 
protection against all influenza virus subtypes. This may be achieved by targeting 
antibodies and T cells at more conserved parts of the influenza A virus than the 
globular head of the HA glycoprotein. In addition, better drugs should be designed 
to prevent or treat influenza. As influenza viruses replicate very rapidly, new drugs 
aimed to limit the disease or facilitate recovery from disease may be more feasible 
than better drugs to inhibit virus replication.
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NeDerlANDse sAmeNVAttiNg
introductie
Influenza A virussen, ook wel griepvirussen genoemd, worden onderverdeeld op 
basis van de oppervlakte-eiwitten hemagglutinine (HA) en neuraminidase (NA). Er 
zijn 17 HA subtypen en 10 NA subtypen bekend. De combinatie van de oppervlakte-
eiwitten bepaalt de naam van het influenza A virus, bijvoorbeeld H3N2 en H5N1. 
Het influenza A virus is een negatief strengs RNA virus waarvan het genetisch mate-
riaal verdeeld is over acht gensegmenten: PB2, PB1, PA, HA, NP, NA, M en NS. 
De H1N1 en H3N2 virussen zijn momenteel verantwoordelijk voor de jaarlijks ter-
ugkerende influenza-epidemieën in de mens. Ouderen en risicogroepen worden 
aangeraden zich hiertegen te laten vaccineren. Veranderingen in HA en NA kunnen 
er echter voor zorgen dat de door het vaccin opgewekte antistoffen niet de influen-
za A virussen kunnen neutraliseren waardoor er toch een infectie optreedt. Doordat 
influenza A virussen regelmatig muteren, is het nodig het vaccin bijna jaarlijks aan 
te passen zodat gevaccineerde mensen beschermd blijven tegen de griep. 
Influenza A virussen komen niet alleen voor in de mens maar ook in andere dier-
soorten. Met uitzondering van het H17N10 virus, komen alle influenza A virus sub-
typen voor in wilde vogels. H17N10 is alleen gevonden in vleermuizen. Sommige 
influenza A virussen die voorkomen in diersoorten kunnen de mens sporadisch in-
fecteren. Dit zijn zogenaamde zoönotische infecties (of zoönosen). In pluimvee en 
andere vogelsoorten kunnen aviaire influenza A virussen ziekte veroorzaken; ‘de vo-
gelgriep’ in de volksmond. Hoogpathogene aviaire influenza (HPAI) virussen van het 
H5 en H7 subtype veroorzaken enorme uitbraken in pluimvee en soms ook ziekte-
gevallen in de mens, zoals de laatste 15 jaar in Zuidoost Azië. Meer dan zeshonderd 
humane gevallen van infectie zijn gemeld bij de Wereldgezondheidsorganisatie, van 
wie meer dan de helft aan de ziekte bezweek. Ook in andere zoogdieren kan infectie 
met HPAI H5N1 virus leiden tot een ernstig ziektebeeld en sterfte. 
De introductie van een nieuw influenza A virus subtype in de mens waartegen geen 
immuniteit bestaat, kan leiden tot een pandemie. De voorwaarde voor een pand-
emie is dat het virus efficiënt wordt overgedragen tussen mensen. Omdat het in-
fluenza A virus uit acht gensegmenten bestaat, kan het infecteren van één cel door 
verschillende influenza A virussen resulteren in een onderlinge uitwisseling van het 
erfelijk materiaal, ook wel reassortering genoemd. Varkens kunnen een rol spelen 
in het reassorteren van influenza A virussen doordat zij zowel door aviaire, humane 
en natuurlijk varkens influenza A virussen geïnfecteerd kunnen worden. Het var-
ken wordt daarom wel aangemerkt als ‘mengvat’ voor influenza A virussen, waarin 
uiteindelijk pandemische virussen kunnen ontstaan.
In de afgelopen honderd jaar hebben vier grieppandemieën plaatsgevonden. De 
´Spaanse´ griep in 1918 was verantwoordelijk voor één van de meest ernstige pand-
emieën waaraan ongeveer vijftig miljoen mensen zijn gestorven. Het H1N1 virus dat 
deze pandemie veroorzaakte, is hoogstwaarschijnlijk direct afkomstig van vogels 
zonder tussenliggende gastheer. Een nieuwe pandemie werd veroorzaakt in 1957 
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door een H2N2 virus, de ‘Aziatische’ griep. Deze verdreef het H1N1 virus uit de 
mens. De H2N2 viruspandemie was het resultaat van een reassortering tussen het 
humane H1N1 virus en een aviair H2N2 virus, waarvan de HA, NA en PB1 genseg-
menten afkomstig waren. Dit virus circuleerde in de mens tot 1968, toen reassor-
tering plaatsvond van het humane H2N2 virus met een aviair H3 virus. Dit leidde tot 
de volgende pandemie die werd veroorzaakt door een H3N2 virus, de ‘Hongkong’ 
griep. Dit virus veroorzaakt jaarlijks nog steeds epidemieën. Het H1N1 virus keerde 
in 1977 terug om vervolgens tot 2009 naast het H3N2 virus in de mens te circul-
eren. De meest recente introductie van een nieuw influenza A virus in de mens 
vond plaats in het voorjaar van 2009. Een nieuw H1N1 virus was het resultaat van 
een reassortering tussen humane, aviaire en varkens influenza A virussen en werd 
overgedragen van varken op mens. Dit nieuwe griepvirus werd wereldwijd bekend 
als de Mexicaanse griep. Het pandemische H1N1 virus verving het ‘oude’ H1N1 vi-
rus en circuleert tot op heden samen met H3N2 in de mens. 
Alle pandemische virussen van de laatste eeuw waren in staat efficiënt tussen 
mensen te worden overgedragen via aerosolen of luchtwegdruppels. De inciden-
tele introducties van aviaire influenza A virussen van het H5 en H7 subtype vanuit 
kippen in de mens zorgt voor een dreiging van een nieuwe pandemie. Gelukkig zijn 
deze virussen vooralsnog niet efficiënt overdraagbaar gebleken tussen mensen. 
Een influenza A virus vermenigvuldiging begint als het virale oppervlakte-eiwit HA 
zich bindt aan de receptor op een cel, waarna het virus de cel kan binnendringen. 
Humane influenza A virussen binden een andere receptor dan aviaire influenza A vi-
russen. Voordat een influenza A virus een celreceptor kan binden, moet het opper-
vlakte-eiwit HA geknipt worden zodat er twee componenten van HA (HA1 en HA2) 
ontstaan. Een influenza A virus waarvan HA niet is geknipt, is niet in staat een cel te 
infecteren. De knip wordt uitgevoerd door de in de gastheer aanwezige proteases; 
eiwitten die specifieke ketens van aminozuren knippen. Humane en laagpathogene 
aviaire influenza A virussen hebben een zogenoemde enkelvoudige basische knip-
plek in HA. Deze wordt herkend door trypsine-achtige proteases, die zowel aan-
wezig zijn in de luchtwegen van zoogdieren en vogels als in de darmen van vogels. 
Door de aanwezigheid van de juiste proteases kan het virus zich op deze locaties 
vermenigvuldigen. Het hoogpathogene karakter van aviaire influenza A virussen van 
het H5 en H7 subtype wordt veroorzaakt door extra aminozuren die aanwezig zijn 
in de knipplek van HA. Deze virussen hebben een meervoudige basische knipplek 
(MBCS) die wordt herkend door in het lichaam veelvoorkomende proteases (furine-
achtige proteases). Hierdoor zijn hoogpathogene influenza A virussen in staat om in 
organen buiten de luchtwegen en darmen te vermenigvuldigen. 
het ontstaan van een subtype specifiek hPAi virus
In de natuur komt een MBCS alleen voor bij influenza A virussen van het H5 en H7 
subtype. De genetische verandering vindt hoogstwaarschijnlijk uitsluitend plaats in 
pluimvee. Naast influenza A virus subtypen H5 en H7 circuleren ook andere sub-
typen (bijvoorbeeld H6 en H9) in kippen maar deze ontwikkelen zich nooit tot een 
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hoogpathogeen virus doordat deze subtypen geen MBCS verkrijgen. In hoofdstuk 
2.1 wordt een onderzoek beschreven waarmee is aangetoond dat een virus van het 
H6 subtype na de kunstmatige introductie van een MBCS (H6N1MBCS), de mogeli-
jkheid heeft zich als een HPAI virus te gedragen. Het onderzochte H6N1MBCS vi-
rus was trypsine-onafhankelijk in cellen net zoals een HPAI H5N1 virus. Door het 
bepalen van een intraveneuze pathogeniteit index (IVPI) werd gekeken hoe virulent 
het virus is in kippen. Deze IVPI varieert van 0 (laagpathogeen) tot 3 (hoogpatho-
geen), waarbij een IVPI hoger dan 1.2 wordt geassocieerd met een hoogpathogeen 
influenza A virus. Het H6N1MBCS virus bleek een IVPI van 1.41 te hebben waarmee 
is aangetoond dat H6N1MBCS een hoogpathogeen virus is. Ook bleek het H6N-
1MBCS virus de mogelijkheid te hebben verkregen om buiten de luchtwegen en 
darmen van kippen te vermenigvuldigen. Met deze studie toonden we aan dat de 
afwezigheid van een MBCS in H6 influenza A virussen niet komt door een incom-
patibiliteit van het HA-eiwit. Waarom andere influenza A virus subtypen dan H5 en 
H7 zich in de natuur niet ontwikkelen tot een hoogpathogeen fenotype is daarmee 
echter nog niet opgehelderd.
hPAi in zoogdieren
Sporadisch worden mensen geïnfecteerd met HPAI H5 virussen. Dit kan leiden tot 
een ernstig ziektebeeld, soms met sterfte tot gevolg. Ook andere zoogdieren zijn 
vatbaar voor HPAI H5 virusinfectie, zoals fretten, tijgers, honden en katten. Fret-
ten worden veel gebruikt in influenza A virusonderzoek (zo ook in dit onderzoek) 
om meerdere redenen: (1) fretten vertonen ongeveer hetzelfde ziektebeeld als 
mensen, (2) in de luchtwegen zijn dezelfde virusreceptoren aanwezig en (3) fretten 
hebben de mogelijkheid humane influenza A virussen over te dragen naar andere 
fretten via de aërogene route (via de lucht), terwijl aviaire influenza A virussen niet 
worden overgedragen via de aërogene route. 
De HAs van humane influenza A virussen bevatten geen MBCS. In hoofdstuk 2.2 
wordt beschreven dat het humane H3N2 virus na de kunstmatige introductie van 
een MBCS (H3N2MBCS) geen verhoogde virulentie vertoonde in fretten. Dit H3N-
2MBCS virus gedroeg zich net als een HPAI H5N1 virus voor wat betreft trypsine-on-
afhankelijkheid in celkweek. In fretten was vermenigvuldiging van het H3N2MBCS 
virus beperkt tot de luchtwegen net zoals het H3N2 virus zonder een MBCS. Uit 
deze studie bleek dat naast de MBCS ook andere factoren een belangrijke rol spe-
len bij de vermenigvuldiging van influenza A virussen buiten de luchtwegen. De 
voorkeur van het influenza A virus HA-eiwit voor de receptor op de cel speelt hier 
hoogstwaarschijnlijk een grote rol bij. 
Een HPAI H5N1 virusinfectie in fretten wordt gekenmerkt door systemische ver-
menigvuldiging waarbij het virus meerdere organen buiten de luchtwegen infect-
eert, zoals de hersenen en de lever. Hoe het virus in zoogdieren zich exact een weg 
naar de hersenen baant en wat de rol van de MBCS is in de systemische vermenig-
vuldiging van het virus, was nog onbekend. In hoofdstuk 2.3 laten we zien dat de 
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verwijdering van een MBCS uit een HPAI H5N1 virus (H5N1ΔMBCS) een bepalende 
factor was voor de virusverspreiding buiten de luchtwegen in fretten. Na intrana-
sale toediening van het H5N1ΔMBCS virus werd de virusverspreiding beperkt tot de 
luchtwegen. Dit in tegenstelling tot infectie met het wildtype HPAI H5N1 virus, dat 
resulteerde in systemische vermenigvuldiging van het virus. Het HPAI H5N1 virus 
verspreidde zich vanuit de olfactorische receptorneuronen in de neus van een fret 
naar de bulbus olfactorius om zich vervolgens verder te verspreiden naar de grote 
en kleine hersenen. Ook kon het HPAI H5N1 virus geïsoleerd worden uit hersen-
vocht. Hiermee werd aangetoond dat het olfactorische traject verantwoordelijk is 
voor een van de belangrijkste routes voor de ontwikkeling van encefalitis, ofwel 
een infectie van de hersenen. Ook bij een HPAI H5N1 virusinfectie van de mens 
wordt het virus soms teruggevonden in hersenvocht, wat duidt op een infectie van 
de hersenen. Of de virusverspreiding in de mens ook verloopt via de olfactorische 
route zal met behulp van verder onderzoek bepaald moeten worden.
reassortering van influenza A virussen
Ten minste drie van de vier grieppandemieën van de laatste eeuw zijn ontstaan als 
het gevolg van reassortering van humane met dierlijke influenza A virussen. In 2009 
manifesteerde een nieuw H1N1 virus (pH1N1) zich dat de eerste influenzapandemie 
van de 21ste eeuw veroorzaakte. Aangezien het pH1N1 virus niet beschikte over 
bekende virulentiefactoren, werd gevreesd dat dit virus zich verder zou aanpassen 
aan de mens via mutaties of reassortering. In het begin van de pandemie circuleerde 
het pH1N1 virus samen met de seizoensgriepvirussen H3N2 en H1N1 (sH1N1). In 
hoofdstuk 3.1 wordt de mogelijkheid van reassortering tussen pH1N1 en H3N2 of 
sH1N1 virussen beschreven. Een mix van verschillende pH1N1 reassortanten werd 
in cellen gecreëerd, waarna virussen met een verhoogde vermenigvuldigings ca-
paciteit werden geselecteerd. Met behulp van “reverse genetics” werden deze ges-
electeerde reassortanten nagemaakt en de virulentie van deze virussen vergeleken 
met het pH1N1 virus in het frettenmodel. Reassortanten van pH1N1 met PB2 en 
PA of alleen PB2 van sH1N1 bleken zich minder goed te vermenigvuldigen in het 
frettenmodel dan het wildtype pH1N1 virus. Echter pH1 virus reassortanten met 
NA en PB1 of alleen NA van H3N2, vertoonden een verhoogde vermenigvuldigings 
capaciteit, wat geassocieerd was met ernstigere longlaesies dan die van fretten 
geïnfecteerd met wildtype pH1N1. Met deze studie toonden we aan dat het pH1N1 
virus de mogelijkheid heeft om te reassorteren met de circulerende H3N2 en sH1N1 
virussen. Reassortanten van het pH1N1 virus bleken virulenter te zijn dan pH1N1 
en bleven aërogeen overdraagbaar. Omdat andere genetische samenstellingen ook 
zouden kunnen ontstaan in mens of dier werd aanbevolen om met behulp van sur-
veillance programma’s reassortering van het pH1N1 virus nauwlettend in de gaten 
te houden tijdens de pandemie.
Door de incidentele infecties met hoogpathogene H5N1 virussen in de mens wordt 
gevreesd dat dit virus reassorteert met in de mens circulerende influenza A virus-
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sen. Dit kan leiden tot influenza A virussen met een aërogene overdraagbaarheid. 
De mogelijkheid voor het H5N1 virus om te reassorteren met humane influenza A 
virussen wordt beschreven in hoofdstuk 3.2. Met behulp van dezelfde selectiemeth-
ode beschreven in hoofdstuk 3.1, werden reassortanten tussen hoogpathogene 
H5N1 en pH1N1, H3N2 of sH1N1 virussen verkregen. Deze geselecteerde H5 virus 
reassortanten bevatten voornamelijk de NA en M gensegmenten van de humane 
influenza A virussen. Geselecteerde reassortanten werden met behulp van “reverse 
genetics” nagemaakt. De vermenigvuldigings capaciteit van de reassortanten was 
niet hoger in zoogdier- en humane bronchiale epitheelcellen dan bij die van het 
wildtype H5N1 virus. In dit hoofdstuk toonden we aan dat H5N1 virussen de mogeli-
jkheid hebben te reassorteren met humane influenza A virussen en dat de NA en 
M gensegmenten van de humane influenza A virussen de hoogste genetische com-
patibiliteit vertonen met het H5N1 virus. Een mix van reassortanten tussen hoog-
pathogeen H5N1 en pH1N1 werd geëvalueerd voor de mogelijke aanwezigheid 
van aërogeen overdraagbare influenza A virussen. In geïnfecteerde fretten werden 
voornamelijk H5 virussen gedetecteerd die de NA en/of M gensegmenten bevatten 
van pH1N1, maar deze influenza A virussen bleken niet aërogeen overdraagbaar 
te zijn tussen fretten. Het gebrek van aërogene overdraagbaarheid van deze H5 
virus reassortanten heeft mogelijk te maken met een geringe uitscheiding vanuit de 
bovenste luchtwegen en de voorkeur van deze influenza A virussen voor een aviaire 
receptor.
Aërogene overdraagbaarheid van aviare influenza A virussen
De incidentele infecties met aviaire influenza A virussen in mensen dragen bij aan 
de dreiging van een nieuwe pandemie. Gelukkig zijn deze aviaire influenza A virus-
sen tot op heden niet aërogeen overdraagbaar gebleken tussen mensen. Het is be-
langrijk om virale-, gastheer- en omgevingsfactoren te bestuderen om erachter te 
komen wat de aërogene overdraagbaarheid bepaalt van influenza A virussen in de 
mens. In hoofdstuk 4.1 wordt informatie over de eerdere pandemieën, zoönozen 
en epidemieën gebruikt om de minimale vereisten voor een influenza A virus om 
overdraagbaar te worden tussen mensen in kaart te brengen. We postuleren dat 
(1) sterke binding aan cellen van de bovenste luchtwegen, (2) verhoogde virusrep-
licatie in de bovenste luchtwegen en (3) efficiënte productie van enkelvoudige par-
tikels die in aërosolen kunnen worden opgenomen, bijdragen aan efficiënte over-
draagbaarheid van influenza A virussen tussen mensen. In hoofdstuk 4.2 werd deze 
hypothese getest door te onderzoeken of een aviair H5N1 virus de mogelijkheid 
heeft aërogeen overdraagbaar te worden tussen zoogdieren. Een HPAI H5N1 virus 
werd door middel van drie aminozuur veranderingen aangepast aan het zoogdier 
als gastheer. Eén van deze veranderingen was een glutaminezuur naar lysine op 
positie 627 van PB2. Dit is een mutatie die belangrijk is voor de adaptatie van influ-
enza A virussen van vogels aan zoogdieren. Ook werd de voorkeur van het influenza 
A virus om te binden aan aviaire receptoren op cellen veranderd in een voorkeur 
voor humane receptoren door twee mutaties aan te brengen in HA. Deze drie muta-
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ties zorgden er echter niet voor dat het influenza A virus aërogeen overdraagbaar 
werd tussen fretten. Het genetisch gemodificeerde H5N1 virus werd daarom ver-
volgens door middel van het herhaald infecteren van fretten aangepast aan repli-
catie in de bovenste luchtwegen van de fret. Het genetisch gemodificeerde H5N1 
virus verkreeg extra mutaties tijdens het passeren in fretten. Daarna werd getest 
of in de verkregen “mix” van geadapteerde virussen aërogeen overdraagbare vari-
anten aanwezig waren. In speciaal ontwikkelde transmissiekooien bleek inderdaad 
dat het H5N1 virus in staat was aërogeen overdraagbaar te worden. Alle aërogeen 
overdraagbare H5N1 virussen hadden vijf mutaties die overeen kwamen; de drie 
door ons geïntroduceerde mutaties en twee extra mutaties in HA. Eén van de extra 
mutaties is verantwoordelijk voor het verliezen van een potentiële glycosyleringsp-
laats met sterkere receptorbinding tot gevolg. De andere mutatie zou mogelijk van 
belang kunnen zijn voor de stabiliteit van HA. Aanvullende experimenten moeten 
uitwijzen of alleen deze gevonden mutaties daadwerkelijk zorgen voor aërogene 
overdraagbaarheid. Ook is het belangrijk te onderzoeken hoe virulent dit virus zal 
zijn in zoogdieren en kippen. In deze studie bleek dat fretten die het aërogene H5N1 
virus verkregen via de aërogene route niet bezweken aan de ziekte. Deze bevindin-
gen maken duidelijk dat aviaire H5N1 virussen de potentie hebben te evolueren tot 
aërogeen overdraagbare virussen in zoogdieren en dus een pandemische dreiging 
vormen.
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Het is zover, mijn proefschrift is af! Dit kan natuurlijk niet zonder een dankwoord. 
Mooi dat je hier gelijk naar toe bent gebladerd. Het is dan ook het meest gelezen 
hoofdstuk van een proefschrift. Hier draait het om. Word ik bedankt? Wat schrijft 
ze over mij? Om te beginnen wil ik zeggen, mocht ik je zijn vergeten, het is niks per-
soonlijks. Je bent gewoon heel even niet in mijn hoofd opgekomen bij het schrijven 
van dit dankwoord. Maar het is zo dat ik op andere momenten wel aan je denk! Bij 
deze voor diegene die ik ben vergeten: BEDANKT! 
Ron, toen de FIV groep ophield te bestaan was je direct enthousiast om mij als anal-
ist in je groep op te nemen. Met plezier heb ik twee AIO´s bijgestaan waarna het 
bij mij ook begon te kriebelen. Gelukkig zag jij dit plan ook wel zitten! Jouw onger-
emde enthousiasme voor de wetenschap zorgt voor een enorme boost bij mij. Dit 
heeft zeker tot een aantal mooie ‘beuk’ projecten geleid! Super bedankt voor het 
in mij gestelde vertrouwen! Ab, al een tijdje loop ik bij je op de afdeling rond. De 
werksfeer die je hebt gecreëerd is een stimulans die tot publiceren leidt! Toen bij 
mij het idee begon dat ik graag een PhD wilde gaan doen, stelde je gelijk voor de 
nieuwe opleiding I&I te gaan doen. Met ontzettend veel plezier heb ik die opleiding 
afgerond. Bedankt voor de kansen op de afdeling!
Sander, waar zal ik eens beginnen!? Wat werken we al lang samen en het gaat nog 
steeds niet vervelen!!! We vormen nog steeds een mooi team. Na onze hMPV werk-
tijd gingen we beiden los op het Influenza werkgebied. Onze paden kruisten al erg 
snel en we werden een geoliede machine ‘beneden’. Het heeft gezorgd voor mooie 
hoofdstukken in dit proefschrift wat zonder jou niet mogelijk zou zijn geweest. Ik 
kan me ook geen betere paranimf bedenken, al ben ik wel bang voor het avond-
programma! Sander, fijn dat je altijd voor me klaarstaat! Joost, de andere paranimf, 
Brabants maatje en buurman. Nooit is het saai met jou als buurman en misschien 
is dit ook wel te wijten aan ons ADHD gedrag. Eigenlijk is het jammer dat we ge-
durende onze flu periode nooit een project samen hebben gedraaid. Het is altijd su-
per om met jou over werk te brainstormen en wat hebben we veel lol gehad tijdens 
de tripjes en borrels! Je bent een goede vriend geworden! Bedankt!
Theo, ik noem je een beetje mijn derde paranimf. Want ondanks dat je geen pakje 
aandoet op 4 oktober wil ik je mega graag bedanken! Voor goede ideeën sta je altijd 
open. Je bent nooit te beroerd om lekkere door te buffelen en ik werk ontzettend 
graag met je samen! 
Dennis, wat zijn we blij met jou als aanvulling op ons team beneden. Je staat altijd 
klaar en vindt het heerlijk mooie sectiedagen te draaien met ons. Dansjes tussen de 
lange secties en schunnige praat hebben ons door de lange dagen heen geholpen! 
Miranda, bedankt voor je gezelligheid, raad en daad, je bent een top collega! De 
hMPV tijd heeft me goed klaargestoomd voor een PhD. Jij kunt me als een van de 
weinige op een goede manier afremmen (was bijna nooit nodig). Ook bedankt voor 
de logeerpartijtjes na de mooie feestjes! Snel gezellig wijnen! Debby, super leuk om 
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een project samen met jou te draaien wat heeft geleid tot een mooi hoofdstuk! Ik 
hoop dat we dit snel nog een keer gaan doen! Kaapstad wordt vast wel weer gezel-
lig net als Montreal! Vincent & Emmie, bedankt voor de superstart op het influenza 
gebied! Dat ik zo voortvarend van start kon gaan is mede te danken aan jullie voor-
bereidend werk. Wie weet tot 4 oktober! Martin, rooie (de een mag het zeggen te-
gen de ander!), je bent altijd bereid te helpen! Super bedankt daarvoor! Ook zeker 
erg gezellig om biertjes mee te drinken! Salin, unfortunately Indesign did recognize 
my Thai writing since I made a Thai thank you. Nevertheless, I really enjoyed work-
ing with you! Hope to see you again. Mathilde, à l'origine nous avions prévu de 
pouvoir mettre notre histoire sur le clivage dans ce livre... Dommage, cela n'a pas 
marché. Mais nous avons prouvé avec notre Nature que nous travaillons très bien 
ensemble! J'apprécie vraiment de travailler avec toi, tu es également une grande 
bosseuse et je pense que nous sommes une bonne équipe! Erin, It´s really time for 
you to fly via Amsterdam! Thanks for the help and fun during the period you where 
here! Hopefully until the 4th of October. Rogier, wat hebben we lol gehad. Maar 
ook voor wijze raad was je altijd te vinden! We missen je wel op de kamer! Geert, 
ik ben blij dat je me de fijne kneepjes van het vak hebt geleerd zodat ik zelf aan de 
slag kon! 
Bedankt aan alle collega´s uit de grote en fantastische flu groep. Ben, gemütliche 
neue mitarbeiter. Monique, bedankt voor alle tips en trucs die je me hebt geleerd. 
Josanne, het was erg gezellig om samen met jou de opleiding te doen. Stefan vd 
V, commando…altijd gezellig op het lab! Bjorn, nu al een beetje dorst voor jouw 
promotie. Ramona, vielen dank für alle plaque weisheit! Pascal, mooie teamver-
sterking! Oanh, we weten altijd wanneer we salaris hebben. Bernike, hopen voor 
jou dat we je snel meer gaan zien! Kim, ella ella (ik ken er nog een leuk liedje van!). 
Саша,мы ещё напишем прекрасную структурную статъю! Kleine Sander, buur-
man op het VMT, leuke gesprekken! Mensen van de hMPV, bedankt voor de gezel-
ligheid en input bij de meetings en avondjes; Bernadette, Jonneke, Pascal B, Stefan 
en Bri. Ook de ‘andere’ flu-groep mag hier niet ontbreken. Dit vooral omdat ik met 
veel van jullie een kamer deel, bedankt voor het uithouden met mij als er weer 
gestuiterd en gezongen wordt; Nella, Tiny, Gerrie, Carolien (is tie mooi??), Lidewij 
(bedankt voor het helpen met mijn BrEnglish). En natuurlijk ook Guus, Stella, Ma-
rine, Heidi, Ruud en Jan. Bedankt voor de wijze raad en gezelligheid.
Ook heeft een aantal mensen van de pathologie een mooie bijdrage geleverd aan 
dit proefschrift. Dus paraffine Peter, bedankt voor jou ´geen probleem´ mentaliteit. 
Lonneke, bedankt voor het leren kleuren en de gezelligheid! Judith, altijd tijd om 
even mee te kijken! Thijs, bedankt voor je wijze raad en daad als het nodig was! 
Medewerkers van het EDC, enorm bedankt voor de samenwerking! Dennis A, Vin-
cent, Edwin, Dominique, niet te vergeten Ed en Martje. Uiteraard natuurlijk ook 
Mieke en Edo, anders hadden al deze mooie experimenten niet op het ABSL3+ lab 
plaats kunnen vinden.
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Een aantal (ex) collega’s wil ik graag nog bedanken voor alle gezelligheid op het 
werk. Patrick, als je de spirit hebt dan loopt het altijd mooi af! Erhard, jij de vol-
gende?? Rory, ik hoop voor iedereen dat we niet gaan zingen! Wel gezellig! All I 
want for Christmas….. Joyce, leuke gesprekken! Moniqe v V, mooi voorbeeld! Tien, 
geen karaoke meer… zelfbescherming! Willem, tja…over voorbeelden gesproken…. 
Wat een leuke tijd bij de FIV en moet je kijken waar het allemaal tot heeft geleid! 
Verder wil ik natuurlijk ook bedanken; de Exotic (geven mooie borrels!), Herpes, 
HIV, Mazelen, RSV en Hepatits werkgroepen, Viroclinics Biosciences en de Cam-
bridge groep. 
Vrouwen van het secretariaat! Wat zijn jullie daar goed bezig en wat hebben jul-
lie heerlijke koffie. Simone, Loubna, Carola, Anouk en natuurlijk ons eigen Maria, 
bedankt! Ook de andere collega’s van het management team; Wim, Sumeyra, Avi-
nash, Ajla, Fernanda, Hans (daar is het allemaal begonnen) en Robin. Maar ook 
Robert, bedankt voor je hulp van het glaswerk tot aan het schrobben beneden!
Ik wil graag iedereen van de afdeling bedanken voor alle gezelligheid tijdens borrels, 
lab-uitjes, frituurvrijdagen, bbq’s, congressen, sinterkerst feesten (met speciale 
dank aan de oude commissie leden; wat een mooie tijd!), Curaçao, Griekenland en 
Dakar.
Zonder vertier geen letter op papier. Dus ook wil ik graag mijn vrienden bedanken. 
Ik hoop op 4 oktober uit te kunnen leggen wat ik nou allemaal heb uitgespookt!
Lieve vriendinnen van het HLO, wat een heerlijke uitjes plannen we toch! Lekker 
eten en weekendjes weg. Alleen doen we het te weinig! Chantal, Daan, Nicole, Daf 
en Mo, zo leuk dat we vanaf de HLO al vriendinnen zijn! 
Angela, bedankt voor je jarenlange vriendschap en de avondjes, dans party´s en alle 
mooie gesprekken! Ik vind het altijd erg leuk om met je over werk te praten, je bent 
altijd geïnteresseerd!  Anne, top wijf! Natuurlijk erg bedankt voor het controleren 
van de Nederlandse samenvatting! Maar ook voor je vriendschap. Wat kwam Gu-
usje op een mooi moment zo na de drukte!
Bram & Dianne, de weekendjes weg zijn altijd top (wanneer NY??) en wat een gezel-
ligheid is er bij jullie te vinden. Bedankt daarvoor (Bram; nee, je mag geen vragen 
stellen). 
Verder wil ik al mijn vrienden bedanken voor de carnavalsweken (CV de Maja’s), het 
sporten en de lange mooie avonden op onze toplocatie Breda Beach. Tussen het 
promoveren door was het altijd heerlijk vertoeven daar!
Dan mijn lieve familie. Monique S, bedankt voor je enorme interesse en gezellig-
heid als we in Lelystad zijn. De avondjes met jou en Han waren motiverend om dit 
traject in te stappen. Sjoerd, Monique, Renske en Lotte, bedankt voor alle gezel-
ligheid! Sjoerd, probeer het nou maar wel te lezen! Ons pap en ons mam. Bedankt 
dat jullie altijd voor me klaar staan en de steun die ik krijg om me verder te blijven 
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ontwikkelen. Het doorzettingsvermogen is me met de paplepel ingegoten en heeft 
me gebracht tot waar ik nu sta! Bedankt voor alles!
Lieve Maurits, het is lastig om mijn dank voor jou op papier te zetten. Altijd mag 
ik tegen je aan praten over alles wat me bezig houdt op de werkvloer. Zonder jou 
was me dit niet gelukt, je staat altijd voor me klaar. Je vraagt me altijd of ik lekker 
gepipetteerd hebt en als ik over ‘titers’ spreek begin je te giechelen laat staan bij het 
woord ‘sectie’. Altijd was je enthousiast toen ik weer met een opleiding aankwam. 
De onvoorwaardelijke support zorgt voor een heerlijk gevoel! En dan hebben we 
nog onze kleine rooie Birgit, wat ben je een lekker ding en ik geniet elke dag van jou!
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